Perceptual Non-evidential Knowledge

An Epistemology of Perception From an Austinian Perspective

by

José Alfonso Anaya Ruiz Esparza

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy

University of Warwick, Department of Philosophy

September 2017

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements

There are a lot of people I should acknowledge for helping me bring to completion the project of writing a PhD thesis. First, I should acknowledge the immensely valuable help from my supervisors in Warwick, Guy Longworth and Matthew Soteriou, as well as all the staff in the philosophy department in that University for continuous help and for providing an environment in which the philosophical interest of young academics can flourish.

I would like to thank to my friends and colleagues who have had a lasting impact both in my academic and personal life. I would like to thank Sam Clarke, Dino Jakušić, Irina Schumski, Tania Ganitsky, Wesley Chai, Thom Ryan, Joe Cunningham, Matthew Godwin, Will Stafford, Lorenzo Serini, Michele Giavazzi, Hanna Schumacher, Maria Roca, Erik Urbieta, and Santiago Oyarzabal. But above all I want to thank Sofía Mercader, for being the best companion a person can be.

Finally I should thank my family. My parents, Alfonso and María. My sisters, Lucía and Sara. And my nephews Leonardo and Dario, as well as my niece Renata.

Declaration

This thesis is submitted to the University of Warwick in support of my application for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. It has been composed by myself and has not been submitted in any previous application for any degree.

José Alfonso Anaya Ruiz Esparza

September 2017

Abstract

The topic of this thesis is perceptual propositional knowledge. More specifically, the guiding question of this thesis will be, how do perceptual experiences figure in making knowledge of our environment available to perceivers? In general terms, the proposal that will be defended throughout this work is that perception figures as a source of reasons which can ground empirical knowledge. More specifically, we will defend the view that our perceptual awareness of the concrete entities which populate the world – entities such as blueberries, cats, the blueberry's colour, the cat eating the blueberry, rainbows, shadows, etc. – affords us with reasons which have the potential to ground knowledge about those entities. The position I will be defending here has not received much attention in recent philosophical discussion. One of the things this thesis is set to achieve is to show that the relatively little attention this view has received is not justified. We will see that once the view has been fleshed out there are several discussions in the contemporary debate on perceptual knowledge which would benefit from engaging with the conception defended here – for the view can serve as the basis to advance original solutions to traditional problems.

Introduction

The topic of this thesis is perceptual propositional knowledge. More specifically, the guiding question of this thesis will be, how do perceptual experiences figure in making knowledge of our environment available to perceivers? In general terms, the proposal that will be defended throughout this work is that perception figures as a source of reasons which can ground empirical knowledge. More specifically, we will defend the view that our perceptual awareness of the concrete entities which populate the world – entities such as blueberries, cats, the blueberry's colour, the cat eating the blueberry, rainbows, shadows, etc. – affords us with reasons which have the potential to ground knowledge about those entities.

This position stands in contrast with at least two types of established epistemological alternatives. On the first hand, my preferred position stands in contrast with externalist epistemologies. One of the fundamental claims at the core of the externalist tradition in epistemology is that propositional knowledge (and other epistemic achievements) does not necessarily rest on the reasons the knower might possess in favour of the proposition known. For the externalist, a subject who lacks reasons in favour of her judgements, might nevertheless possess knowledge by virtue of the obtaining of facts which lie beyond the subject's ken. The position we will defend here stands in contrast to externalism by maintaining that certain central instances of perceptual knowledge are grounded on reasons possessed by the subject. I will explore this contrast in chapter 5 and will advance arguments that favour my proposal.

On the other hand, my preferred view stands in contrast with the type of epistemology of perception championed by John McDowell – who claims his view has Kantian, Hegelian, and Sellarsian ancestry (McDowell, 2009). McDowell defends an epistemology of perception where perceptual knowledge is based on reasons possessed by the subject. Moreover, he maintains, like us, that the epistemological significance of perception consists in its making the subject aware of the reasons there might be to make world-directed judgements. The main

point of difference between our view and McDowell's is that for him perception of *concreta* cannot possibly suffice to provide perceivers with the type of warrant required for acquiring knowledge. For McDowell, an appropriate epistemology of perception has to conceive of perceptual experience as involving the (passive) actualization of our conceptual capacities in experience. But the type of view I wish to defend here need not conceive of perceptual experience in this manner. On the conception I defend, perception of concreta affords us with reasons for making world-directed judgements because concreta constitute valid reasons for judging. I will explore this contrast in chapter 6 and will advance arguments that favour my proposal.

The position I will be defending here has not received much attention in recent philosophical discussion. One of the things this thesis is set to achieve is to show that the relatively little attention this view has received is not justified. We will see that once the view has been fleshed out there are several discussions in the contemporary debate on perceptual knowledge which would benefit from engaging with the conception defended here – for the view can serve as the basis to advance original solutions to traditional problems. The main source of inspiration for advancing this view is to be found in J.L. Austin's remarks on perceptual knowledge, mainly located in *Sense and Sensibilia* (1962) and "Other Minds" (1946). A discussion of the epistemology of perception that I find in these texts (in chapter 1) will be the springboard for the rest of the thesis. The main contemporary influence for the position I defend is Mark Kalderon's "Before the Law" (2011). I use the epistemological picture he advances there to flesh out one aspect of the epistemology of perception I find in Austin. A good part of this thesis is devoted to defending some of the commitments that arise from endorsement of Austin's and Kalderon's positions. Another influence which should be acknowledge here is that of Charles Travis, whose work (2004, 2005, 2007) has contributed greatly to the development of the position I wish to defend here.

In terms of the structure of this work, there are two big divisions in this thesis. The first part, comprising chapters 1 and 2, presents the epistemology of perception I find in Austin. Then, the position is applied to a contemporary debate on defeaters for perceptual warrant. The second part, comprising chapters 3-7, elaborates Austin's contention that in central cases perceptual experience provides the perceiver with *non-evidential* warrant for

making world-directed judgements. We appeal to Kalderon's work (2011) to flesh out this claim and advance arguments in favour of the resulting conception.

We start in chapter 1 by looking more closely at the dialectical context in which Austin advances the remarks which form the basis of the epistemology of perception we find in his work. We find that much of Austin's claims on the matter are advanced as a response to the problems he finds in A.J. Ayer's account of perception and perceptual knowledge in Ayer's *The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge* (1940). We present Ayer's position and Austin's criticism of it. Then, we argue that it is possible to find an original conception of perceptual knowledge in the remarks Austin makes in responding to Ayer. We suggest that Austin's epistemology of perception revolves around the idea that, in central cases, we enjoy perceptual knowledge because we are in the "best possible position" to make a perceptual judgement (Austin, 1962: 105-116). On my interpretation of the notion, being in this optimal position involves, on the one hand, that the subject enjoys successful perceptual experiences, and, on the other hand, that the subject has done enough to be able to exploit the epistemic warrant afforded to her by perception.

In chapter 2 we explain how Austin's position can allow us to solve a problem which arises for John McDowell's epistemology of perception. We start by advancing a detailed exposition of McDowell's position. We focus then on his treatment of some examples advanced by Tyler Burge (2011) to challenge McDowell's position. The examples present situations in which subjects who seem to enjoy successful perceptual experiences are presented with reasons (or apparent reasons, depending on the case) to suspect that their perceptual capacities are not to be trusted in the operative circumstances. The examples are devised to put pressure on McDowell's conception of the warrant afforded by perception as "conclusive," i.e. as excluding the possibility that the warranted proposition be false. We suggest that McDowell's treatment of the cases is unsatisfactory and advance an alternative inspired in the Austinian epistemology presented in chapter 1. We argue that the Austinian approach deals better with the examples that pose problems for McDowell.

Chapter 3 is a hinge chapter. There, we begin our in-depth exploration of one aspect of Austin's notion of being in the optimal position for making a perceptual judgement. We focus on the claim that in central cases perception provides subjects with non-evidential warrant for making perceptual judgements. We appeal to the position advanced recently by

Kalderon (2011), labelled here "Radical Anti-psychologism", to flesh out this aspect of Austin's epistemology of perception. Here, the focus is to explain how the position advanced by Kalderon can be used to do justice to the position we find in Austin.

In chapter 4 we present systematically the Radical Anti-psychologist position and identify four core claims advanced by it. These are: a) among the things that we perceive we find "concreta" (entities such as blueberries, their colour, a cat eating a blueberry, shadows and rainbows), b) these concreta can be reasons for judging, c) perceptual experience is epistemologically significant partly because, at least in some cases, it makes us aware of concreta, which on this position are reasons for judging, and d) concreta are truthmakers for propositions judged in response to experience. The remainder of the thesis is devoted to a defence of the resulting radical Anti-psychologist position, claim by claim. In the second part of this chapter I begin this task by exploring the claim (a), that concreta can be objects of perceptual awareness. The main aim of the second part of this chapter is to advance a working definition of the notion of concretum.

Chapter 5 is devoted to a defence of the claim that perceptual knowledge is based on reasons possessed by the subject. Here, the contrast of our position with the externalist tradition in epistemology is brought to the foreground. The strategy deployed in that chapter consists in, first, advancing simple arguments to favour a reasons-based account of the perceptual knowledge enjoyed by adult humans. Then, we explore two standard arguments advanced from the externalist tradition which attempt to show that a reasons-based account of this type for perceptual knowledge would be untenable. Then, we respond to the criticisms, explaining explicitly how a Radical Anti-psychologist position has the resources to circumvent the problems allegedly raised by those arguments.

The claims defended in chapters 4 and 5 are not claims distinctive to the Radical Anti-psychologist position. It is explained in those chapters that other philosophical positions might endorse them. In chapter 6, nevertheless, we defend the most distinctive claim of the Radical Anti-psychologist position, namely that concreta can be reasons for judging. In the first part of the chapter, I situate the position within the contemporary debate on reasons, assuming an anti-psychologistic account of reasons. Then, I advance arguments for thinking that concreta have normative force and can play a motivational role, two key features that reasons are thought to exhibit in contemporary philosophical discussions of reasons. A core

idea in this defence is the claim that concreta can serve as reasons because they serve as truthmakers for the relevant propositions. The claim is controversial and I turn to a defence of it the final chapter. In the second part of the chapter, we defend the claim from the charge that it might fall prey to the Myth of the Given. We focus on McDowell's version of this type of criticism and look carefully at various versions of this attack. Finally, we advance a proposal regarding the role that the agent might have in achieving perceptual recognition. We argue that this is one of the aspects in which our appeal to Austin might provide us with an original approach to a contemporary discussion.

Chapter 7 explores the claim that concreta are truthmakers for many of the propositions knowable via perception. A core part of the idea defended in chapter 6 depended on the claim that concreta can serve as reasons because they are truthmakers for the relevant propositions. We explain the commitments of a truthmaker view and explore the versions of the view which might serve better the theoretical needs of the Radical Anti-psychologistic position. Here, I adopt a less direct approach than the one used in previous chapters. I concentrate my efforts in defending the truthmaker view - i.e. the theory that propositions are made true by virtue of the existence of some entities – from the recent attacks advanced by Julian Dodd. The result is that we merely advance a defensive move on behalf of the truthmaker view. We point out that that this is one of the task that should be completed elsewhere if we are to defend in a more exhaustive manner the Radical Anti-psychologism advocated in this thesis.

In doing all this I hope to have shown that the Radical Anti-psychologistic position derived from Austin, Kalderon, and Travis is a live option, and worthy of serious consideration. Throughout the thesis I will flag up the several aspects of this defence which should be further developed, as well as the avenues of research which our position might open but which cannot be further pursued here. I will summarise these potential lines for future research in the conclusions of this work.

Chapter 1 - Austin on Perceptual Knowledge and Perceptual Experience

In *Sense and Sensibilia* J.L. Austin attacks one incarnation of the sense-datum theory of perception. There Austin takes aim at the version of the view advanced by A. J. Ayer in *The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge*.[1] Austin's attack is comprehensive – it targets both the substantial tenets of Ayer's doctrine as well as more peripheral issues, such as Ayer's motivations and background assumptions. In one of these seemingly peripheral attacks Austin accuses Ayer of placing too strong an emphasis on the epistemological significance of perceptual experience. This criticism is only seemingly peripheral for it reveals (in Austin's view) the root of many of the problems faced by Ayer's philosophical account of perception. Austin thinks that Ayer is not interested in the nature of perceptual experience at all – instead, Austin tells us, he is interested in developing an epistemology which has "incorrigible" knowledge grounded in perceptual experience at its foundation. For Ayer, the "incorrigibility" at play here is understood as deriving from the possession of a general *infallible* capacity to generate true judgements about the items encountered in perception – an unnecessarily demanding construal of "incorrigibility" for perceptual knowledge, according to Austin. Ayer's aspiration to deliver this type of incorrigibility at the level of our perceptual knowledge, Austin suggests, leads him to endorse a deeply flawed account of perception, and to accept dubious arguments in its favour. We will explore how Austin rejects both the epistemological project which motivates Ayer, as well as the account of perception he arrives at. However, in *Sense and Sensibilia* little is said about the positive views which should be put in place of Ayer's.

In the first part of this chapter I will explore Austin's criticism of Ayer's theory of perception and its epistemological motivations. I will argue that Austin hints at an alternative epistemology of perception, which is not committed to Ayer's controversial sense-datum theory of perception. Moreover, Austin's view intends to deliver "incorrigible" perceptual knowledge, provided we replace Ayer's conception of incorrigibility with a less demanding understanding of that notion. In the second part of this chapter I will explore the positive

[1] Although Austin also discusses some aspects of H. H. Price (1932) and G. J. Warnock's (1953) views on the matter, the bulk of attack is directed to Ayer's view. This choice of target is criticized by Snowdon (2014).

epistemology of perception sketched by Austin. The suggestion will be that it is possible to identify three distinguishable strands to his position. First, for Austin, being in the "best possible position" for making a perceptual judgment puts the subject in a position to acquire perceptual knowledge about her environment. Second, part of what puts subjects in said optimal position is the obtaining of a successful perceptual relation to her environment. Being in this perceptual relation affords subjects with "non-evidential" warrant for making world-directed judgements. Third, part of what puts the subject in the optimal position is her exercising (or being disposed to exercise) relevant capacities which allows her to exploit that warrant. Among the capacities identified by Austin we find the capacity to pay attention to the objects of perception, the capacity to neutralize potential counter-considerations against her perceptual judgements, and the capacity to recognize the perceived objects as the objects they are. We will explore how these three strands fit together into a cohesive epistemology of perception.

1.1 Ayer's Epistemological Project and the Sense-datum Theory of Perception

Ayer's interest in securing an incorrigible foundation for all our empirical knowledge is an aspiration he inherited from the early views of the logical empiricists of the Vienna Circle.[2] On this view, perceptual experience is to be credited as the most important, fundamental, source of justification for empirical knowledge: "How is it to be determined that any empirical propositions does… correspond to a fact? The answer is that, in the last resort it is always to be determined by actual observation" (Ayer, 1940: 108). On this conception, perceptual experience is the ultimate tribunal which determines whether or not an empirical

[2] The pursuit of protocol sentences, on which all empirical human knowledge is supposed to rest, goes back to the Logical Empiricists' early project of a Unified Science. It is worth noting, nevertheless, that their original project did not involve a commitment to the sort of representative realism endorse by Ayer in the form of a sense-datum theory. Thus, in the initial logical empiricist view, protocol sentences did not need to be about psychological reality. As Schlick clearly notes: "What was originally meant by 'protocol statements,' as the name indicates, are those statements which express the facts with absolute simplicity, without any moulding, alteration or addition, in whose elaboration every science consists, and which precede all knowing, every judgment of the world" (Schlick, 1934: 209-210). What is essential to the early logical empiricists' verificationist picture is that all meaningful non-observational sentences should imply—and be implied by—a special kind of sentence which can be directly verified by observation alone. The idea that protocol sentences are necessarily about sense-data or about some aspect of psychological reality is a further step not present in the original view of the early logical empiricists. It is also important to note that not all logical empiricists held onto this project for the entirety of their careers. For instance, when Ayer wrote *The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge* he was already battling Otto Neurath (1932,3) coherentism and Rudolf Carnap's (1932) conventionalism.

judgement is justified. Now, this fundamental tenet of empiricism, together with Ayer's epistemological desideratum of securing an incorrigible foundation for empirical knowledge, gives rise to a challenge when we reflect on some examples which suggest that perception is inherently fallible – in the sense that the general policy of always taking perceptual experience, as it were, at face value is liable to give rise to false judgements. For instance, when we look at the Müller-Lyer illusion, taking our experience at face-value would produce a false judgement regarding the length of the lines. How are we to reconcile this ordinary aspect of perceptual experience (i.e. that we are liable to be misled by it) with the epistemological project of securing an incorrigible foundation for empirical knowledge? Ayer's way of dissolving this tension consists in endorsing a version of the sense-datum theory of perception on which the items that we seem to be perceptually acquainted with cannot fail to exist nor can they fail to have the properties they seem to have. This means that the general policy, if restricted to sense-data, will never lead to false judgements. Let us now examine closely the examples which are meant to give rise to problems for Ayer's epistemological project. We will leave for later a critical examination of the epistemological project which motivates Ayer.

i) Ayer's Argument from Illusion

The examples that Ayer appeals to in order to advance his own version of a sense-datum theory are common-stock among philosophers of perception. These are usually advanced as the first step of the "argument from illusion". They include, among others, the case of a straight stick that looks bent when it is partially submerged in water, the case of a coin that looks circular when seen from above but elliptical when seen from a skewed angle, among others.[3] What is common to these cases is that in all of them "material things … present different appearances to different observers, or to the same observer in different conditions" (Ayer, 1940: 3).[4] This would be a problem for someone who wished to attain the type of knowledge that Ayer is interested in securing. Ayer endorses a sense-datum theory of

[3] For the full list see Ayer (1940: 3).

[4] Austin has reservations about Ayer's use of the pair of terms "material object" and "sense-datum". We will explore in chapters 3 and 4 Austin's reasons for such reservations, which have to do with the idea that there are many objects we can perceive but which are not straightforwardly classifiable as material objects nor sense-data; here he is thinking about things such as rainbows, shadows, reflections, or flames.

perception to solve this problem. Nevertheless, in an Austinian spirit we could stop for a moment and ask ourselves why should these cases seem problematic at all? Surely, it is a common and absolutely normal occurrence that things can look, taste, or feel different in a variety of circumstances, and to different subjects. So why are these cases problematic for a philosophical account of perception? Here, Austin's diagnosis of Ayer's position (that it rests too heavily in an implicit epistemological program) can help us understand what is going on. The suggestion is that these examples are problematic only in the light of a particular understanding of what perception is required to deliver in terms of cognitive access to the world – an understanding which is not mandatory and may be challenged.

Let us look closely at the way Ayer reasons from one of these examples to the positing of sense-data as objects of perception:

> Let us now consider one of these examples, say that of the stick which is refracted in water, and see what is to be inferred. For the present it must be assumed that the stick does not really change its shape when it is placed in water. […] Then it follows that at least one of the visual appearances of the stick is delusive; for it cannot be both crooked and straight. Nevertheless, even in the case where what we see is not the real quality of a material thing, it is supposed that we are still seeing something; and that it is convenient to give this a name. And it is for this purpose that philosophers have recourse to the term "sense-datum" (Ayer, 1940: 4).

Here Ayer's suggestion seems to be that the conclusion that in "delusive" cases we are aware of sense-data (and not "material things") follows ultimately from the fact that the stick cannot be both crooked and straight at the same time. Such a contradictory result seems to follow from endorsing a conception in which "material things" are always the objects of perceptual awareness. Ayer seems to suggest, then, that the natural way to avoid falling into this contradiction is by endorsing the claim that in some cases we are aware of sense-data. Once this much has been seemingly established Ayer will advance additional arguments to generalize the point and maintain that sense-data are the objects of perceptual awareness in all cases. We will not be analysing that generalizing step here. There is plenty of material in the reasoning advanced above.

Ayer's suggestion is that the "problematic" examples show that sense-data must be brought into the picture in order to avoid contradictory consequences, such as the stick being

both crooked and straight. But why would a view which does not introduce sense-data give rise to this contradictory result in the first place? The answer comes in the form of a version of the "phenomenal principle". Once it has been established that one of the experiences of the stick must be delusive Ayer makes the following remark: "even in the case where what we see is not the real quality of a material thing, it is supposed that we are still seeing something". Note that this version of the phenomenal principle is too weak for Ayer's purposes. Ayer's explicit version of the principle does not preclude us from maintaining that in both cases (when the stick seems straight to us and when it seems crooked to us) the object of awareness is the stick itself, not a sense-datum. In order to derive the required contradiction we need a stronger version of the phenomenal principle. For instance, we need a principle like this: "whenever it appears to a subject that there is something which possesses a particular quality, then there is something of which the subject is aware which does possess that quality."[5] This stronger principle, coupled with the claim that material things are always the objects of perceptual awareness, yields the problematic inference that the perceived stick is both crooked and straight. Now, we are in a position to evaluate Ayer's version of the argument from illusion. Here is a more fully spelled out version of the argument, which will aid our discussion of it:

1. We always perceive material things (assumption for *reductio*).
2. In experience e_1 a stick (a material thing) appears straight, and in experience e_2 the same stick appears crooked (*ex hypothesi*).
3. Thus, in both e_1 and e_2 the subject is aware of one and the same stick (from 1 and 2).
4. Whenever it appears to a subject that there is something which possesses a particular quality, then there is something of which the subject is aware which does possess that quality (phenomenal principle).
5. Thus, in e_1 the subject is aware of something straight, and in e_2 the subject is aware of something crooked (from 2 and 4).
6. Thus, the perceived stick is both crooked and straight (from 3 and 5).[6]
7. Therefore, it is not the case that we always perceive material things (by *reductio*).

[5] This version of the phenomenal principle follows very closely Howard Robinson's (1994: 32) formulation of it.

[6] Notice that this inference seems to depend on a further premise to the effect that in the relevant experiences the subject is not aware of anything other than the stick. This premise might be challenged on good grounds, such as the fact that presumably we are also aware of the water and the glass (see Austin, 1962: 26). We will grant this implicit premise for the sake of the argument.

This part of the argument is meant to establish merely that we do not always perceive material objects. For in "delusive" cases (e.g. when the stick appears crooked to us) the object of awareness cannot be a material object, for the stick is straight. So, this part of the argument leaves open the issue of what is the object of perception in delusive cases. How do sense-data come into the picture? The answer, again, might come from the phenomenal principle, for it requires that the object of perception in delusive cases has the qualities it seems to have. Here, Ayer suggests, an answer can be provided by the sense-datum theory of perception. Sense-data might have the qualities we seem to perceive in delusive cases. The stick might not be crooked, but the sense-datum we are aware of surely can be. In other words, since there is no material object which is both crooked and straight, we bring in a non-material object which has one of the otherwise conflicting properties.

Let us concentrate on the part of the argument which is meant to establish that at least sometimes the objects we are perceptually aware of are not material things (i.e. the argument from (1) to (7)). Austin challenges many aspects of this argument. For instance, he criticizes the examples Ayer employs to illustrate his argument (Austin 1962: 3), the use he makes of the notions of "illusion" and "delusion" (ibid. 20-32), as well as his use of the notions of "appearance" and "look" (ibid. 33-43). But here I will focus on Austin's criticism of Ayer's implicit understanding of the phenomenal principle. As we have seen Ayer's version of this principle is instrumental in advancing the claim that we do not always perceive material objects, but also in advancing the claim that sense-data are the objects of perception in delusive cases.

Austin seems to think that the natural reaction to the seemingly problematic cases would be to explain how really there is absolutely nothing problematic about them. Normally, no one in the circumstances described would be tempted to draw, for example, the conclusion that the stick must be both crooked and bent. All that follows from the example is that the stick *looks* bent when it is submerged in water and that it *looks* straight when it is not. Of course, we also know that the stick is straight; but this is hardly contradictory with the fact that it *looks* bent. Thus, Austin elaborates: "[w]hat is wrong, what is even faintly surprising, in the idea of a stick's being straight but looking bent sometimes? Does anyone suppose that if something is straight, then it jolly well has to *look* straight at all times and in all circumstances? Obviously, no one seriously supposes this. So what mess are we supposed to

get into here, what is the difficulty?" (Austin, 1962: 29). Austin's point here is that the "jejune examples" on which Ayer's sense-datum theory depends, are so common and ordinary that there is no difficulty at all in explaining them without appeal to sense-data.

Here Austin is challenging Ayer's assumed version of the phenomenal principle. This is what allows him to claim that there is nothing problematic about the examples. Austin points out that, in general, there is nothing perplexing about something being one way (say, straight) but looking a different way (say, crooked). But this common conception of appearance and reality is at odds with Ayer's implicit phenomenal principle. But what is the support for that principle? If there is nothing surprising about a stick being straight and looking crooked, then why the stick looking crooked implies that there must be something crooked that we are aware of? Here, Austin's suggestion that Ayer's real motivation for a sense-datum theory of perception is epistemological might help us understand just why Ayer assumes the phenomenal principle in the required strong reading. Let us remember that according to our interpretation of Ayer's epistemological project, he is interested in securing an epistemological outlook in which we possess a general infallible capacity to attain true beliefs about the world. If perception were always of material things, then taking our experiences at face value would not be such an infallible capacity. For sometimes, e.g. when the stick appears crooked, taking experience at face value will yield false beliefs about the world.

If we allowed for the possibility of experiences which, if taken at face-value, would yield false beliefs, we would lose the type of cognitive grasp on the world Ayer wishes to secure. In contrast, on Ayer's account of perception, I cannot get things wrong when I describe how things seem to me. The strong version of the phenomenal principle actually requires from Ayer to advance a view in which when something appears to be *F* to us, there really is something that is *F*, of which we are perceptually aware.[7] We might wonder whether there are any objects which might fit the bill. In response to this worry we find Ayer's characterisation of sense-data. For Ayer a) sense-data cannot have a property they do not appear to have, or, positively, if a sense-datum has a property, then in our awareness of it, the sense-datum will appear to us to have that property and b) sense-data cannot appear to

[7] We will explore in the following section Austin's criticism that there are not any objects which might meet the stringent requirements imposed by the phenomenal principle.

have properties that they do not really have, or, positively, if it seems to us that a sense-datum has a property, then it has that property (Ayer, 1940: 117). Ayer maintains that he is entitled to adopt this characterisation of sense-data, since it accommodates the "basic facts about perception"; and moreover, we are free to adopt any characterisation of the objects of perception which accommodate these basic facts. In the end, which characterisation we adopt boils down to a linguistic choice (we will explore below the credentials of this "linguistic move"). Independently of the flaws or merits this understanding of sense-data might have, it is clear that something Ayer wishes to achieve by adopting such a conception is to attain incorrigibility at the level of the "foundation" of empirical knowledge. If being aware of a red and square sense-datum makes it impossible for the sense-datum to not be red and square, then it follows that taking my experience at face-value (i.e. if I judge the sense-datum to be red and square) will necessarily yield a true belief. For Ayer, the only possible source of error must be verbal, i.e. that I don't know if "square" or "red" are the appropriate words to describe my experience. In the second part of this chapter we will explore whether there are any sense-data, so construed.

We have, then, that Ayer's philosophical account of perception follows from his wish to secure the epistemological project he has set for himself. In contrast, we find in Austin a very different approach to perception and the "problematic" examples. Austin does not share Ayer's epistemological project – we will explore his reasons in the second part of this chapter – which takes away the motivation to endorse Ayer's version of the phenomenal principle. As we will see, Austin's position leaves the doors open for fallibility, i.e. for the thought that sometimes we will get things wrong if we take experience at face-value. But, for Austin, this is only a natural consequence of a correct understanding of perception and its role in underwriting knowledge. For Austin it is only natural that sometimes concrete objects will seem to have properties they do not really have. Moreover, that this is a common phenomenon only makes it natural that, sometimes, we will get things wrong. But does anyone suppose that our perceptual – and cognitive – capacities should be immune to this sort of error? It does not seem so. Actually, the opposite seems to be true instead: cases in which we are "deceived" by our experience are a very natural, everyday, phenomenon, which has to be acknowledged and explained by any plausible theory of perception. Why would

this be a problem? The suggestion is that this seems problematic only if we start by assuming an epistemological project where liability to error must be avoided at all costs.

But before presenting Austin's reaction to Ayer's position let me address a couple of issues which might suggest that we have been unfair to Ayer in our assessment of his defence of a sense-datum theory of perception. First, one might wonder whether Austin's assessment that Ayer is ultimately motivated by the epistemological project described above is correct. Second, it might be pointed out that Ayer himself thought that the argument from illusion failed to establish the sense-datum theory of perception. One might wonder, then, whether our treatment of his case as resting heavily on a version of that argument is correct. Let me address these issues in turn.

ii) (Not-so-)Covert Epistemological Motivations and Linguistic Twists

Admittedly, we do not find an explicit acknowledgement from Ayer in *The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge* that his real motivation for endorsing the sense-datum theory is the securing of an epistemological project with infallibility at his heart. Nor do we find an explicit admission that the real problem raised by the argument from illusion is that it jeopardizes our cognitive grasp of the world. Surely, Ayer does not make his project explicit in this way, although, as Austin points out, the title of Ayer's book (*The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge*) serves as a clear indication of what Ayer really is after. Above we found a strong reason to think that this epistemological project must be at the base of Ayer's motivations, for otherwise the arguments he advances in favour of his sense-datum theory of perception are found inconclusive.

Yet, it is possible to find a confirmation of sorts that Austin's diagnosis is correct, from Ayer himself. A few years after the posthumous publication of *Sense and Sensibilia* Ayer took himself to the task of responding to the criticisms set forth there by Austin (Ayer, 1967). It is quite telling that in his response, Ayer admits that if there is something that the argument from illusion clearly establishes it is an epistemological point which would be at odds with the incorrigible foundations picture he wishes to secure: "what the argument from illusion […] does clearly establish is the humdrum conclusion that there is not a perfect coincidence between appearance and reality. It shows that if we were always to take experiences as it were at face value we would sometimes go wrong" (Ayer, 1967: 129). Here,

Ayer acknowledges that the real problem raised by the argument from illusion is that our cognitive access to the world would be fallible if we insist to maintain that material things are the objects of perceptual awareness. This represents a problem for Ayer because he is after an epistemological project in which our empirical knowledge rests on a bed of perceptual knowledge derived from an infallible capacity to get things right.

The second reason why it might be thought that we have been unfair to Ayer is that, strictly speaking, he thinks that the argument from illusion fails to establish the sense-datum theory of perception.[8] Instead he thinks that endorsement of the claim that in perception we are aware of sense-data amounts to nothing but a "linguistic choice" made by the philosophical theorizer. According to him, as long as a characterisation of the objects of perception accommodates the "basic facts about perception", then we are entitled to endorse that characterisation. That is, Ayer thinks that it is simply a matter of a linguistic choice to adopt a sense-datum theory of perception over a theory that *prefers* to say that in perception we are directly aware of material things. Nevertheless, it is not so clear that this move allows him to evade the problems we have discussed above.

Ayer thinks that the argument from illusion simply restricts the linguistic choices a theorist of perception is allowed to make. In other words, the argument from illusion, from Ayer's perspective, presents us with the following two options. On the one hand, we can claim that in perception we are directly aware of material things, as long as we are willing to reform the use of the term "material thing" to allow for material things to change their qualities so much as is required by *perceptual appearances* – i.e. one must be prepared to say that when I see a coin as elliptical it must be so because the coin really has changed its shape. Of course, this move involves a profound change of the way in which we conceive ordinary material objects. As Ayer himself admits, to put it mildly, this change involves thinking of material things as being "more variable and evanescent than we normally do" (Ayer, 1940: 17). On the other hand, we can maintain that in perceptual experience we are aware not of material objects, but sense-data. Ayer takes each option to be as adequate as the other. The issue is simply a matter of linguistic convenience, since both options are consistent with all the "empirical facts". Austin rightly points out that this way of treating the "dispute"

[8] See specially Ayer (1940: 11-19).

shows that Ayer is assuming something quite similar to a sense-datum theory of perception, for the "empirical facts" which have to be accommodated by any linguistic choice are actually facts about sense-data:

> It is not, [Ayer] says, (surprising as this may seem) a question of fact whether a penny, or any other "material thing", does or does not constantly change its shape, its colour, its size, its location—here indeed we *can* say whatever we please. Where then are "empirical facts" to be found? And Ayer's answer is quite clear—they are *facts about sense-data*, or as he also puts it, 'about the nature of the sensible appearances', 'the phenomena'; this is where we really encounter the 'empirical evidence' (Austin, 1962: 60).

According to this diagnosis, Ayer can claim that any dispute between a sense-datum theory of perception and an alternative where material things are the objects of perception is *merely* verbal, only because he assumes that there are no fundamental facts about material objects – the fundamental empirical facts can only be found at the level of "sensible appearances". This suggests that Ayer's own understanding of what the argument from illusion shows already presupposes his thesis that sense-data are the fundamental objects of perception.

But more importantly, even here it is possible to identify the influence of Ayer's covert epistemological project. Why is it that in order to avoid the problems raised by the argument from illusion we could maintain that material objects change their shape, size, and location constantly as our appearances of them change? One immediate answer is that such a move would allow us to hold on to Ayer's preferred conception of incorrigibility in basic empirical knowledge. If the stick really becomes crooked as it enters the bucket of water, then the general policy of taking our experience at face value would yield a true belief, i.e. that the stick is crooked. The two linguistic alternatives left open by the argument from illusion are alternatives which would secure Ayer's epistemological project. So, even in the linguistic version of Ayer's reasoning we find that his covert epistemological project is doing work in the background.

***

So far we have explored Austin's suggestion that Ayer's sense-datum theory of perception is ultimately motivated by his epistemological project of providing "incorrigible" foundations for our empirical knowledge. Austin's suggestion allowed us to understand better some of the argumentative moves which might otherwise seem unwarranted in Ayer's project. Nevertheless, it is Austin's position that Ayer goes wrong, in the first place, in buying into such a stringent epistemological project – a project which requires that we have an infallible capacity to get things right within the realm of perception. In the following section we will explore Austin's reasons against Ayer's epistemological project. We will argue that in his criticism of Ayer, it is possible to find the sketch of an original and interesting epistemology of perception. The guiding theme of our exploration will be the development of an adequate notion of incorrigibility, devised precisely to avoid the problems that Ayer's own notion falls into.

1.2 Austin's Epistemology of Perception

As mentioned before, Austin's exploration of the topic of perception in *Sense and Sensibilia* involves a comprehensive attack on Ayer's version of the sense-datum theory of perception. The resulting text is a detailed scrutiny of Ayer's view, in which almost every argumentative step is called into question and criticised. We find, therefore, on the surface of this text, a largely negative outlook; a fact which has not gone unnoticed by its readers. For instance, G. J. Warnock (one of the targets in Austin's book) highlights this aspect in his monograph about Austin when he describes the book as "almost throughout undeviatingly negative, critical, even polemically critical" (Warnock, 1989: 11);[9] although he immediately provides an explanation as to why this might be so. *Sense and Sensibilia* constitutes an exception in Austin's *oeuvre*, Warnock tells us, not only in its being a largely negative work but also in terms of its origin, as it was reconstructed by Warnock himself from several sets of notes Austin made in preparation for the lectures he delivered on the topic of perception from 1947 to 1959. Although it is possible that Austin planned to publish some of this material, he had not started preparing it for publication at the time of his death.[10] Warnock's suggestion is that

[9] We can find a similar complaint in Ayer's response to Austin. See Ayer (1967: 117).
[10] See Warnock (1989: 11-12) and Warnock (1962: vi).

had Austin prepared the material for publication, the resulting work would have advanced more explicitly a positive outlook. It is true that many of Austin's published works, written as they were as contributions for symposia, contain extended critical and negative assessments of some of the views he was responding to; but this was done only to clear the way for the advancement of the particular view he favoured.[11]

Nevertheless, despite *Sense and Sensibilia* being a sustained criticism of a particular philosophical view (an admirably careful and thorough effort), it would be a mistake to think that its philosophical contribution is exhausted by these criticisms. Furthermore, it has been suggested relatively recently that the most enduring contribution made by Austin there is not his critique of Ayer's views, or the sense-datum theory more generally – for there are good reasons to think that the scope of his attack is more limited than he took it to be – but rather the positive insights scattered throughout the work (Putnam, 1994; Martin, 2000, ms; Travis, 2004, 2005).

It might be thought that Austin's case against the sense-datum theory has been influential in subsequent philosophers of perception on the grounds that this theory has been abandoned almost completely by contemporary philosophers of mind.[12] As Michael Martin points out, nowadays "a commitment to [sense-data] is taken rather to indicate that a philosopher must have gone wrong in their reasoning" (Martin, ms: 5). In a similar fashion, some paradigmatic versions of the argument from illusion, one of the main targets of Austin's criticism, are now widely regarded as fallacious pieces of reasoning (Dancy 1995). But there are reasons to think that Austin's attack may not have been as influential as it first seems. Hilary Putnam points out that while it is true that, after Austin, most philosophers refrained from describing perception in terms of sense-data, they simply replaced such talk with talk about "sensory experiences" or "representations," notions which, Putnam thinks, play an equivalent role to that of sense-data, and do not address the real problem identified by Austin. For Putnam, these are merely "linguistic" moves and fail to appreciate the full extent of

[11] Examples of this are "Other Minds" (1946), "Truth" (1950), "Pretending" (1958), and "Unfair to Facts" (1954). The last paper, despite not being a contribution to a symposium is, nevertheless, a response to Strawson's response to Austin's contribution to the 1950 Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and Mind Association's symposium on the topic of truth, in which Austin himself contributed with his (1950). It is important to note that "Unfair to facts" is a version of parts of the lectures on which *Sense and Sensibilia* is based.

[12] Although, there's a few remarkable exceptions, such as Howard Robinson, see specially his *Perception* (1994).

Austin's criticism (Putnam, 1994: 454). Furthermore, Martin thinks that the real reasons why philosophers have come to reject the existence of sense-data are quite different from any of the reasons advanced by Austin. For instance, Martin suggest that one of the main reasons why contemporary philosophers of mind have tended to reject sense-data boils down to their commitment to a physicalist picture of reality. A picture which has tended to avoid commitments to the existence of "mental" entities, such as sense-data (provided these are construed as non-physical entities).[13]

These considerations might be taken to suggest that Austin's work has been less influential in determining the current misfortune of sense-datum theories of perception than would appear at first glance. But it would be a mistake to think that there is nothing of philosophical interest left in Austin's text. There are plenty positive proposals advanced by Austin throughout. In the remainder of this chapter I will be arguing that it is possible to find an original and interesting sketch of an epistemology of perception. Although what Austin has to say about perceptual knowledge in *Sense and Sensibilia* is brief and fragmented, when it is coupled with his general discussion of knowledge in "Other Minds" a sketch of a systematic epistemology of perception emerges into view, or so I want to argue.

In what follows, I will identify three clear strands that stand out in Austin's discussion of perceptual knowledge, which constitute, in my opinion, fundamental elements of a systematic and distinctive account of perceptual knowledge. We have, first, the claim that being in the optimal position for making a judgement makes available knowledge for the subject. Second, that successful perceptual experience is one element which contributes to the subject being in that optimal position. And, third, we have that the subject's successful exercise of certain capacities (such as recognition, attention, and capacity to neutralize counter-consideration) also contributes to the subject putting herself in that optimal position. We will start our analysis of Austin's epistemology by looking at the picture which Austin advances to challenge Ayer's understanding of incorrigibility in perceptual knowledge.

[13] Some have claimed, though, that the existence of sense-data is not inconsistent with a physicalist picture of the world, e.g. Cornman (1975). Moreover, not all sense-datum theorists have construed sense-data as non-physical, mind-dependent entities. See, for instance, Moore (1903, 1913) for a construal of sense-data where these features are absent.

i) Intrinsic and Contextual Incorrigibility

The quest for incorrigibility in human cognition is one of the pursuits that have been at the centre of epistemology as early as philosophical theorizing itself emerged, Austin tells us.[14] According to him, such a pursuit can be traced all the way back to Ancient Greece, and the form such pursuit took back then can be clearly distinguished from the form it has taken relatively recently with the dawn of Modern Philosophy.[15] In Austin's view the pursuit of certainty in Antiquity took the form of a search for "something that will be always true" (Austin, 1962: 104). Although Austin presents Plato as a prominent example of this take on incorrigibility, the urge for finding something that will be always true can be found even further back, in Heraclitus and Parmenides.[16] During Modern Philosophy, in contrast, the quest has taken a rather different form – here we find a "hankering for something to be *absolutely certain*" (Austin, 1962: 104). Austin credits Descartes with the re-animation of the original quest in this new form, and thinks that the contemporaneous form the quest has taken can be traced back to this point in history.

Here, we will focus on incorrigibility in perceptual knowledge, as understood in modern times according to Austin's reconstruction – i.e. as the pursuit of certainty in our worldview. On our favoured characterisation of the notion, a judgement is incorrigible when it is based on conclusive grounds, i.e. grounds whose obtaining is incompatible with the falsity of the proposition affirmed by means of the relevant judgement. On this understanding, incorrigible judgements are made on the basis of grounds which "prove" the truth of the relevant proposition.[17] As the notion will be understood in this thesis, incompatibility of the grounds on which a judgement is based with the falsity of the relevant proposition is a *minimal* requirement for incorrigibility. We will see below how Austin goes beyond this minimal requirement and develops a more robust conception of incorrigibility. In due time, we will also consider the advantages of such a robust understanding. This

[14] Following Aristotle's traditional account of the early history of Philosophy in the initial chapters of the *Metaphysics* (1998), one would be tempted to think that pre-Socratic philosophers where mainly concerned about cosmological issues. Nevertheless, there are strong reasons to think that an interest in epistemological issues was already present in most pre-Socratic philosophers, see Lesher (1999).
[15] See Austin (1962: 104).
[16] See Heraclitus (B1, B80, B50), and Parmenides (B2:1-6, B8:25-31) in Graham (2010)
[17] The idea of knowledge as based on warrant akin to proof can be found in the views of the so-called Oxford Realists, views which had a strong influence in Austin's philosophy. See Kalderon and Travis (2013), and Marion (2000, 2000b).

minimal conception of incorrigibility will serve, however, as a starting point to compare the different approaches to perceptual knowledge by Ayer and Austin.

In order to sharpen our favoured construal of incorrigibility it will be useful to distinguish it from a completely different, yet natural and colloquial, way of understanding the notion of incorrigibility. On this alternative understanding, we say that a subject's judgement is incorrigible when the subject is in no position to amend it. Accordingly, a judgement being incorrigible in this sense would be compatible with the subject being in a bad epistemic position with respect to the judged proposition. More specifically, on this understanding, the obtaining of the grounds on which an incorrigible judgement that *p* is based, would be consistent with the falsity of *p*. In contrast, our preferred conception of incorrigibly is one where the grounds on which an incorrigible judgement is based are inconsistent with the falsity of the relevant proposition.

I will be arguing that we find in Austin a conception in which perception can yield incorrigible judgements, where the notion is understood as involving conclusive grounds, i.e. grounds which are incompatible with the falsity of the relevant proposition. We will explain how Austin's conception of incorrigibility diverges from Ayer's. But before addressing these issues, let me say something about a development in epistemology, recent enough to be beyond Austin's brief characterisation of the history of epistemology as revolving around a preoccupation with incorrigibility. In recent decades, there has been a move away from seeking certainty in epistemology. This break with the long tradition identified by Austin might suggest that endorsing an approach like Austin's (in which knowledge is conceived as incorrigible) is somehow outdated and long ago proven to be misguided. We will argue in the following chapter, that despite this shift in epistemological interests, the motivations for looking for incorrigibility remain in place. One way in which the move away from incorrigibility is evident is in a shift of focus in many epistemologist's interest from knowledge to justified belief. This shift might have been at least partially caused by a generalised consensus that Gettier-style problems rendered impossible a reductive analysis of knowledge.[18] This shift in focus sometimes brings with it a lack of preoccupation with

[18] See Gettier (1963) for the original formulation of the problem and the Essays in Pappas and Swain (1978) for the impact that this problem had in epistemological discussions in the years after Gettier's publication. Nevertheless, see Williamson (2000) for a view where knowledge takes a central place, inspired partly by the history of responses to the Gettier problem.

notions such as certainty or incorrigibility, which might be required for knowledge. For on this way of looking at things, the epistemological achievement which is the main focus of inquiry – i.e. justified belief – is compatible with lack of certainty. Being justified in believing something is consistent with being wrong about it, which means that one's beliefs can be justified on the basis of grounds which fail to guarantee the truth of the relevant belief.[19] A second way in which contemporary epistemology has steered away from the pursuit of incorrigibility is to be found in the adoption of a conception of knowledge, where the grounds on which putative pieces of knowledge rest are consistent with the falsity of the propositions known.[20] Now, these relatively recent developments might call into question the tenability or desirability of an epistemological conception in which perceptual knowledge is incorrigible. We cannot address this worry – i.e. that Austin's interest in incorrigibility is outdated – in the present chapter, for it would take us too far from our main interest, that of explaining Austin's conception of incorrigibility. Here I merely want to recognize the existence of this potential worry and flag it up for further treatment in the following chapter (in section 2.1). There I will advance and endorse John McDowell's reasons for thinking that a correct understanding of the notion of knowledge requires us to conceive it as being based on conclusive grounds.

After this brief digression let us return to the main topic of this chapter – Austin's epistemology of perception. In Chapter ten of *Sense and Sensibilia*, Austin is reacting to the particular way of articulating incorrigibility advanced by Ayer in his *The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge*. Now, we should not equate Austin's strong criticism of Ayer's take on incorrigibility with a rejection of the epistemological framework which calls for certainty. Rather we should see Austin's rejection of Ayer's picture as a criticism of one *way* of fleshing out the notion of incorrigibility in perceptual knowledge. Austin thinks that Ayer's project of finding the incorrigible fails ultimately due to the adoption of an unnecessarily strong interpretation of the notion. In describing the form that the pursuit of the incorrigible has taken in Modern Philosophy, Austin remarks: "In some cases the motive seems to be a comparatively simple hankering for something to be *absolutely certain*—a hankering which

[19] See Alston (1989), BonJour (1985) and Goldman (1979) for examples where a shift from knowledge to justification can be identified. See also Wright (1991) and Kaplan (1985).
[20] This kind of view can be found, among others, in the work of Ernest Sosa (2009), and Tyler Burge (2003).

can be difficult enough to satisfy *if* one rigs it so that certainty is absolutely unattainable" (Austin, 1962: 104, emphasis added). On my understanding of this remark, Austin claims that adoption of an overly demanding construal of certainty might place it out of reach for us. It is important to note, nevertheless, that Austin's response does not involve jettisoning the whole project of finding the incorrigible in perceptual knowledge. Rather, he advances a proposal which involves a comparatively *modest* understanding of the notion. By introducing this modest notion Austin tries to counteract approaches like Ayer's, in which incorrigibility seems unattainable.

In general terms, Ayer's position consists in maintaining that our general capacity to make judgements about our current perceptual experiences is an infallible capacity. An infallible capacity in this sense is one that is successful every time the capacity is exercised. Let us assume that, for Ayer, the aim of the capacity to judge is that of producing true judgements. Thus, Ayer's position that our capacity to judge is infallible, amounts to the idea that this capacity produces true judgement every time it is exercised. For Ayer, the incorrigibility of our judgements derives from the infallibility of this capacity. If the capacity is infallible, then that amounts to a guarantee that a particular exercise will produce true judgements. In Ayer's picture, the possibility of falsehood is excluded by the infallibility of the general capacity which produces the relevant judgements. Now, Ayer's position is not that our capacity to judge is unrestrictedly infallible – as we have seen, he is open to the idea that we might be liable to error in the judgements we make about material objects. His claim is that our capacity to make judgements about the sense-data we perceive is an infallible capacity. More specifically, this general capacity is infallible partly because in making these judgements the subject makes use of the most cautious sentences to describe their current perceptual experiences, which guarantees the truth of the relevant judgements. The infallibility of this capacity derives, in Ayer's view, from the security of the sentences exploited for making the relevant judgements – these sentences are especially secure in that they are non-committal about the external reality which might cause our perceptual appearances. In other words, our general capacity to make judgements about our current experiences is an infallible one, and its particular exercises are incorrigible – for they are supposedly based on grounds which exclude the possibility of falsity (see Ayer, 1940: 80-84). Below, following Austin, we will challenge some of the main tenets of this picture. We

will call into question Ayer's idea that a general (human) capacity like this can indeed be infallible. We will also see how Austin challenges the existence of such specific capacity by rejecting the idea that using the most cautious sentences in making judgements about our perceptual experiences can deliver the required infallibility. Before that, let us present in more detail Ayer's case.

In the *Foundations of Empirical Knowledge*, Ayer advances an epistemology of perception in which all empirical knowledge is to be derived from beliefs which describe the subject's experiential states. Having inherited the logical empiricists' early project of finding an incorrigible foundation for empirical science, Ayer's take on the pursuit of the incorrigible takes the form of a search for a special *kind* of sentence, the use of which would give rise to incorrigible statements and judgements. In addition, given Ayer's allegedly independent case for endorsing a sense-datum theory of perceptual experience, we have the result that the special sentences which serve as the foundation for all empirical knowledge are sentences about *sense-data*. According to Austin, one of Ayer's main mistakes in his approach to incorrigibility consists in thinking that the way to find the incorrigible is by identifying the most cautious *kind* of sentence. This reasoning leads him to the idea that statements about how things *seem to us* must be incorrigible, for they make use of the most cautious sentences to be found – they are so cautious that in stating them no error could be made to misrepresent the experiences that are so described, or so Ayer argues. It should be noted, though, that at different points in his career Ayer was ambivalent on whether other types of error in describing our own experiences were possible, such as errors from inattention or incapacity to discriminate (Ayer, 1967: 137-8; 1956: 65). Yet, in *The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge* he tries to rule out such possibilities by appeal to his characterisation of sense-data explored above. Let us remember that Ayer's characterisation had it that sense-data must have all properties they seem to have, and that they cannot have properties they do not appear to have. But we have already challenged the plausibility of this characterisation of sense-data in the first part of this chapter.[21] We argued above that Ayer's case for his characterisation

[21] See pp. 14-16.

of sense data is inconclusive, for it rests on the assumption that sense-data are the fundamental objects of perception.[22]

Let us go back to Ayer's reasoning for the possibility of infallibility in the realm of perceptual appearances. The case for the claim that statements of how things seem to us are incorrigible starts by noting the perfectly innocuous phenomenon that some forms of words are more cautious than others. For instance, in saying that the painting in Sofía's living room is a Picasso, there are several ways in which I could be proven wrong – just consider the following: highlighting my ignorance in artistic matters Sofía points out it is not a Picasso, but a Juan Gris. If, instead, I were to say that the object hanging in Sofía's living room is a painting, its not being a Picasso could no longer be used to show I made a mistake. Yet, there are still several ways in which I could be proven wrong – Sofía takes the "painting" from the wall and shows me it is not really a painting but a print she got from the cubist exhibition in London a few years ago. But, the line of reasoning continues, if instead I were to say that *that* looks to me like a painting by Picasso, then its not being a painting (let alone its not being a Picasso) would have left my statement unscathed. This shows merely that one can very well take refuge from error by advancing particularly cautious forms of words – nothing seems to be wrong in this observation. The problem with Ayer's case for incorrigible statements is that it takes this phenomenon one step further: "reflections of this kind apparently give rise to the idea that there is or could be a kind of sentence in the utterance of which I take no chances *at all*, my commitment is absolutely minimal; so that in principle *nothing* could show that I had made a mistake, and my remark would be 'incorrigible'" (see Austin, 1962: 112; Ayer, 1940: 82-85). The idea Ayer is chasing here is that of finding the safest possible formulae, such that no mistake whatsoever could be made in uttering them. If a statement is such that it is impossible to show that it is wrong in virtue of using the most cautious kind of sentence, we'll say that the statement is "*intrinsically incorrigible*".

As mentioned before, Ayer's position is that we have a general capacity – the capacity to make judgements about our experiences using the most cautious sentences possible – which is infallible. One ground on which Ayer's position could be challenged is by calling into question its very commitment to the existence of a general (human) capacity which is

[22] See Pears (1979) for a useful discussion of Ayer on sense-datum statements and a comparison with Austin's criticisms.

infallible. A capacity to judge, as described here, is a general capacity, i.e. a capacity which finds application across several circumstances. Its generality derives from the fact that such a capacity involves the subsumption of different situations under conceptual generalities. Now, there is nothing in a capacity like this which implies that the capacity will be successful in every application. Moreover, once the capacity has been characterised as general, there are prima facie reasons for thinking that no such general capacity could be infallible. On the one hand, natural limitations on the part of human cognitive capacities opens the possibility for mistakes. On the other hand, the indefinite number of particular situations in which the general capacity might be applied increases the likelihood of error. It would seem that excluding the possibility of error in the many applications of a general capacity, in the way required by Ayer, would require perfect tracking and discrimination capacities from the judging subject – capacities which there is reason to think are far from perfect in humans.

Austin's case against Ayer's notion of incorrigibility can be seen as an application of this general criticism. His criticism places a heavy emphasis on the idea that using a cautious sentence in advancing one's judgements fails to deliver the required infallibility for the general capacity. It is important to note that the mere fact that there are forms of words which are more cautious than others, and that *in general* statements about how things seem to us are among the most cautious ones, do not show that it is possible to find a *kind* of sentence so cautious that no mistake could possibly be made in using them to describe our own experiences. Austin thinks that reflecting on the examples advanced by Ayer shows that not even the most cautious formulae imaginable could be used to produce intrinsically incorrigible statements, for it is possible to devise situations in which the relevant statements should be "amended or retracted" (Austin, 1962: 112). Ayer thinks that the only sort of mistake that could be made in producing a statement that reports how things seem to us is a verbal mistake – that of producing the wrong word in describing the experience (e.g. saying "lemon" meaning to say "lime"). But Austin's retort consists in showing that there is definitely more room for error than Ayer is prepared to admit:

> I may say 'Magenta' wrongly either by a mere slip, having meant to say 'Vermilion'; or because I don't know quite what 'magenta' means, what shade of colour is called *magenta*; or again, because I was unable to, or perhaps just didn't, really notice or attend to or properly size up the colour before me… And this holds for the case in which I say, 'It seems, to me personally, here and now, as if

> I were seeing something magenta', just as much as for the case in which I say, 'That is magenta.' The first formula may be more cautious, but it isn't *incorrigible* (Austin: 1962: 111).

In describing an experience (the way things seem to us, here and now) one can produce a misdescription in several different ways and not only through slips of the tongue. I might make a mistake because I did not learn correctly the meaning of the word "magenta" and as a result I misdescribe my experience when I encounter a magenta object. Or, looking at the thing only superficially I hastily announce that my experience is as of a magenta cup. Yet had I paid closer attention to the cup and to my experience of it, I would have realised it was not an experience of a magenta cup, but of a vermilion one. Or, being unable to tell the difference between cyan and turquoise, when I see a turquoise cup I announce confidently that it seems to me as if there was a cyan cup. But had I been able to tell the difference I would have described my experience as of a turquoise cup instead. Austin's point in advancing these examples is that in describing one's own experience one can make mistakes due to lack of knowledge of the meaning of words, inattention, or a general incapacity to discriminate. Furthermore, one could go wrong in all these ways irrespective of how cautious the description is. Saying "that looks cyan" is as susceptible to these kinds of error as saying "it seems to me, personally, here and now, that this is cyan". A general capacity to describe our experiences veridically would be infallible only if we had a particular reason to think that these possibilities of error are closed. Unfortunately, it seems that the opposite is true of creatures like us: our knowledge of the words of a language is not perfect, we are incapable of paying full attention to all aspects of our experience, and it is not true that we are capable of discriminating all possible differences between any given experiences, or any given aspects of an experience.

But this does not mean we must abandon the pursuit of the incorrigible. For Austin one reason why Ayer's project fails is that it starts with too strict a notion of incorrigibility. Austin's position rejects the existence of general infallible capacities to judge, but maintains that there is still space for incorrigibility. How is this balance achieved? For Austin, there is no non-analytic statement which is *intrinsically* incorrigible (Austin, 1962: 111). That is, no statement can be guaranteed to be true on the basis of the kind of sentence used to make it. But this does not mean that there are not alternative ways of construing the notion of incorrigibility which will yield more promising results. After finding Ayer's notion of

incorrigibility too strict, Austin suggests a weaker reading of the notion which might yield better results:

> Yes, but, it may be said, even if such cautious formulae are not *intrinsically* incorrigible, surely there will be plenty of cases in which what we say by their utterance will *in fact* be incorrigible—cases in which… nothing whatever could be produced as a cogent ground for retracting them… For if, when I make some statement, it is true that nothing whatever could in fact be produced as a cogent ground for retracting it, this can only be because I am in, have got myself into, the very best possible position for making that statement—I have, and am entitled to have, *complete* confidence in it when I make it. But whether this is so or not is not a matter of what *kind of sentence* I use in making my statement, but of what *the circumstances are* in which I make it (Austin, 1962: 114).

This passage contains a lot of interesting suggestion from Austin. I want to highlight Austin's proposal on how to understand the notion of incorrigibility without positing an infallible general capacity to judge. On Austin's proposed construal, a statement will be incorrigible *not* when we use the most cautious sentence imaginable to make it; instead a statement will be incorrigible when the *circumstances* in which it is made are such that there is no good reason to retract it. Making use of the most cautious sentence in making a statement will not guard the subject from the possibility of error. As the examples presented by Austin show, it is always possible to devise a situation in which a subject could make a mistake in describing their experiences, regardless of how cautious the sentences used are. Reflection about Ayer's failures leads Austin to the suggestion that some statements might be incorrigible if the circumstances in which the statement is made are appropriate (irrespective of which kind of sentence is used). Let us call a statement "contextually incorrigible" when it is incorrigible in this sense.

Given that this notion of contextual incorrigibility is at the centre of Austin's epistemological project, the notion of being in the "best possible position" for making a judgement becomes crucial. For Austin, the circumstances in which judgements can be considered contextually incorrigible are grouped under the heading of being in the "optimal position" for making a judgement. There are several suggestions I want to make about this central notion and its place in Austin's epistemology of perception. First, I want to suggest that being in the optimal position for judging is, for Austin, incompatible with the falsity of the relevant proposition. For instance, if one is in the optimal position to judge that there is a

pig before one, being in that position is incompatible with the falsity of the proposition that there is a pig before one (Austin, 1962: 115). This claim will be further defended in the following section. In the meantime we can say that if this is a correct interpretation, then Austin's conception of incorrigibility qualifies as a view which meets the minimal requirement for incorrigibility described at the outset of this section. For this is a view in which the grounds one has for making certain perceptual judgements are such that they exclude the possibility of falsity of those judgements. In other words, Austin's view is one where there is space for conclusive warrant. Importantly, and in contrast to Ayer's notion, Austin's position does not imply that we have an infallible capacity to judge. On Austin's position, our capacity to be in the optimal position to make judgements about our perceived environment is a fallible capacity to get into positions where our grounds for judgement are conclusive.

The reasons why being in the optimal position is incompatible with the falsity of the relevant proposition have to do with the way in which the notion of "optimal position" is fleshed out. The second suggestion is about how to understand the notion of being in the optimal position. My suggestion is that being in such a position involves two distinguishable contributions. In the passage Austin says that one "finds oneself" in the optimal position, but also that one "gets oneself into" that position. This characterisation of the two distinguishable contributions suggests that, on the one hand, certain things must happen to a subject for her to be in the optimal position, and, on the other hand, that the subject must *do something* to be in that position. One central example advanced by Austin will help us understand these contributions better. For Austin the best possible position for making a judgement about our perceived surroundings is one in which the relevant items in our environment are in plain view and we have plenty of opportunity to inspect it. Thus, the optimal position for judging that there is a pig before us is characterised as follows:

> If I watch for some time an animal a few feet in front of me, in a good light, if I prod perhaps, sniff, and take note of the noises it makes, I may say, 'That's a pig'; and this too will be 'incorrigible', nothing could be produced that would show that I had made a mistake (Austin, 1962: 114).

My suggestion is that the first contribution to the optimal position is provided by the perceptual awareness of the pig itself, and its position in relation to the perceiver, as well as

the adequacy of the environmental conditions for sight. That is why the optimal position, in this case, is one in which the perceiver can see the animal, which is a few feet in front of her, the light is good, and the perceiver has enough time to watch it. A suggestion which will be developed below is that perceptual awareness provides the subject with "non-evidential" warrant for making the relevant judgement. We will advance a detailed characterisation of this type of warrant below, but we can anticipate that possessing this warrant is inconsistent with the falsity of the relevant propositions. For this warrant that we possess has the capacity to "settle" the question of whether a pig is before us (Austin, 1962: 115). The suggestion will be that being in this perceptual relation implies the existence of the relevant object of perception (e.g. the pig), which in turn makes true the relevant proposition (e.g. that there is a pig). On the other hand, the second contribution to the optimal position, involves the active engagement from the perceiver in order to be able to exploit the non-evidential warrant afforded to her by perception. This is why Austin characterises this contribution as "getting oneself into" the optimal position. In the passage about the pig Austin suggests that the perceiver must pay attention and inspect the animal in order to make sure it is a pig. Below, we will characterise this contribution more fully and will argue that Austin suggests that the subject must exercise (or be disposed to exercise) additional capacities in order to be in said optimal position. We will argue that, for Austin, being in the optimal position involves exercise of our capacities for perceptual recognition, as well as being able to neutralize potential counter-considerations which might arise against the perceptual judgements we make.

Thus, it becomes clear why we remarked before that Austin provides us with a notion of incorrigibility which is more robust than the minimal conception. The minimal conception maintains that a judgement is incorrigible when it is based on conclusive grounds. For Austin, possession of conclusive warrant does not suffice to render a judgement incorrigible. Additionally, the subject must position herself in a way that she can exploit said warrant in the judgments she actually makes. We will explain more fully these two elements in the remaining sections of this chapter. This will bring Austin's epistemology of perception into full view. But before doing so let us conclude our discussion of Austin's conception of incorrigibility as a response to Ayer's.

On Austin's conception, then, whether a statement or a judgement are incorrigible depends on the circumstances in which the statement or judgement are made. Note that this approach is consistent with the claim that our general capacity to make judgements about our perceptual experiences is fallible. But, importantly, accepting that this general capacity is a fallible one does not force us into accepting the claim that its particular exercises fail to be incorrigible.[23] That a general capacity is fallible only implies that we are liable to make mistakes. That is consistent with the capacity being successful at times. And moreover, all of this by itself cannot rule out the possibility that when the capacity is successful it puts subjects in possession of conclusive warrant. We pointed out that, on Austin's view, Ayer's quest to find incorrigibility is thwarted by the endorsement of too strict an interpretation of the notion. Ayer's position on perceptual knowledge fails partly because he commits himself to the existence of an infallible judging capacity. Ayer buys into an unnecessarily strict conception of incorrigibility (i.e. one that commits him to infallible judging capacities). But Austin's proposal shows that it is possible to articulate an understanding of perceptual knowledge without endorsement of infallible judging capacities. In the following chapter we will put Austin's conception of incorrigibility in perceptual knowledge to the test by placing it in a contemporary debate about defeaters for perceptual judgements. There we will also explore John McDowell's reasons in favour of a view where perception is conceived as a fallible capacity to put subjects in possession of conclusive warrant for world-directed judgements.

The task in the remainder of the chapter will be to explore the two remaining aspects of Austin's epistemology of perception. First, that perception provides subjects with non-evidential warrant for world-directed judgements, and, second, that there are several things the subject must do (or be disposed to do) in order to exploit said warrant.

ii) Non-evidential Warrant

Much of Austin's positive stance with respect to perceptual knowledge is advanced as an alternative to Ayer's own proposal on the matter. As we saw in the previous section, a central goal in Ayer's epistemological program is to establish that we have an infallible capacity to describe truly our own experiences. On Ayer's view, any statement which merely reports the

[23] See McDowell (2011) for an extended defence of this general line of reasoning against Tyler Burge (2003). We will explore this dispute in detail in the following chapter.

way things seem to a subject – i.e. insofar as they report the sense-data the subject is aware of – will be incorrigible. The sentences used in such statements are labelled by Ayer, following standard logical empiricist terminology, "observation-sentences". In Ayer's picture, observation statements are incorrigible, but they also have the exclusive role of being evidence-providers for the rest of the subject's empirical judgements. Austin challenges Ayer's understanding of evidence and in so doing, I will suggest, sketches a conception of perception as a source of non-evidential warrant.

For Ayer, observation-sentences can be used to formulate the incorrigible judgements which form the basis for the rest of our empirical knowledge. Moreover, on Ayer's foundational picture, all our empirical knowledge is supposed to rest on – i.e. be inferentially derived from – the incorrigible foundations. This means that sentences about sense-data, insofar as they are the only ones which give rise to incorrigible judgements, formulate the *evidence* in favour of all other empirical statements, e.g. statements about "material objects". It is precisely this contention – i.e. that "there is a special subclass of sentences whose business is to count as evidence… for other sentences" and "whose special feature it is to be incorrigible" (Austin, 1962: 110; see Ayer, 1940: 80-84, 108-112) – which is the focus of Austin's attack at least when it comes to the epistemological part of Ayer's text. We have already discussed the incorrigibility contention in Ayer's position. In this section, we turn the focus to Ayer's doctrine on evidence, although considerations of incorrigibility will continue to surface, as both features are often addressed in the same breath by Austin. We start by looking at Austin's criticisms of Ayer.

Austin targets mainly two claims in Ayer's doctrine on evidence. The first is that observation-sentences have the exclusive right to formulate the evidence for all our empirical knowledge. The second is that all our judgements about material objects must rest, ultimately, on the evidence formulated by observation-sentences. Let us start with the former claim. Austin provides us with a general reason to doubt that it is possible to identify a class of sentence whose role is to formulate the evidence for all our empirical knowledge:

> [I]f you just take a bunch of sentences… impeccably formulated in some language or other, there can be no question of sorting them out into those that are true and those that are false; for… the question of truth and falsehood does not turn only on what a sentence *is*, nor yet on what it *means*, but on, speaking very broadly,

> the circumstances in which it is uttered. Sentences are not *as such* either true or false. But it is really equally clear, when one comes to think of it, that for much the same reasons there could be no question of picking out from one's bunch of sentences those that are evidence for others, those that are 'testable', or those that are 'incorrigible' (Austin, 1962: 111).

It is important to pinpoint exactly what Austin is claiming in this passage, because it is more subtle than it might first appear. In the first part of the passage Austin is making a point about the truth and falsity of sentences, and then, in the second part, he extends his reasoning to the capacity of sentences to formulate evidence (among other properties). In the first part, he points out that it would be impossible to sort out, from a group of well-formed sentences in a given language, without further information, those sentences that are true from those that are false. For there is no characteristic that we could use to pick out the true sentences from the false ones.

But there is more to Austin's point in this first part of the passage, for there he insists that the *circumstance* in which one utters a sentence will make a difference to whether the resulting statement is to be considered true or false. The context dependency of the notion of truth and falsehood, according to Austin, goes further than a simple point about correspondence (see Austin, 1950: 124, fn. 1). For Austin, knowledge of the meaning of a sentence and a confrontation of such meaning with the facts might be insufficient to yield a definite answer to the question of whether such a sentence is true or false, for we also need to know the context in which the sentence is uttered. For instance, if the sentence "the Spanish conquest of Tenochtitlán was the result of the conquistadors' intensive siege" occurs in a primary school textbook then it would be reasonable to count it as a true sentence; but if the same sentence is made in the course of a work of historical research on the Spanish conquest of Mesoamerica, then it might be reasonable to say that, at best, it is an oversimplification, if not an outright falsity.[24] Austin's point here is that the issue of whether a statement is taken to be an *accurate* or *inaccurate* description of reality will depend, at least partly, on the intents and purposes with which the statement is made.

[24] On this point see Austin (1962b: 143-5).

In the second part of the passage ("for much the same reasons…") Austin extends this reasoning to the issue of incorrigibility, testability, and the capacity to provide evidence. It is not possible to tell whether any given sentence has any of these properties independently of the context of utterance, and the intents and purposes behind the statement, Austin tells us. There are no syntactical, semantical, or otherwise perceivable properties of sentences which can reveal which ones are incorrigible, which ones are evidence-providing, and so on. Moreover, consideration of particular cases suggests that the evidence-providing relation is not unidirectional between types of sentences. For instance, it is true that, in some cases, claims about how things are are based on claims about how things look, e.g. that the painting hanging in Sofía's living room is crooked might be grounded on the basis that it looks crooked. But "if the circumstances were appropriate", Austin tells us, the relation could very well be reversed. I might say that the painting looks crooked on the basis that I put it up, and made sure it was crooked.[25] For similar reasons not all evidence for "material objects" statements is provided by observation-sentences. In many cases it would be entirely natural and acceptable to provide evidence for "material-object" statements in terms of other "material-object" statements. For instance, the cat hair in the sofa, the cat food in the kitchen, and the cat toys lying around in the living room all constitute good evidence for thinking that there is a cat in the house. In most cases it would be entirely normal if someone were to provide as their evidence for thinking there is a cat in the house the statement that these material objects are to be found in the house. And in many contexts, this will do perfectly well – we would not insist that the subject carry on providing further and further evidence until they reach evidence which is formulated in terms observation-sentences. The thought is, then, that the issue of whether a statement finds itself in need of evidential support, and which kind of sentence is to be used to formulate the evidence for a given statement, is something that will depend on the context in which the relevant statements are made.

Now, a possible way in which Ayer could respond to this criticism is by pointing out that his view is only committed to the idea that every statement about material objects should *ultimately* be grounded in statements which use "observation-sentences". The fact that in an everyday context we provide evidence for statements about material objects by appealing to other statements about material objects is neither here nor there. In other words, Ayer's view

[25] See Austin (1962: 116-7).

could be reformulated as the claim that in the context of looking for the *ultimate* ground for a material object statement, we are always bound to find that an observation-sentence formulates our grounds – our evidence.

This possible response in behalf of Ayer leads us to consider the second claim in Ayer's doctrine about evidence, namely that all material object statements are based, ultimately, on evidence which is formulated by observation-sentences (Ayer, 1940: 108) In response to this position, Austin advances his most distinctive proposal in the epistemology of perception, namely that in central cases perceptual knowledge is based on non-evidential warrant. Austin thinks that this aspect of Ayer's doctrine on evidence can be proved wrong by focusing on certain central cases of perceptual knowledge. For Austin, the correct thing to say in those circumstances is that perceptual knowledge is not based on any evidence whatsoever. The cases he has in mind are cases in which a subject who is currently undergoing a perceptual experience of a certain object comes to know something, on the basis of that experience, about that very object. It is precisely in reflecting about exactly what makes these cases epistemically distinctive that the most positive aspects of Austin's epistemology of perception are advanced. We have cases where our perceptual knowledge seems not to be based on evidence:

> [t]he situation in which I would properly be said to have *evidence* for the statement that some animal is a pig is that, for example, in which the beast itself is not actually on view, but I can see plenty of pig-like marks on the ground outside its retreat. If I find a few buckets of pig-food, that's a bit more evidence, and the noises and the smell may provide better evidence still. But if the animal then emerges and stands there plainly in view, there is no longer any question of collecting evidence; its coming into view doesn't provide me with more *evidence* that it's a pig, I can now just *see* that it is, the question is settled. And of course, I might in different circumstances, have just seen this in the first place, and not had to bother with collecting evidence at all (Austin, 1962: 115).

In this passage, Austin contrasts two *ways* in which we might come to know the same proposition, e.g. that there is a pig roaming in the farm, on the basis of perception. On one occasion, our knowledge that there is a pig around is grounded on the *evidence* delivered by our perceptual experiences – this is the case in which we see *signs* of porcine presence. On

the other hand, when the pig is in plain view in front of us, our knowledge of the same proposition is not grounded on evidence of porcine presence afforded to us by perception. In these circumstances experience makes us aware *not* of evidence of porcine presence, rather it makes us aware of the pig itself. Both are cases of perceptually based knowledge, nevertheless the *nature* of the epistemic warrant provided in the two cases is radically different. Austin notes that when the pig comes out of its hiding place the issue of collecting evidence suddenly becomes irrelevant, and had I seen the pig from the beginning, the need to collect evidence would not have arisen in the first place. When we know that there is a pig roaming in the farm on the basis of seeing it we have particularly strong warrant for making the relevant judgement ("the question is settled"). Moreover, there is something distinctive about the warrant we have in these cases – there is some sort of immediacy, not present in the evidential case, in coming to know that there is a pig in front of us in virtue of seeing it ("I can now *just see* that it is"). This immediacy is cashed out in terms of the idea that, in these circumstances, we come to know the relevant propositions in a *non-evidential* manner. The suggestion I want to advance is that in the central cases described by Austin, perception affords the subject with non-evidential warrant, a type of warrant which will be characterised more fully in the following.

Elucidating exactly why Austin characterises the use of the notion of "evidence" as a "gross misuse" in the relevant examples will help us get an idea of what Austin has in mind when he talks about non-evidential warrant.[26] The pig's hoofmarks and the pig food are evidence of there being a pig somewhere in the farm, insofar as they are an indication of the presence of a pig. But it would be a "gross" mischaracterisation to say that the pig itself standing there in front of us is also evidence for thinking that there is a pig somewhere in the farm, for the pig itself is *not merely* an indication of the presence of a pig.[27] Nevertheless, the error involved in talking of evidence when the thing itself is present is not characterised by Austin as something that is straightforwardly false to say. Instead, he calls it *misleading*: it is "misleading to lump together … all the characteristic features of any casual item as 'signs'

[26] There might be worries about whether or not Austin's considerations suffice to establish that the central cases of perceptual knowledge involve no evidence. It might be argued that Austin only establishes something about the way we ordinarily speak about evidence. We will address these worries in the first part of chapter 3.
[27] For more on the idea that we only talk about evidence, signs or symptoms of something *when the thing itself is absent*, see Austin (1946: 105-108).

or ‘symptoms’ of if” (Austin, 1946: 106) – it is misleading, but not strictly speaking false, then, to call the pig itself, with all its observable features, a sign of porcine presence. My contention is that Austin avoids talking of outright falsity here because there are *some* similarities between the case in which we merely see the pig’s traces and the case in which we see the pig itself. My suggestion is that the similarities amount to the fact that in both cases our perceptual experience puts us in a good epistemic position with respect to the subject matter of whether there is a pig in the farm – i.e. in both cases we are in possession of warrant for making that judgement. But why would characterizing an encounter with the pig itself as a case where we have evidence be an *inept* or *misleading* way of looking at things? My suggestion is that this characterisation is misleading because, in those circumstances, we have something better than mere evidence – not merely *particularly strong* evidence, but a type of warrant *altogether different* from evidential warrant:

> Once you know the murderer, you don’t get any more clues, only what were or would have been clues: nor is a confession or an eye-witness’s view of the crime a particularly good clue – these are *something different altogether* (Austin, 1946: 106, my emphasis).

Seeing a pig or witnessing a crime, then, do not provide the subject with evidence for making the relevant judgements, but with an altogether different sort of epistemic warrant. A suggestion I want to make here is that we should understand these remarks as maintaining that the type of warrant we find in non-evidential cases is *different in kind* from evidential warrant. Moreover, insofar as the warrant involved in non-evidential cases has the capacity to settle issues (and render superfluous the gathering of evidence), non-evidential warrant should be characterised as conclusive.

Let us refer to the claim that the warrant involved in non-evidential instances of perceptual knowledge is *distinctive* as “Austin’s insight”. Now it should be obvious from our interpretation of Austin that it is possible to distinguish two associated claims with Austin’s insight – a *positive* and a *negative* claim. The negative claim maintains that non-evidential warrant is *different* in kind from evidential warrant. That, for Austin, non-evidential warrant is different in kind from evidential warrant is supported by his contention that witnessing a shooting and having evidence for thinking someone shot someone else are entirely different

grounds for judging that a shooting occurred. On the other hand, the positive claim says that there is something distinctively *good*, from an epistemic point of view, about non-evidential warrant. Non-evidential warrant is tantamount to proof – possessing it excludes the possibility of the relevant proposition being false. That non-evidential warrant is, on Austin's view, conclusive is supported by Austin's remarks that seeing the pig has the capacity to settle the issue of whether a pig is present, in a way which renders the acquisition of evidence superfluous. In other words, we could say that Austin's insight about the distinctiveness of non-evidential warrant can be broken down into its being both *distinct* from evidential warrant (i.e. different in kind), and *distinctively* good from an epistemic point of view.

Now, important and original as it might be, Austin's insight and its associated positive and negative claims fall short of providing us with a detailed epistemological picture of perceptual non-evidential knowledge. For instance, Austin's insight is silent on what exactly constitutes non-evidential warrant. When I see a pig in front of me, why am I in a position to come to know that there is a pig in front of me? Given the negative claim of Austin's insight, the explanation cannot be that I am in possession of evidence for so thinking. So what constitutes the warrant I possess for thinking that there is a pig when I enjoy a visual experience of the pig? These are questions to which Austin's insight does not provide a straightforward answer on its own.

As a way of contrast, it would be relatively simple to provide the start of an answer to similar questions with respect to evidential warrant. For in this case we have a ready response in the following form: when I am perceptually aware of evidence of porcine presence, I might be in a position to know that there is a pig around *precisely* because I am aware of evidence for so thinking, i.e. I am aware of something that *points to* (or reliably indicates) the truth of the relevant propositions. Of course, a further question of *what* exactly constitutes the evidence in such cases could be raised. Consider the case in which the murder weapon is found in someone's flat. On the assumption that such circumstance amounts to finding evidence for thinking the dweller committed the murder, we could ask *what* constitutes the evidence in said case. Different responses could be advanced. For example, it could be proposed that the gun itself constitutes the evidence, or, alternatively, it could be said that the proposition that the gun was found in the flat constitutes the evidence (see Williamson, 2000). Regardless of how we answer the latter question, it is possible to give at

least the start of an answer to the question of what constitutes our evidential warrant in those cases. We cannot answer the equivalent question for non-evidential cases merely by turning to Austin's insight – for the insight and its associated positive and negative claims are silent on that respect.

Now, this observation should not be interpreted as a criticism of Austinian epistemology, but merely as a way of pointing out to the limitations of the view, as advanced by Austin himself. Again, it is important to note that Austin main aim in the passages analysed is not to advance a detailed epistemology of perception, but rather to challenge some of the epistemological claims advanced by Ayer. The importance of Austin's insight and other aspects of his epistemology lie not so much in the details of the view – for it is, admittedly, underdeveloped – but on the originality and the attractiveness of the proposal. The discussion in the previous paragraphs has helped us uncover one of the tasks that should be undertaken by any attempt to defend an Austinian epistemology. We have to advance a framework that can be used to explain why subjects in non-evidential cases find themselves in a position to acquire knowledge of their environment *and* has a plausible answer to the question of what constitutes the non-evidential warrant possessed by them.

Let me sketch briefly the kind of view that I will be advancing to substantiate the position I find in Austin whilst addressing independent epistemological worries which arise from the contemporaneous philosophical landscape. A full exposition of the view and a defence of it will be carried out from chapter 3. I will endorse a view recently advanced by Mark Kalderon (2011), which I label *Radical Anti-psychologism*. In a nutshell, this view maintains that everyday objects of perception (e.g. tomatoes, pigs, shadows, the tomato's redness, or the pig walking across the field) are reasons for judging. These objects are reasons for making judgements because they stand in *truthmaking* relations to certain propositions – i.e. the very propositions they are reasons for us to judge. When we enjoy a perceptual experience of these objects we find ourselves in possession of a reason for thinking that certain propositions are true. For example, in seeing a tomato we are entitled to judge that there is a red tomato, for we are aware of the tomato, and the tomato stands in the truthmaking relation with respect to the proposition that there is a red tomato. Endorsing this Radical Anti-psychologistic picture would provide us with the elements to respond to the questions advanced above. We could say that the warrant in non-evidential cases is constituted by the

very objects of perception. For example, in having the pig in plain view I am in a position to know that there is a pig in front of me because I have non-evidential warrant for so thinking. My warrant in such a case is constituted by the pig itself.

Of course, endorsing Radical Anti-psychologism as a way of fleshing out the Austinian epistemology goes beyond what is strictly speaking proposed by Austin. This move brings with it its own set of theoretical tasks. For example, we have to show that the Radical Anti-psychologist position is a plausible way of developing Austin's epistemology. In particular, we have to explain with more detail how Radical Anti-psychologism can make sense of Austin's insight and its associated claims.[28] In addition, the Radical Anti-psychologist position makes a series of philosophical commitments which are not free of controversy. If the resulting view is to be tenable, we have to address these commitments and defend them against objections. This work will be carried out in chapters 4-7. By placing an Austin-inspired epistemology in the arena of contemporary epistemology we should also contrast it with competing accounts of the way in which perceptual experiences provide us with knowledge of our environment to establish if it is in any way a plausible view *vis-à-vis* competing accounts of perceptual knowledge. These are tasks, nevertheless, to be undertaken in the following chapters.

Before bringing our discussion of non-evidential warrant in Austin to a close, I would like to go back to the theme of the previous section – incorrigibility and the optimal position for making perceptual judgements. We saw before that Austin's conception of incorrigibility is characterised by the claim that a perceptual judgement can be incorrigible if the subject finds herself in the optimal position for making that judgement. We advanced the suggestion that being in the optimal position, for perceptual cases, is constituted by two elements: a passive and an active one. The discussion in this section allows us to add more detail to the passive element in the optimal position. The passive element is constituted by the subject being in a relation of perceptual awareness with the relevant aspects of the mind-independent environment. On the Radical Anti-psychologist interpretation advanced here, we have the result that being in this perceptual state of awareness provides the subject with non-evidential, conclusive, warrant for judging. Thus, the Austinian position defended here

[28] This task will be undertaken in chapter 3.

maintains that being in the optimal position to judge involves possession of conclusive warrant afforded by perceptual experiences. But, in addition, the subject must exercise certain capacities in order to be in a position to exploit the non-evidential warrant afforded to her by perception. In the final section of this chapter we will try to flesh out what is involved, for Austin, in the active contribution to the optimal position.

There is one last clarification point I would like to discuss before moving on to a discussion of the active contribution to the optimal position. It has to do with other epistemological proposal which also appeals to the notion of non-evidential warrant. Crispin Wright has argued, in his discussion about the Epistemic Warrant Transmission Principle, that we come to know certain "heavyweight propositions" – i.e. propositions which do not seem to be knowable by reason alone, nor by perception aided by reason (Zalabardo, 2012) – on the basis of non-evidential warrant. Paradigmatic examples of heavyweight propositions are the negation of sceptical hypotheses, e.g. "I am not a brain in a vat". For Wright, the only way out of certain sceptical challenges consists in maintaining that we have *default* warrant in favour of such propositions. We lack non-question-begging evidence in favour of heavyweight propositions, but we are nevertheless epistemically entitled to regard them as true. Rather schematically, this is the sort of non-evidential warrant he has been advocating recently in a series of papers (Wright; 2004, 2014). To avoid confusion, it is important to note that Austin's own take on non-evidential warrant is nothing like Wright's. The kind of non-evidential warrant that Austin proposes is completely different to Wright's "entitlement". Firstly, for Austin it is possible to have this kind of non-evidential warrant in favour of "lightweight" propositions. Secondly, and more importantly, the non-evidential warrant Austin identifies is not possessed by the subject by *default*. Austin's non-evidential warrant is had by the subject in virtue of being in a perceptual state with respect to a relevant object. Thus, although both Austin and Wright appeal to a form of non-evidential warrant to deal with the phenomena they are concerned there is little in common between their proposals, apart from appealing to a type of warrant which is *not* constituted by evidence possessed by the subject.

iii) Epistemic Perceptual Agency

In the final section of this chapter we turn to the active element in the optimal position for making a perceptual judgement. On our interpretation of the Austinian picture, perceptual awareness is the crucial aspect in the passive element of the optimal position. But the issue of identifying what factors contribute to the active element is not such a straightforward matter. On our picture, perceptual awareness provides us with non-evidential warrant for making world-directed judgements. But there are several things which might be required from the subject to do in order to be able to exploit such warrant. What is required from the subject will depend, in many cases, on the details about the situation. Suppose that I find myself in a situation where I can clearly see an American goldfinch standing on a tree. Suppose further that, in the area I find myself, there are other birds which look like American goldfinches, such as the female scarlet tanager. Now, being in this situation, one obvious thing I should do if I am to be in the optimal position to judge that the bird is an American goldfinch is to discard the possibility that it is a female scarlet tanager. Perhaps I can do so by paying closer attention to its head or by getting closer to it. But arguably I would not have to do any of this if I found myself in a setting with no female scarlet tanagers (or other similar-looking birds) around. There might be many things a potential knower must be prepared to do if she is to be able to exploit the non-evidential warrant afforded to her by perception. The suggestion I want to advance here is that a subject finds herself in the optimal position only if she has done *enough* to put herself in a position to exploit that warrant. Thus, being in the optimal position means possessing conclusive warrant and getting oneself into a position where one can exploit it. It does not mean that the subject must do every conceivable thing to make sure her judgement is correct. What should a subject do in a particular situation to be in that position is something that will depend on the particular circumstances.

Nevertheless, there might be other things subjects must do put themselves in the optimal position, which have general applicability for perceptual cases. Here I want to focus on three such things which, I argue, can be identified in Austin's position. First, subjects must pay attention to the relevant aspects of their perceived environment. Second, subjects must be able to neutralize potential counter-consideration against their perceptual judgements. Third, subjects must be able to recognize the things perceived as the things they are. I suggest that the full force of the Austinian position comes into view when we elucidate both aspects

of the optimal position – the passive and active elements. Nevertheless, it should be noted here that in this thesis I will not have the space to explore and defend in detail the active element in the Austinian position. This is a task which should be left for another occasion. Nevertheless, here I will sketch the aspects mentioned above. I will also appeal to them in different parts in this thesis (mainly in chapters 2 and 6) although they will not be the focus of the investigation.

In *Sense and Sensibilia* Austin says explicitly that someone who is in the optimal position to make a perceptual judgement should pay attention to the scene before her. Here, again, I suggest, contextual considerations rule. What is the extent to which I should pay attention might depend on the circumstances. Not being familiar with pigs, failing to pay close attention to the pig before me might prevent me from exploiting the warrant afforded to me by perception. I might need to pay close attention to the animal in order to be able to judge that the animal before me is a pig. But a farmer who encounters pigs every day might not need to attend so scrupulously as I might, in order to be able to exploit her warrant. This treatment of the issue leaves open the possibility that someone who does not pay attention might be able to exploit the warrant afforded to her by perception. Again, I do not want to deny that there might be contexts in which this would be possible. What I want to highlight here is merely the suggestion that in some cases paying attention is something that we are in a position to do, which would allow us to exploit some perceptual warrant, which otherwise might not be available to us.

In "Other Minds" we find two further suggestions which might be considered aspects which contribute to the subject getting herself into the optimal position to make a perceptual judgement. First, the subject must be able to neutralize potential challenges to her claim to know. Secondly, the subject must be able to recognize the things she perceives as the things they are. Let us look at these considerations in turn. I suggest that the former requirement should take a relatively undemanding form in order to capture Austin's suggestion that a knower need not be able to neutralize just any conceivable counter-consideration. Austin makes various suggestions aimed at limiting the type of challenge which would be considered valid, and therefore a challenge that a knower must be able to neutralize. For instance, he maintains that the challenge has to be specific. Considering a case where someone who

claims to know that the bird on a tree is a goldfinch. Austin says the following about a possible challenge that the subject's grounds are not enough to prove it is a goldfinch:

> If you say 'that's not enough', then you must have in mind some more or less definite lack. 'To be a goldfinch, besides having a red head it must also have the characteristic eye-markings' … If there is no definite lack, which you are at least prepared to specify on being pressed, then it's silly (outrageous) just to go on saying 'That's not enough' (Austin, 1946: 84).

Moreover, within the class of specific challenges which might be directed against a claim to know, not all of them are going to be considered valid ones. A potential knower should only be expected to be able to neutralize those which are relevant for the present context:

> Enough is enough: it doesn't mean everything. Enough means enough to show that (*within reason, and for present intents and purposes*) it 'can't' be anything else, there is no room for an alternative, competing description of it. It does *not* mean, for example, enough to show it isn't a *stuffed* goldfinch (Austin 1947: 84, emphasis added).

For Austin, if a subject is to be in a position where she can exploit the warrant afforded to her by perception, she must be in a position to neutralize specific challenges which are relevant for the operative circumstances. Austin's position contrasts with positions which might require from knowers that they be able to neutralize just any possible counter-consideration there might be.[29] Austin thinks that epistemic responsibility cannot demand from us, for instance, that in order to know that the bird is a goldfinch that we are capable of discarding possibilities which there are no good reason to think that obtain. It would be absurd to demand that the subject be able to discard the possibility that the animal is a similar-looking bird we are highly unlikely to encounter here, or a type of bird which is thought to be extinct. This position is consistent with the thought that in cases where no valid counter-considerations are in the offing merely being sensitive to potential counter-considerations suffices for the subject to be in a position where she can exploit the warrant afforded to her by perception. Notice that this position is also consistent with the possibility that in some cases the subject might be unable to discard a valid counter-consideration. For instance, think

[29] See Pryor (2000, 2004) for a discussion of these requirements for knowledge. See Wright (2007) and Stroud (1984) for defences of these commitments.

of a case in which the bird flies away before we can ascertain that it is not a woodpecker. In such cases the subject might be unable to acquire perceptual knowledge.

The final suggestion to be considered here is the contribution made by the subject's capacities to recognize the items perceived as the items they are. I should clarify that Austin does not explicitly subsume recognition under the things that a subject should *do* in order to exploit the warrant afforded to her by perception.[30] This issue will be taken up again and looked into in detail in chapter 6. Austin's remarks regarding recognitional capacities emerge from his discussion about how we can answer the question "how do you know?" (Austin, 1946: 75-83). Now, in asking the question "how do you know?" in a paradigmatic case, e.g. when someone comes to know that there is a bittern in the tree on the basis of a perceptual, say visual, experience of a bittern, Austin says we could disambiguate the question in the following way:

> I may take you to have been asking:
>
> (Q1) How do I come to be in a position to know about bitterns?
>
> (Q2) How do I come to be in a position to say there's a bittern here and now?
>
> (Q3) How do (can) I tell bitterns?
>
> (Q4) How do (can) I tell the thing here and now as a bittern? (Austin, 1946: 79)

Possible answers to these questions would have to specify the following:

> (A1) [I must have] been trained in an environment where I could become familiar with bitterns
>
> (A2) [I must have] had certain opportunity in the current case
>
> (A3) [I must have] learned to recognize or tell bitterns
>
> (A4) [I must have] succeeded in recognizing or telling this as a bittern (Austin, 1946: 80).

The list of conditions (A1)-(A4) give us a brief explanation of the different ways in which perceptually based knowledge relies on the successful exercise, and acquisition, of

[30] Although he does advance in passing the following remark: "certainly 'recognizing' is not a highly voluntary *activity* of ours" (Austin, 1946: 97). In one reading of it, the remark suggests that recognizing is an activity of ours, just not a highly voluntary one.

recognitional capacities. (A1) seems to specify some of the conditions on which a successful acquisition of the relevant recognitional capacity could ensue. (A2) seems to say that in order for a recognitional capacity to be successfully deployed certain conditions (independent of the capacity and its application) should obtain. (A3) simply states that in order for someone to know, say, that a particular bird that she sees is a bittern, the subject must possess the capacity to recognize bitterns by sight; more generally, for the subject to know that the object perceived is *X* the subject must have the capacity to recognize *X*s by perception. (A4) seems to state that in order for a particular instance to be, say, a case of knowing that a bird is a bittern, the relevant recognitional capacity must be successfully deployed in the particular case in question.

A lot of questions can be asked about each of these conditions. For example, it is not clear exactly what is involved in the condition specified in (A1). In order to be in possession of the capacity to tell bitterns by sight one must have been trained to do so in an environment suitable for acquiring the capacity, i.e. an environment in which one could become familiar with bitterns. The ambiguous element in this condition is the notion of "familiarity". Clearly an aviary with many bitterns will classify as a suitable environment, but what about the case in which I am trained at the library using highly specialized books on bitterns? Can I become familiar with bitterns in such a case? Now, although it is not clear what Austin means by "having a certain opportunity" in (A2), one could easily try to specify the notion by considering what he says about perceptual knowledge in *Sense and Sensibilia*. For one to have an opportunity to recognize the bird in front of us we have to have a good view of the animal, the conditions of observation should be adequate, and we should have enough time to carefully attend and inspect it. There are also questions regarding when a subject possesses a perceptual capacity and when it is successfully exercised. Not all of these questions will be further addressed here. But they do point out to avenues of future research which should be explored in advancing a more developed account of recognitional capacities in an Austinian epistemology. Yet, some of the questions raised in this paragraph will deserve a closer inspection in this thesis. In chapter 6 we will explore in what way recognition can be considered something that the subject does. In providing a potential account of the agential involvement in recognition we will appeal to Austin's idea that one's capacity to recognize depends on suitable training (A1, A3). We will also consider whether the subject might be

involved in getting the process of achieving recognition in motion and on whether the subject can affect, perhaps in an indirect manner, the result of a particular process of achieving recognition.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have explored how Austin's epistemology of perception arises mainly as a response to Ayer's conception of perceptual knowledge. We explored Austin's criticism of Ayer's epistemology for advancing an overly demanding conception of incorrigibility. Ayer's conception required that we have a general infallible capacity to describe truly our own experiences. In response, we argued, Austin advances a conception of incorrigibility which does not require infallible capacities. We explained that, on Austin's view, our perceptual knowledge can be incorrigible when it is made on the basis of being in the best possible position for making that judgement. We suggested that Austin's position can be read as involving the contribution of an active and a passive element to be in that optimal position. On our interpretation, the passive element involves, mainly, successful perceptual awareness of the relevant aspects of the mind-independent environment. Whereas the active element is something which can only be determined in a more precise manner in function of the operative particular circumstances. Yet, we suggested that there are some general things which might find applicability in many instances of perceptual knowledge. These are: paying attention to certain elements in the perceived scene, being able to neutralize potential (valid) counter-considerations for our judgements, and being able to recognize the items we perceive as the items they are.

It is now time to see whether the epistemology of perception we find in Austin can be put to use in contemporary epistemology. In the following chapter, we will apply Austin's position on incorrigibility in perceptual knowledge to a recent dispute between Tyler Burge and John McDowell. Then, in the remaining chapters, we will flesh out Austin's suggestion that in successful exercises of perception subjects are afforded with non-evidential warrant for judging. We will defend the resulting position and argue that it provides us with an original and interesting epistemology of perception.

Chapter 2 – Conclusive Warrant and Perceptual Knowledge

In the previous chapter, we explored some of Austin's remarks on perceptual knowledge and argued that it is possible to find there the sketch of an original epistemology of perception. Our interpretation of Austin's epistemology was centred around his notion of being in the optimal position for making a perceptual judgement. On this interpretation of Austin, when a subject is in the optimal position, her resulting judgement will be incorrigible, i.e. grounded on warrant which is incompatible with the falsity of the propositions judged.

The main aim of this chapter is to show how the type of view advanced by Austin can be put to use in the contemporary philosophical landscape. In particular, we will explore one aspect of the account of perceptual knowledge which has been advanced by John McDowell (1982, 2010, 2011, 2012b, 2013). The first part of this chapter will be devoted to a detailed exposition of McDowell's view. I will start by advancing in general terms McDowell's position, the main arguments in its favour, as well as some standard arguments against it (2.1-2.2). I present the McDowellian approach in detail because a detailed exposition of his view will be useful in subsequent chapters, mainly chapters 3, 5, and 6, where the McDowellian approach will again be contrasted with the view inspired in Austin advocated here. Moreover, as will become clear in the following, McDowell's approach has a lot in common with the Austinian approach we endorse here. For instance, both Austin and McDowell try to make space for a conception in which our fallible perceptual capacities put us in position to possess conclusive warrant, a similarity which will be explored in this chapter. In chapters 3 and 5, we will explore further respects in which the views are similar. In addition, McDowell's view is one of the more sophisticated and developed accounts of perceptual knowledge in offer in the contemporary epistemological landscape, so it is a good point of comparison for our proposal. Ultimately, we will find, in chapter 6, that there is a fundamental locus of disagreement between McDowell's view and the position we will articulate in the following chapters. The locus of disagreement is that our position would be classified by McDowell as a view which endorses the "Myth of the Given".

Although a good part of this chapter will be devoted to a detailed exposition of McDowell's view we should not lose from sight that the main aim of this chapter is to put to

use the view we found in Austin in the previous chapter. In the second part of this chapter we will look closely at McDowell's treatment of some cases in which subjects who are perceptually aware of their surroundings are provided with reasons to doubt their perceptual experiences. I will argue that McDowell's view struggles to accommodate one of these examples. I will suggest that a view inspired by Austin can provide an alternative, and more satisfying, account of the cases McDowell struggles with (2.3-2.4). The suggestion I advance, inspired by Austin, is compatible with the fundamental tenets of McDowell's position, and could be incorporated into his view, or so I argue.

2.1 McDowell's Epistemological Disjunctivism

Recently McDowell has characterised his epistemology of perception as a view on which human perceptual capacities are categorized as general capacities to attain knowledge – not any sort of knowledge, but the sophisticated kind of knowledge enjoyed by self-conscious rational beings (see McDowell, 2011: 9-11). For McDowell, knowledge had by self-conscious rational beings means knowledge based on reasons that the subject possesses. We will assess the merits of this conception of the knowledge enjoyed by self-conscious rational beings in chapter 5. For the time being, we will concentrate on McDowell's position. For McDowell, the epistemological significance of perception derives from its role in affording self-conscious rational subjects with this kind of knowledge (McDowell, 2006:127). But what exactly is involved in an epistemological project which conceives of perception as a general capacity, the successful exercise of which results in this kind of knowledge? This is not a straightforward matter, which is shown by the fact that a literal reading of that formulation cannot be what McDowell has in mind.

On a literal reading, the claim that perception is a capacity for knowledge means that the successful exercises of perceptual capacities are to be identified with states of knowing. But McDowell cannot be holding the thesis that perception is a capacity for knowledge in this sense, for he explicitly rejects a view in which the deliverances of perception are to be identified with knowledge or belief. For McDowell a subject's perceptual capacities might be successfully exercised whilst the subject lacks the knowledge which is made available to her by that experience. In support of this claim McDowell cites reasons which are familiar

from discussions about the plausibility of belief-acquisition theories of perception.[31] On McDowell's conception, it is up to the subject whether to make a judgement on the basis of a perceptual experience. A point which is illustrated by well-known cases of illusion. For instance, subjects familiar with the Müller-Lyer illusion will abstain from judging that the seen lines are unequal in length, despite undergoing an experience in which it seems that they are unequal (see McDowell, 1996: 11; 1982: 385; and Fish, 2010: 56-9). Admittedly, this example presents us with a case where the subject's perceptual capacities are not exercised successfully. But these cases of illusion do show that it is possible to disassociate perceptual experiences from the corresponding judgements. This suggests, then, that the literal reading of the claim that perception is a capacity for knowledge cannot be right. For even when our perceptual capacities are successfully exercised we can refrain from making the corresponding judgement, in which case a successful perception need not yield knowledge. But if successful exercise of perceptual experience do not guarantee knowledge in this sense, what is its connection with knowledge acquisition? What does it mean to say that perception is a capacity for knowledge, then, if the strict reading of that claim has been discarded?

A natural suggestion would be to hold that perception is a capacity for knowledge in the sense that, at least in central circumstances, successful exercises of perception are necessary for the subject's acquisition of perceptual knowledge. Note that this view is consistent with the claim that success in acquisition of knowledge is not to be attributed entirely to the successful exercise of the perceptual capacity. On the view suggested here, perceptual experience makes an indispensable contribution to our knowledge of our perceived surroundings. Following McDowell's terminology, we can say that perception is a capacity to make knowledge of our surroundings *available* to the perceiver, or, alternatively, that perception is a capacity to put the subject in a position to know things about their surroundings. Crucially, on this conception, perception can put one in a position to know something and yet one might fail to acquire that knowledge.[32] A subject's perceptual experience might make the knowledge that there are seven tomatoes in the kitchen table available to her, yet she might fail to acquire that knowledge, for instance, because she did

[31] See Pitcher (1971) for a defence of this account of perception, and see Dretske (1969) for criticism.
[32] McDowell explicitly acknowledges the possibility of failing to know something that one's perceptual capacities put one in a position to know. See McDowell (1982: 390, fn. 39), and McDowell (2010, 246). See also Williamson (1996), and Kalderon (2011).

not take the time to count the tomatoes. That is, when the capacity is successfully exercised, the subject is in a position to know – i.e. knowledge is made *available* to them.

But if we want to defend a view on which successful exercises of perceptual capacities make an indispensable contribution to perceptual knowledge, we should give a detailed account of the nature of this contribution. In what way does perception put subjects in a position to know things about their surroundings? McDowell's suggestion is that they do so by providing the subject with *conclusive* warrant in favour of a judgment which describes the way things seem to the subject in perception. This aspect of McDowell's theory places his view on the side of epistemological conceptions which look for incorrigibility in perceptual knowledge, as described at the outset of the previous chapter. For McDowell, the conclusive warrant a perceiving subject possesses in favour of, say, *p*, is such that her having that warrant is incompatible with the falsity of *p*. We will explore below in what ways McDowell's approach to incorrigibility differs from Ayer's and Austin's. But before doing so, let us consider a possible argument which might challenge the idea that in successful exercises of her perceptual capacities the perceiver has conclusive warrant for making a world-directed judgement.

McDowell's conception of successful exercises as affording the subject with conclusive warrant could be challenged by an argument which attempts to exploit the fact that our ability to tell successful from unsuccessful exercises is fallible. The possibility of there being defective exercises which are subjectively indistinguishable from successful exercises is exploited in this argument. Here, our understanding of a subjectively indistinguishable experience is as follows: a defective exercise of the perceptual capacity is subjectively indistinguishable from a successful exercise just in case being in the former situation hinders one from coming to know that the capacity has not been exercised successfully.[33] Note that this conception of the subjective indistinguishability of bad cases does not imply a commitment to the idea that when the capacity is successfully exercised one is not in a position to tell that the capacity has been exercised successfully.[34] The argument against McDowell's position could go as follows:

[33] See Soteriou (2016) for a similar characterisation of the subjective indistinguishability relevant for McDowell's project.

[34] Bernard Williams (1978) advanced good reasons to think that, in general, this implication does not hold. We will have a chance to explore these reasons below.

1. Defective exercises of perceptual capacities afford subjects with, at most, *less than conclusive* warrant for a corresponding world-directed judgement.
2. The warrant afforded to subjects by successful exercises of their perceptual capacities cannot be stronger, or better, than the warrant provided by a subjectively undistinguishable defective exercise of these capacities.
3. Thus, successful exercises of perceptual capacities can afford the subject with no more than less than conclusive warrant in favour of the corresponding world-directed judgements.

Premise (1) of the argument would likely be conceded by McDowell. But premise (2) in this argument is a formulation of the "Highest Common Factor" (HCF) claim identified by him in his (1982) – a claim which he rejects. The Highest Common Factor claim maintains that successful and unsuccessful exercises of perceptual capacities must provide the subject with the same type of warrant. Since, as it has been conceded, defective exercises provide subjects with less than conclusive warrant, then, by HCF, it follows that the warrant afforded to the subject in successful cases is less than conclusive. A natural response to this argument would be to challenge its appeal to the HCF claim. A rejection of it would allow us to reject the argument's conclusion, which would leave open the door for the claim that there is an epistemic asymmetry between successful and (subjectively indistinguishable) defective exercises of our perceptual capacities. This asymmetry could then be cashed out in terms of the claim that, in successful exercises, subjects possess conclusive warrant for the corresponding world directed judgements.

Now, there are good reasons to be sceptical of the HCF claim. In order to establish the HCF claim, proponents of it seem to reason from the fact that defective exercises are indistinguishable from successful ones to the claim that successful exercises are indistinguishable from defective ones. But this is precisely the inferential step that McDowell invites us to challenge (see McDowell 1982: 386). It seems that, in general, it is not the case that the inability to tell that an exercise of a capacity is defective implies that one should therefore be unable to tell when a successful exercise of it is not defective. Which is to say that, in general, the subjective indistinguishability of "bad cases" (defective exercises of the capacity) from "good cases" (successful exercises of the capacity) imply a match in their epistemic significance. This general point can be illustrated bringing forward certain

considerations from Bernard Williams (1978). Williams invites us to consider pairs of good case / bad case situations in which a match in epistemic significance clearly fails to obtain. He asks us to consider pairs such as being alive / being dead, or being sober / being severely drunk (see Williams, 1978: 310-311). In these scenarios, bad cases are subjectively indistinguishable from the good cases in the stipulated sense. That is, when someone is dead they cannot come to know that they are not alive, and similarly when someone is severely drunk they cannot come to know that they are not sober. Crucially, in both cases the mere indistinguishability of the bad cases from the good ones does not imply that subjects in good cases are in an epistemic position comparable to that of subjects in bad cases. In particular, it is obvious that subjects can know that they are alive when they are, and that they are sober when they are. These cases show that the inference from subjective indistinguishability to a match in epistemic significance is flawed. One explanation as to why this epistemic asymmetry obtains might be that the indistinguishability of the bad cases from good ones does not imply that good cases are indistinguishable from the bad ones.

These examples raise doubts for the inference from indistinguishability of bad cases with respect to good ones, to a match in their epistemic significance, in general. But it could be argued that does not suffice to show that there is an epistemic asymmetry in successful and defective exercises of perceptual capacities. An argument for this idea, i.e. that there is no epistemic asymmetry in in these cases, could be mounted along the following lines. In the cases advanced by Williams, there is a straightforward explanation of why there is an epistemic asymmetry between good and bad cases. When one is dead one does not exist to make any judgements, and when one is severely drunk one's capacity to make rational judgements is impaired (see Williams, 1978: 310). But is it possible to advance a similar explanation as to why in the perceptual case the alleged epistemic asymmetry obtains? In order to answer this question, it might be useful to consider whether the epistemological disjunctivist can resist the following argument:[35]

a) Let us assume, for *reductio*, that there is an epistemic asymmetry between successful and (subjectively indistinguishable) defective exercises of perceptual capacities, i.e. that in successful exercises we have access to conclusive warrant for world-directed judgements, a type of warrant which is absent in defective exercises.

[35] This is an adapted version of an argument analysed by Soteriou (2016: 123).

b) Now, if (a) was correct, then in a (subjectively indistinguishable) defective exercise of her capacity the subject would be able to tell that they lacked conclusive warrant for the corresponding world directed judgement; this would allow them to know that the exercise is not a successful one.
c) But in defective exercises which are subjectively indistinguishable from successful exercises, the subjects are incapable of coming to know that the exercise is not a successful one. This contradicts (b).
d) To avoid contradiction, we should reject the initial assumption, i.e. we should reject the claim that there is an epistemic asymmetry between successful and (subjectively indistinguishable) defective exercises of perceptual capacities.

Advancing a way to resist this argument might give us a clue of how to answer the question of whether there is a good explanation of why there might be an epistemic asymmetry between successful and defective exercises of perceptual capacities. One way in which the argument might be challenged is by rejecting the move from (a) to (b). We can claim that there being a difference in the warrant afforded to subjects by two different experiences does not imply that the subject will always be able to tell that such a difference obtains – although the subject might be able to tell sometimes that there is a difference. The implication would hold only if a strong assumption is in play with respect to our introspective capacities to reveal the nature of our experiences. The assumption being that no difference in the epistemic standing of two experiences could go unnoticed to introspection. Such a strong position on the powers of introspection is not obviously true and it has indeed been consistently challenged in the philosophical literature on introspection.[36]

On McDowell's view, we can consistently maintain the following two claims. First, that in a (subjectively indistinguishable) defective exercise of her perceptual capacities a subject would be unable to tell she lacks conclusive warrant for the corresponding world-directed judgement. And second, that there is an epistemic asymmetry between defective and successful exercises of a subject's perceptual capacities. McDowell's explanation of why in the defective cases subjects would be unable to notice their lack of conclusive warrant rests on the idea that, despite their differences, there is something in common between successful and (subjectively indistinguishable) defective exercises of perceptual capacities. Namely, both cases share the appearance that things in the subject's surroundings are thus and so (see

[36] See Pears (1979), Williamson (1996).

McDowell, 2010: 244, and 2013: 260). In other words, both exercises are similar in that they share "an appearance, a state of a subject that consists in her having it appear to her that things are a certain way" (McDowell, 2010: 244). This commonality would explain why in the bad case a subject would be unable to tell their warrant is not conclusive: it seems to her that it is! Yet she lacks conclusive warrant, for the environmental reality is not made manifest to her; that is why it *merely appears* to her as if she had conclusive warrant. On the other hand, successfully perceiving subjects are, in addition, aware of their environment (that aspect of reality is made manifest to them in experience); that is why it *appears* to them that they have conclusive warrant for the corresponding world-directed judgements.[37]

The success of this line of defence opens the path to maintain an epistemological disjunctivist position, i.e. a view in which there is an asymmetry in the epistemic significance of successful and defective exercises of perceptual capacities. On McDowell's view, the epistemic significance of successful exercises amounts to *possession* of conclusive warrant. But nothing in our defence showed that this was the correct characterisation of the epistemic position in successful exercises of perceptual capacities. I take it that the main achievement of this line of defence is a rejection of the HCF claim. Note that rejection of this claim is consistent with the idea that the warrant provided by successful exercises of perceptual capacities is better or stronger than the warrant afforded by defective exercises, and *yet* less than conclusive. The claim that successful exercises provide subjects with conclusive warrant is an additional step in the argument. What are the grounds for the extra step?

One flat-footed response would be that this option is available once we have rejected the HCF claim. And given our interest in exploring the prospects of an epistemology where perceptual knowledge is based on conclusive warrant we should exploit the available option which most helps us secure that conception. Although such a response might be dialectically efficacious in the present context, it runs the risk of concealing the fact that there are independent reasons in favour of a conception where perceptual knowledge is based on conclusive warrant. McDowell himself has advanced independent reasons for thinking that an account where perceptual knowledge is incorrigible is desirable in epistemology.

[37] See Soteriou (2016), ch. 5 for a detailed articulation of this line of defence for the epistemological disjunctivist.

McDowell maintains that a correct understanding of the notion of knowledge implies that having knowledge is inconsistent with it being grounded on inconclusive warrant – i.e. warrant the obtaining of which is consistent with the falsity of the warranted proposition. We can find an expression of this position in the following passage, where McDowell discusses the specific case of knowledge acquired through testimony:

> I have been exploiting a principle to this effect: if we want to be able to suppose the title of a belief to count as knowledge is constituted by the believer's possession of an argument to its truth, it had better not be the case that the best argument he has at his disposal leaves it open that things are not as he believes them to be. If it does, what we are picturing is an epistemic position in which, for all the subject knows, things are not as he takes them to be; and that is not a picture of something that might intelligibly amount to knowing that they are that way. The argument would need to be conclusive. If you know something, you cannot be wrong about it (McDowell, 1994: 421).

Although the dialectical context in this passage is convoluted, its main point is that knowledge, in general, cannot be based on inconclusive grounds. For having knowledge implies that one *cannot* be wrong about what one knows. Now, the passage makes this point through the consideration (and subsequent rejection) of an inferential account of testimonial knowledge. McDowell argues that *if* this type of knowledge was grounded on an argument, then the argument should be conclusive, i.e. it should not leave open the possibility that the conclusion be false. For if the argument leaves open the possibility that the conclusion be false, then the judgement or belief based on that argument could not count as a piece of knowledge.[38] What is crucial to our discussion here is that McDowell is articulating a view of knowledge according to which one cannot know something if the grounds one has for believing the corresponding proposition are consistent with the falsity of that proposition.

The intuition behind McDowell's construal of knowledge can be made salient by considering the well-known lottery cases. Suppose I buy a ticket for a lottery in which the odds of winning are extremely low for any individual ticket, and I know this. Now, suppose that on this basis I form the belief that I will lose the lottery. Nevertheless, it seems natural to say that, despite being justified in holding this belief, I do not *know* that I will not win the lottery, for my evidence fails to rule out the possibility – however remote – that I possess a winning ticket. It is not until the lottery is drawn and I learn that my ticket is not the winning

[38] McDowell's ultimate conclusion in this context is that testimonial knowledge is not based on an argument to its truth, for there can be no conclusive argument for the case of testimony. See McDowell (1994).

one that I come to know that I have not won the lottery. One way of explaining this intuition appeals to adoption of the claim that knowledge can only be acquired on the back of conclusive warrant. The statistical evidence I possessed for thinking I would lose the lottery before it was drawn was inconclusive (albeit, still very good evidence). My evidence was consistent with the falsity of the proposition that I would not win the lottery. This is the reason why it was inappropriate to say – in advance of the draw – that I *knew* I would lose the lottery. Nevertheless, after I learn that my ticket is not the winning ticket I have acquired *conclusive* evidence for the relevant proposition. Only then – once conclusive grounds are acquired – can we say that we know.

Now, this is merely a prima facie reason to favour McDowell's construal of knowledge as requiring conclusive warrant. For the above line of reasoning depends on the intuition that in lottery cases we lack knowledge of the relevant proposition. But such an intuition can be challenged. Providing a response to views which challenge the intuition would put us back again in a defensive position. Unfortunately, here I lack the space to pursue this issue further. For my main aim is to present McDowell's position in order to argue that the view benefits from the incorporation of some insights from Austin. But I want to conclude my exposition of McDowell's view with a consideration in favour of his construal of knowledge which looks at the issue from a different angle.

McDowell thinks that the availability of alternative epistemological views in which knowledge can be had on the basis of inconclusive warrant is not a real threat to his account. For he thinks that as long as a position like his is tenable, it clearly is to be preferred over a view in which knowledge can be had on the basis of inconclusive warrant. This kind of argument can be found in the following passage, where he attacks "hybrid conceptions" of knowledge, i.e. conceptions according to which the epistemic standing which grounds relevant knowledge fails to guarantee the truth of the warranted belief:

> A hybrid conception of knowledge is often taken to be obvious… What makes the hybrid conception seem obvious is that … this view of knowledge seems to be the only alternative to scepticism. But this is one of those set-ups that are familiar in philosophy, in which a supposedly exhaustive choice confers a spurious plausibility on a philosophical position. The apparent plausibility is not intrinsic to the position, but reflects an assumed framework; when one looks at the position on its own, the plausibility crumbles away… (McDowell, 1995: 404).

McDowell argues that "hybrid conceptions" of knowledge in general can only seem attractive in a framework in which conclusive warrant is not available. In the passage, McDowell implies that his own proposal constitutes a plausible response to scepticism which offers an alternative to the hybrid conception. Nevertheless, note that the mere fact that his proposal constitutes an alternative to scepticism is not what makes the view preferable to a hybrid conception. The assumption that conclusive warrant is not available is what makes the hybrid conception seem attractive at all. Once a view in which conclusive warrant is available enters the scene, the plausibility of the hybrid conception is lost. Here, the argument seems to rest ultimately on the idea that a conception where knowledge is based on conclusive warrant is a more attractive view than one in which knowledge is based on inconclusive warrant. A hybrid view is only attractive under the assumption that a view where knowledge is based on conclusive warrant is not available. But we have explained how such a conception is tenable in the contemporary philosophical debate. Given that such a view is available, then the reasons to go for a hybrid view fade away.[39]

In Summary, McDowell's case for favouring a view in which perceptual knowledge is incorrigible depends on the following two ideas. First, the conception of knowledge as requiring conclusive grounds seems desirable from an epistemological point of view, as it voices certain intuitions we have regarding knowledge – for instance, it allows us to accommodate intuitions about knowledge in lottery scenarios. Second, hybrid views, where knowledge is had on the basis of inconclusive warrant, only seem attractive on the assumption that alternative views – where knowledge rests on conclusive grounds – are not available. These two points provide us with good prima facie reasons to favour a view in which successful exercises of perceptual capacities provide subjects with conclusive warrant. Establishing this case would require to defend these ideas from potential challenges. But that is something which has not been done here. McDowell's position, nevertheless, remains a plausible view in the current debate – my aim here has not been to establish it, but merely to present it in detail. Ultimately, in the final section of this chapter, we will suggest one way in which McDowell's view could be improved by appeal to Austin's epistemology.

[39] Against this line of reasoning it could be argued that McDowell's view, i.e. that perception provides us with conclusive warrant, is not a tenable position. See Wright (2008) and Logue (2011).

2.2 Fallible Capacities, Indefeasible Warrant

In the previous chapter we explained how Ayer tried to secure incorrigibility in perceptual knowledge by arguing that we have a general infallible capacity to tell what our experiences are like. There, we endorsed the reasons advanced by Austin to think that it is implausible to think we have such a capacity. Importantly Austin's case against the possibility of such an infallible capacity, left room for a conception where perceptual knowledge is grounded on conclusive grounds.

McDowell's epistemological disjunctivism is a way of articulating such a position. For McDowell, perceptual capacities (characterised as capacities to provide the subject with conclusive warrant) are not infallible, i.e. they are liable to fail. This means that there will be some exercises of the capacity – defective exercises – where the subject will not thereby be afforded with conclusive warrant for corresponding world-directed judgements. Yet, that the capacity is fallible in this way does not preclude that in successful exercises of the capacity the subject is thereby afforded with conclusive warrant (see McDowell, 2011: 38). This framework allows that fallible perceptual capacities sometimes afford subjects with conclusive warrant. We should now consider whether such a characterisation is correct. In particular, we will look more closely at the characterisation of successful exercises of perceptual capacities in order to determine on what grounds it can be maintained that such exercises provide conclusive warrant to perceiving subjects.

In his epistemology of perception McDowell makes space for a special kind of perceptual episode which plays a central role in explaining how rational subjects acquire perceptual knowledge. McDowell characterises such episodes as ones in which the subject's perceptual state makes an environmental reality manifest to her. These are successful exercises of perceptual capacities, or *good cases.* A paradigmatic example of a perceptual episode of this sort is that of *seeing* – when a subject sees, say, that a cat is on the mat, that fact is made manifest to the subject. Being in this state affords the subject which conclusive warrant and, thereby, puts the subject in a position to know that the relevant fact obtains. On the McDowellian picture, these cases are to be contrasted with cases in which it *merely seems* to the subject as if an environmental reality were made manifest to them. These are defective exercises of the capacities, or *bad cases*.

As we have seen, one of the distinctive features of a good case is that they put subjects in a position to know that the fact which is made manifest to them in perception actually obtains. Now, the notion of *being in a position to know something* is not entirely conspicuous. It is important to spend some time clarifying in what way the notion is used by McDowell, for this will be relevant in a later stage of this chapter. The notion could be understood at least in the following two different ways:

i) A subject is in a position to know that *p* if and only if *all* the subject should do to acquire knowledge is to judge that *p*.[40]

ii) A subject is in a position to know that *p* if and only if the subject is in possession of grounds which guarantee the truth of *p*.

McDowell chooses to characterise the notion along the lines of (ii) (McDowell, 2010: 246). Here, it is important to remember a point mentioned earlier, namely that on the operative conception, being in a position to know something does not imply actually knowing it – i.e. one can be in a position to know something and not know it. Thus, not knowing something does not suffice to show that someone is not in a position to know it. On McDowell's view, the successful exercise of a subject's perceptual capacities put her in position to know things about their surroundings by virtue of providing her with conclusive warrant for corresponding judgements.

Now, why is it that in successful exercises of perceptual capacities the subject has conclusive warrant? Why is that a correct characterisation of the capacity? In short, McDowell's response is that the conclusiveness of the warrant is guaranteed by the fact that the possession of that warrant is grounded in a state of affairs the obtaining of which is incompatible with the falsity of the relevant propositions warranted. McDowell thinks that a successful perceptual exercise provides subjects with indefeasible or conclusive warrant for making world-directed judgements because the following description is true of this kind of perceptual exercise:

> If a perceptual state makes a feature of the environment present to a perceiver's rationally self-conscious awareness, there is *no* possibility, compatibly with someone's being in that state, that things are not as the state would warrant her in believing that they are, in a belief that would simply register the presence of that

[40] Timothy Williamson advances this conception of being in a position to know in his (1996).

> feature of the environment. The warrant for belief that the state provides is indefeasible; it *cannot* be undermined (McDowell, 2011: 31).[41]

That is, when a subject undergoes a successful perceptual episode, an episode of, say, seeing that a cat is before her, the warrant thereby provided to them for thinking that there is a cat in front of her is conclusive *because* the subject couldn't possibly be in that state and the relevant proposition (i.e. that there is a cat in front of them) be false. Ultimately, it is the holding of this connection between successful exercises and the truth of certain propositions which grounds the conclusiveness of the warrants provided by successful perceptions.

2.3 Indefeasible warrant?

Now I want to call attention to the fact that in the passage quoted before McDowell presents his view in terms of "indefeasible" warrant. This has led some philosophers to think that, for McDowell, someone who forms a judgement on the basis of being in this kind of perceptual episode could not possibly be presented with counter-considerations which would lead her to retract her judgement (see Burge 2011).[42] This interpretation might be suggested by the last sentence of the passage: the warrant provided by successful perceptions is such that "it *cannot* be undermined". But McDowell maintains that this is not the correct reading of his contention that perception provides subjects with indefeasible warrant. He concedes that when an aspect of the environment is made manifest to a subject, some considerations could be advanced which would compel the subject to retract her claim to know.[43] McDowell addresses these worries by reformulating his claim. Where he used to talk about indefeasible warrant he talks now of conclusive warrant: "I do not need that word [i.e. indefeasibility] to express the notion I explained. I could make my claim like this: non-defective acts of perceptual capacities are experiences in which environmental realities are perceptually present to subjects, so that the experiences warrant associated beliefs *conclusively* (McDowell, 2013: 267).

I want to suggest that, nevertheless, some of the worries raised by Burge are not appropriately addressed by McDowell's change in vocabulary. One might still wonder

[41] See also McDowell (2010: 245).
[42] See Wright (2008) for a similar criticism to McDowell's view.
[43] This is an aspect which was already present in McDowell's conception as early as his (1982), see especially p. 390, fn. 37.

whether the warrant provided to subjects in successful exercises of perceptual capacities could be undermined by counter-considerations. This is precisely one of the points that Tyler Burge (2011) presses on in his response to McDowell (2010). Burge argues that "well-known counterexamples" show that the warrant provided by successful exercises of perceptual capacities is open to defeat by counter-considerations:

> The individual could have had the same successful perceptual belief, resting on the same successful perception. But the individual could have been given overwhelming reason – from induction or from expert testimony – to think (mistakenly), immediately after forming the belief, that his or her perception or belief-formation process was inaccurate or unreliable in the circumstances (Burge, 2011: 59).

To illustrate the point made by Burge let me use two examples advanced by McDowell himself, which differ slightly from Burge's general characterisation (I favour McDowell's characterisation of the problematic cases because it is more fine-grained than Burge's).

- Scenario (1): Suppose a subject is *misled* by a trustworthy experimenter into thinking that she finds herself in the following experimental setting: 50% of the time the lighting conditions in the laboratory will be such that, provided the subject's perceptual system is working properly, she would be able to tell the colour of the objects in front of her. The other 50% of the time the lighting conditions will be such that the subject would be unable to tell the colour of the things in front of her, despite the proper working of her perceptual systems. But the subject is misled into thinking she is in this situation. As a matter of fact she finds herself in a normal setting where the lighting conditions are appropriate all of the time. In other words, the subject in this scenario is provided with persuasive *but misleading* evidence to not trust their apparent perceptions. Unbeknownst to her, in any given occasion the situation will be such that the lighting conditions are appropriate for telling the colours of objects.
- Scenario (2): Suppose a subject actually finds herself in the experimental setting described in the previous paragraph. Imagine that the subject has been informed about the way the experiment she is participating in works, but is not informed in any given occasion what is the state of the lighting conditions. Thus, in any given occasion the subject does not know whether the lighting conditions are appropriate for telling the colours of things, for she knows she finds herself in this experimental setting. In other

words, the information she is given by the experimenter constitutes good reason to not trust their apparent perceptions.

The question which arises from these examples is whether in a given circumstance *O*, where the lighting conditions are appropriate for telling the colour of objects, subjects in scenarios (1) and (2) are in a position to know, say, that there is a green sphere before them? In other words, are such subjects in possession of conclusive warrant for thinking that there is a green sphere before them? If an affirmative answer is given to these questions do the counter-considerations presented by the experimenters effectively defeat the conclusive warrant the subjects enjoy? Interestingly, McDowell gives different verdicts for the two cases. He thinks that whether the information provided by the experimenters constitutes "good reason" or "misleading evidence" makes all the difference in these cases. For scenario (1) McDowell advances the following verdict:

> Suppose someone has an experience that makes a certain environmental reality perceptually present to her, but she is dissuaded by misleading evidence from taking that to be so. In that case, her perceptual state leaves open no possibility that a suitably related belief is false, but she is deprived of awareness that she is in such a position … But that leaves unchallenged the claim that the warrant her experience gives her … is conclusive (McDowell, 2013: 269).

Whereas for the second kind of case his verdict is as follows:

> An experience had in circumstances in which there is good reason to believe apparent perceptions are untrustworthy is not an experience of perceiving, even if it happens to be veridical. So if our subject had been in such a situation, her experience would not have been an experience of perceiving, and it would not have provided her with conclusive warrant for the belief (McDowell, 2013: 269).

Let us look closely at the two situations and McDowell's verdicts about them. Let us start with scenario (1). It seems clear that if a subject were to judge, in that situation, that there is a green sphere before her, her judgement would not be knowledgeable. Why not? A natural response would be that the counter-considerations effectively undermine the subject's capacity to exploit the warrant afforded by her experience. How do they to this? One suggestion is that these counter-considerations make it so that it would be irresponsible from the subject to judge that the sphere is green in the operative circumstances. Let us assume that a subject can only acquire knowledge if she has formed the relevant judgement in an epistemically responsible fashion. This is a claim which would be endorsed by McDowell

himself: "If one's taking things to be thus and so are to be cases of knowledge, they must be sensitive to the requirements of doxastic responsibility" (McDowell, 1994: 429). Ignoring independent, seemingly trustworthy evidence which suggests that one's source of epistemic warrant might not function appropriately would be epistemically irresponsible. As scenario (1) was set up, it seems that it would be irresponsible from the subject to ignore the information given to the subject by the experimenters. If the subject in scenario (1) would be breaking her epistemic obligations by judging that the sphere is green, then her resulting judgement cannot constitute knowledge.

These are considerations which might lead us to think that if the subject in scenario (1) where to judge that the sphere is green, her judgement would not constitute knowledge. But is this a reason for thinking that this subject would not be in a position to know that proposition, i.e. that the subject would not possess conclusive warrant? It seems not. Let us remember that a subject not knowing something does not imply that she is not in a position to know that. Let us remember also that McDowell has chosen to flesh out the notion of being in a position to know in terms of possessing conclusive warrant.[44] According to McDowell, in a particular occasion *O*, where the subject in scenario (1) is presented with a green sphere, the subject is thereby provided with warrant for thinking there is a green sphere, and the obtaining of that perceptual episode *is* incompatible with the falsity of the warranted proposition. So, there seems to be no reason to deny that the subject indeed has conclusive warrant. Nevertheless, being in possession of conclusive warrant does not license "one in refusing to consider apparent grounds for supposing that one's experience is not one of perceiving" (McDowell, 2013: 270). This is the reason why the subject in scenario (1) would not know that there is a green sphere before them. Importantly, for McDowell, the warrant afforded by perception has not been undermined by the misleading information: the subject is in possession of conclusive warrant in virtue of being in that perceptual state. The counter-considerations prevent the subject from exploiting the warrant she possesses.

But McDowell's verdict is very different in scenario (2). Surprisingly, his position with respect to this type of case is that even in a particular occasion *O*, when the lighting

[44] These considerations might suggest that McDowell's construal of the notion of "being in a position to know" is inappropriate, for in the relevant circumstances it seems that the subject's position precludes her from knowing. This is a criticism I will not pursue here at the moment.

conditions are appropriate, and a green sphere is before her, the subject's experience is not one of perceiving. In other words, in such an occasion the exercise of the subject's perceptual capacities is defective. What is the rationale behind this claim? In a similar fashion to the situation considered in the previous paragraphs, a subject undergoing *O* in scenario (2) would not acquire knowledge if they made the judgement that there is a green sphere before them. As in scenario (1), this would be partly due to the fact that making that judgement would be epistemically irresponsible. And we have assumed that knowledge is incompatible with epistemic irresponsibility. Nevertheless, the one salient difference in scenario (2) with respect to scenario (1) is that this is not the only reason why a subject would not know (had they made the judgement that there is a green sphere before them). Unlike scenario (1), in scenario (2) the information provided by the experimenters is not misleading, it actually constitutes good evidence for thinking that one should not trust their senses in this context. That the subject finds herself as a matter of fact in that experimental setting brings forth a further reason which prevents her from knowing that the sphere is green. Namely, that she is in a setting where her judgements about the colour of things would be, at best, true by luck – a kind of luck which is incompatible with the relevant judgment constituting knowledge. And, as pointed out by Matthew Soteriou, the subject finds herself in this situation independently of her awareness that she is in this situation: "in the kind of experimental conditions I described, the subject's perceptual experiences are untrustworthy, and the fact that they are untrustworthy is independent of the subject's being appraised of that fact" (Soteriou, 2016: 143). In other words, in scenario (2) there is more than one reason why the subject would not know that the sphere is green (had they made the relevant judgement). In situation *O*, the subject's judgement would be epistemically irresponsible; and even if true, it would have been true by luck.

Nevertheless, it is not clear at all that this feature of scenario (2) should suffice to sustain a verdict different to the one advanced in scenario (1). All that has been shown by our discussion of scenario (2) is that the subject in this scenario would not know that there is a green sphere before them (had they made the relevant judgement). But, as we saw before, not knowing something does not imply that someone is not in a position to know it. Moreover, in a particular occasion *O*, where the subject in scenario (2) is perceptually aware of the green sphere, what would be the reason to deny that the subject is thereby provided

with conclusive warrant for thinking that there is a green sphere? After all, the obtaining of that perceptual episode *is* incompatible with the falsity of the warranted proposition. What are McDowell's reasons for thinking that, in these circumstances, the exercise of the subject's perceptual capacities would be defective? If the only reason for thinking that the subject in scenario (2) does not perceive the green sphere (and thus, lacks conclusive warrant for so thinking), is that the subject's judgement that the sphere is green in those circumstances would not amount to knowledge, then McDowell's case is not definitive. For we have seen that a subject can be in possession of conclusive warrant whilst not knowing the proposition that she has warrant for. We cannot infer from the subject's lack of knowledge that they also lack conclusive warrant. Moreover, one reason advanced by McDowell to say that in scenario (1) the subject in situation *O* does possess conclusive warrant is that her having that experience excludes the possibility that the relevant judgement be false: "it is still the case that her experience leaves open no possibility that things are not as they would be believed to be in the belief she would have been misled into thinking she is not in a position to form" (McDowell, 2013: 270). But this is something that holds *also* for the subject in scenario (2), in *O*. If this is a good ground to maintain that the subject in scenario (1) possesses conclusive warrant, it should also be a good ground for maintaining the same thing about a subject in scenario (2).

The last paragraph shows that there seems to be no good reason to maintain that subjects in scenarios like (2), in a situation type *O*, lack conclusive perceptual warrant. There is no good reason for this restriction especially within a view like McDowell's, in which subjects in scenarios like (1), in a situation type *O*, are considered to possess conclusive warrant. Given these reasons to doubt McDowell's verdict of scenario (2), we should consider whether an alternative, and more satisfactory, explanation is available. One natural suggestion would be to advance a conception in which subjects in scenarios like (2), in a situation type *O*, do possess conclusive warrant. On such a conception, we could maintain that the effect the operative counter-considerations have is that they render the subject unable to exploit the warrant her perceptual experience provides her with.

So we are presented with two alternative accounts of scenario (2). On McDowell's account the subject's exercise of her perceptual capacities in *O* is defective – the subject is not provided with conclusive warrant. This would explain why the subject in *O* would not

know if she were to judge that the sphere before her is green. On our alternative account, the subject's exercise of her perceptual capacities in *O* is successful – the subject is provided with conclusive warrant. Our explanation of why the subject would not know if she were to judge that the sphere is green has to do with the fact that there are two obstacles which prevent her from exploiting her perceptual conclusive warrant. These obstacles are: the trustworthy information given by the experimenters, which would render her potential judgement irresponsible; and the fact that she finds herself in a situation such that if she were to judge that the sphere is green, her judgement would be true by luck.

Perhaps an additional twist to the story could help us see the plausibility that our alternative account has over McDowell's. Imagine that after the experiment is over the chief experimenter informs you that in occasion *O* the lighting conditions were appropriate. Could you then acquire knowledge that there was a green sphere before you in *O*? It seems reasonable to respond affirmatively to this question. After being told that the situation was normal in *O*, one could come to know that the sphere was green after all. A straightforward explanation of why this additional information allows us to acquire knowledge about the previously experienced situation is that the obstacle which hindered the subject from exploiting the warrant afforded to her by perception has been now dismantled. The subject would not be epistemically irresponsible anymore if she were to judge that the sphere was green. And, moreover, even when it was partly due to luck that in that particular situation, *O*, the lighting conditions were appropriate, it was not due to luck that *in that situation* her judgement was true – after all the situation was such that it excluded the possibility that the judgement be false. The additional information puts the subject in a position to show that the luck involved in *O* does not prevent her from knowing. After being informed by an authority that this is the only real barn in barn-façade County, one might be able to know that the structure before one is a barn. For one has the elements to neutralize the luck involved in being in barn-façade country vis-à-vis judging that the structure before one is a barn.[45] We have, then, a straightforward way of explaining how a subject could acquire knowledge about *O*, after the experiment is over and she acquires the additional information about *O*. The explanation is this: the subject had conclusive warrant all along. The information provided to her after the experiment is over allows her to exploit that warrant and acquire the

[45] The barn façade example is due to Goldman (1976).

knowledge that was available to her all along. This information allows her to exploit the warrant because it dismantles the obstacles that prevented the subject from exploiting that warrant.

But within McDowell's account we cannot advance this explanation. For McDowell, the subject's perceptual capacities are exercised defectively in scenario (2), in situation *O*. Which means that the subject lacks conclusive warrant for thinking that the sphere before her in *O* was green. Thus, the additional information that in *O* the lighting conditions were appropriate to tell colours cannot enable the subject to exploit the warrant afforded to her by perception – for her perception did not provide her with any warrant she could exploit in a judgement. One suggestion which could be advanced on behalf of McDowell would be to say that a subject in scenario (2), in situation *O*, lacked *conclusive* warrant for thinking that the sphere was green. Nevertheless, it could be claimed that her perceptual experience afforded her with *less than conclusive* warrant in that situation. When the subject is informed by the chief experimenter that in situation *O* the lights were appropriate to tell the colours of things, then the subject is in a position to exploit her less than conclusive warrant, afforded to her by perception. Nevertheless, this would not get McDowell too far, for he is committed to a conception according to which knowledge has to rest on conclusive grounds if it is to be considered knowledge at all. But if the suggestion is that perceptual experiences could afford a subject in scenario (2), in situation *O*, at most with less than conclusive warrant, then he cannot make sense of the idea that such a subject could attain knowledge when she is provided with the additional information regarding *O*. At this stage several options open for McDowell. First, he can reject the claim that in the latest twist to the story the subject would know that the sphere was green if she were to make that judgement. Second, he could claim that her less than conclusive warrant, supplemented with the additional information regarding *O*, constitute conclusive warrant for thinking that the sphere was green. Third, he could revise his account of scenario (2) and embrace our proposal to concede that a subject in *O* would possess conclusive warrant for thinking that the sphere was green.

Here I will not look closely at the plausibility of the first two options. I will say a few things about them in order to suggest that the best option available for McDowell is to endorse the alternative account of scenario (2) advanced by us. The first two options involve holding on to the account of scenario (2) given by McDowell, according to which the exercise

of the subject's perceptual capacities are defective and fail to provide her with conclusive warrant. But, we saw before that such an approach lacks adequate motivation, for the only reasons in its favour were found to be indecisive. Moreover, the first strategy would involve rejecting the intuition that subjects in the latest twist of the story could acquire knowledge were they to judge that the sphere was green. This intuition would have to be explained away if the first strategy is going to be successful. The second strategy would involve serious theoretical work to explain how the situation described in the latest twist to the story could give rise to conclusive warrant for the subject. Given these considerations, I want to suggest that the more economical reaction from McDowell would be to embrace the third strategy and adopt our account of scenario (2), according to which the subject in *O* does have conclusive warrant for thinking that the sphere was green.

In the final section of this chapter I want to suggest that our treatment of scenario (2) is not a just-so story, but that it actually follows from the Austinian approach to perceptual knowledge that we wish to defend in this thesis. That Austin's epistemology finds applicability in this discussion, and helps us deal better with the scenarios that are problematic for McDowell's view, is a strong indication to think that Austin's approach to perceptual knowledge has a lot to offer in the contemporary philosophical landscape.

2.4 Back to Austin – the Optimal position for Making a Perceptual Judgement

Let us remember that in our interpretation of Austin, a judgement made on the basis of perception, on a given circumstance, is incorrigible only if the subject who does it finds herself in the optimal position to make that judgement. An important aspect of this interpretation of Austin is that being in this optimal position to make a perceptually based judgement is not exhausted by the subject being in a given perceptual state:

> [I]f when I make a statement, it is true that nothing whatever could in fact be produced as a cogent ground for retracting it, this can only be because I am in, have got myself into, the very best possible position for making that statement (Austin, 1962: 114).

On the assumption that Austin's remarks extend to judgements, when someone finds herself in the best possible position for judging that there is a green sphere in front of them, this is not merely because they are in, say, a state of seeing the green sphere. Being in the optimal

position for making a judgement also involves the subject having done something to be in that position, i.e. to be in a position in which they can exploit the warrant afforded to her by perception. A suggestion made in the previous chapter was that, on Austin's picture, there are two elements which contribute to the optimal position for making a judgement: a passive and an active element.

Both Austin and McDowell would agree that the successful exercise of perceptual capacities provide subjects with a distinctive kind of warrant for world-directed judgements. But the Austinian approach we have advanced incorporates explicitly an agential element. Depending on the circumstances, different things will be required from the perceiver in order to exploit the warrant afforded to her by perception. This is why Austin remarks that one "gets oneself into" the optimal position to make a judgement. Let us consider a simple case in which the subject has not done enough to place themselves in that position. Consider, for instance, a case in which there are plenty of tapirs and pigs roaming in the farm and the subject has a quick glimpse of a pig. The subject's perceptual experience provides her with conclusive warrant for thinking that the animal is a pig – after all the subject being in that perceptual state is inconsistent with the falsity of the relevant proposition. But despite possessing conclusive warrant, the subject might not be in a position to rationally judge this, let alone know it. Let us suppose that the subject did not pay enough attention to the animal to ascertain that it indeed was a pig. For Austin, this means that the subject did not do what she had to do to be in a position to exploit the warrant afforded to her by her perceptual experience. Given the presence of ringers, it might be required from the subject to do more than having a quick glimpse on the animal in order to be able to exploit the warrant afforded to her by perception.

On Austin's position, a failure to know in cases where perceptual capacities are exercised does not necessarily mean that the exercise has been defective. There are plenty of alternative reasons as to why, in a particular case, the subject might be unable to acquire knowledge. For, depending on the case, there are many things the subject might need to do in order to be able to exploit the conclusive warrant afforded to her by perception. For instance, in "Other Minds" (1946: 82-97), Austin suggests that one can know that a bird in a branch is a goldfinch only if one is prepared to deal with potential counter-considerations. Moreover, when a specific counter-consideration does arise, if one is to retain the claim to

knowledge one must be able to neutralize that counter-consideration. It is important to note that Austin's position is not as demanding as this characterisation makes it sound. For Austin's position in that paper is that for one to be knowledgeable one need not be able to neutralize just any possible counter-considerations. Thus, for instance, one need not be worried if my claim that the bird is a goldfinch is challenged on the basis that my grounds (say, that it has a red head) for so thinking are "not enough". If no further specification is advanced, then the challenge that my grounds are not enough fails to gain any traction. A valid challenge must specify in what sense my grounds are not enough. You might point out, for instance, that other birds in the vicinity have red heads too (Austin, 1946: 84). Thus, for Austin, the requirement that the subject be able to deal with potential counter-considerations is limited by the many different ways in which a challenge might turn out to be "invalid". Yet, the suggestion is that a subject can exploit the warrant afford to her by perception only if she is able to neutralize valid challenges.

The account we advanced of scenario (2) in the previous section seems natural from the Austinian perspective we have developed. This approach makes space for the possibility that the subject in scenario (2), in *O*, successfully perceives her environment and that, therefore, has conclusive warrant for thinking that the sphere is green. Yet, we can explain their lack of knowledge on the basis that the subject has not done enough to place herself in a position where she can exploit that warrant. The information given by the experimenter amounts to a valid challenge to her potential judgement that the sphere is green. Unless the subject has a way to neutralize those counter-considerations, she will be unable to exploit that warrant. The additional information described in the latest twist to the story, provides the subject with the elements to dismantle the obstacle which prevented her from exploiting the conclusive warrant afforded to her by perception.[46]

These considerations show that our account of scenario (2) follows naturally from the Austinian epistemology we are defending in this thesis. This means that our account is not a

[46] It is important to note that the Austinian approach advanced here is consistent with saying that there might be circumstances in which there is nothing the subject could have done to put herself in a position in which she could exploit a warrant afforded to her by perception. Consider, for instance a case in which we can see a goldfinch standing on a tree, only for it to immediately fly away. The position is not incompatible with the fact that sometimes, despite possessing conclusive warrant, there simply is nothing the subject could do to exploit that warrant (see Austin, 1946: 88).

just-so story invoked in the face of the problems which arise for McDowell's position, rather it is a well-motivated account. I would like to finish this chapter by highlighting something which was mentioned before already. Namely, that our case for favouring our account of scenario (2) should not be considered a knock down argument against McDowell's position. Quite the opposite. My suggestion is that McDowell's position would be improved if it incorporated the account we advanced of scenario (2). The issue of whether there is a further aspect of McDowell's position which makes it incompatible with embracing this account cannot be addressed here.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have explored one way in which an Austin-inspired epistemology could be put to use in the contemporary epistemological landscape. We explained how embracing an aspect of that Austinian approach would allow us to provide a plausible explanation of the cases that McDowell struggles with. In order to do this we engaged in detailed exposition of McDowell's position in the first part of the chapter. This work will be useful in future chapters where we will again contrast our position to McDowell's. In order to address the problems raised by the examples presented by Burge we appealed to the optimal position for making a judgement which figures in Austin's epistemology. I suggested that this provided us with good reason to think that the Austinian approach can be effectively put to use in the contemporary epistemological landscape. In the remainder of this thesis we will look closer at Austin's suggestion that in successful exercises of perceptual experience subjects are afforded with non-evidential warrant for making world-directed judgements. In the following chapter we propose that this aspect of Austin's epistemology can be fleshed out by the Radical Anti-psychologism advanced by Mark Kalderon in a recent paper (Kalderon, 2011).

Chapter 3 – Austin's Insight and Radical Anti-psychologism

In the previous chapter we discussed Austin's conception of incorrigibility in central cases of perceptual knowledge. There, I argued that, for Austin, incorrigibility in those central cases stems from the subject's being in the best possible position for making the relevant judgement. Two components make up such an optimal position. On the one hand successful perceptual experiences make available conclusive warrant for the perceiving subject. This was characterised as the *passive* element in the optimal position. On the other hand, there is a set of things the subject should *do* in order to be able to exploit the warrant afforded to her by perception. This was characterised as the *active* element in the optimal position. In the previous chapter, we identified and discussed *one* such condition of the active element. For Austin, the subject must be able to neutralize valid counter-considerations to her judgement. In other words, the subject must be disposed to act accordingly – i.e. in an epistemically responsible manner – in the face of counter-considerations to her judgement. Further conditions which contribute to the active element in the optimal position might include paying careful attention to the relevant perceived aspects of the environment, and successfully recognizing those elements as the things they are. In the previous chapter we noted the difficulties in characterizing these capacities (attention, recognition, and sensitivity to counter-considerations) as active capacities.

The focus for the remainder of this thesis will be the passive element of the optimal position. Advancing a detailed elucidation and defence of this will provide us with enough material for this thesis. Unfortunately, then, a detailed elucidation and defence of the active element will be set aside. It is important, nevertheless, to bear in mind that the passive element in the optimal position is only *one* part of the Austinian story about perceptual knowledge. Recognition that there is an active element in this epistemological story will be relevant for our purposes – i.e. elucidating the passive element – at certain points. Thus, something brief will be said about the active element, although it will not be the focus of the present enquiry, nor will we develop a full account of it. For instance, we have already said something about sensitivity to counter-considerations in the previous chapter, and we will say something brief about recognitional capacities in chapters 5 and 6.

More specifically, the focus in the remainder of the thesis will be what we called "Austin's insight" in chapter 1. That is the claim that the warrant on which certain paradigmatic instances of perceptual knowledge are based is a *distinctive* kind of warrant. There, the warrant in question was characterised as non-evidential. We identified two claims associated with the insight – a positive one, and a negative one. According to the negative claim, the non-evidential warrant possessed by a subject in paradigmatic cases is *different in kind* from the warrant possessed by the subject in cases of evidential perceptual knowledge. According to the positive claim, the warrant possessed by subjects in non-evidential cases is *distinctively* good, epistemologically speaking. More specifically, non-evidential warrant is tantamount to proof, in the sense that it has the capacity to *settle* an issue. The emphasis in this and the following chapters will be on elucidating and defending of a specific interpretation of these claims. The theoretical framework that will be used to provide this elucidation is the Radical Anti-psychologism advanced recently by Mark Kalderon (2011).

In the first part of this chapter we will address a worry which might arise at a fundamental level with respect to Austin's insight. That is, the worry that the insight amounts to no more than a linguistic observation which has little or no philosophical significance for an epistemological account of perception. We will argue that such an accusation rests on a misunderstanding of the Austinian method. The second part of this chapter will be devoted to an articulation of Austin's insight along Radical Anti-psychologist lines. The adoption of this position will provide us with the elements to explain how non-evidential warrant can be different in kind from evidential warrant, as well as how perception can provide subjects with conclusive warrant. In that section, we will also contrast our favoured interpretation of Austin's insight with two possible alternatives – one based on Timothy Williamson's remarks on evidence (2000), and one based on McDowell's (1982, 2011) conception of the epistemological significance of perception.

3.1 Austin's insight. Linguistic Observation or Epistemological Claim?

We have argued that a distinctive and attractive epistemology of perception can be found in Austin's writings, and our overall aim in this thesis is to start articulating a detailed epistemology of perception which takes its cue from Austin's observations. This approach to Austin's epistemology and to Austin's Insight assumes that something philosophically

significant has been uncovered by him in his discussion of evidential and non-evidential perceptual knowledge. Nevertheless, this assumption could be challenged by someone who is sceptical of Austin's methodology on the basis that its excessive reliance on the analysis of our ordinary use of language prevents him from appreciating the genuinely philosophical problems that lie behind ordinary talk. In this section, we will pay close attention to this form of criticism. This will serve as a springboard for the following section. Once we have made a case for thinking that Austin's insight indeed uncovers something philosophically significant we will advance an epistemological picture which fleshes out Austin's insight.

As we saw in the first chapter, Austin appeals to a couple of examples to establish the claim that in certain circumstances our perceptual knowledge is non-evidentially warranted. He does so by drawing a distinction between two different ways in which we could come to know something on the basis of perception. For instance, he says, we would *properly talk* of evidence for thinking that there is a pig somewhere in the farm when we saw pig hoofprints on the ground, but not when the pig itself was in plain view in front of us. Similarly, we do not *say* that we have evidence for thinking that a man shot another if we have witnessed the shooting ourselves. This way of talking – i.e. talk of evidence – is reserved for cases such as the one in which we find the murder weapon covered in the murderer's fingerprints. Note that this is consistent with the claim that someone in the position of the witness can provide evidence for someone less well-placed. That is, an eyewitness can produce evidence for someone else in the form of their testimony, for instance in a court of law. But, importantly, this does not entail that the witness' knowledge that the shooting occurred rests on evidence – she does not *need* evidence, she has witnessed the shooting.[47] The notions of "signs" and "symptoms" exhibit a behaviour similar to that of "evidence". According to Austin, "we never talk of 'symptoms' or 'signs' except *by way of implied contrast with inspection of the item itself*" (Austin, 1946: 105). This is illustrated by means of another example: looking from a window, it would be improper to say that there are signs of a storm when we can see that it is pouring with rain outside. Instead, talk of signs of a storm are reserved for cases in which the storm is not currently present, for example if it were approaching in the horizon

[47] This is not an uncontroversial way of understanding the epistemic significance of testimony. See, for instance Moran (2005), for a view in which the epistemic role of testimony is not to provide the hearer with evidence, but with a distinctive kind of reason for belief.

(*Cfr*. Austin, 1946: 106). Now, that at least this contrast is marked, or at least implied, in ordinary talk should be obvious from the examples. Nevertheless, it is not so clear what is the best way to flesh out the distinction and what, if any, is its epistemological significance.[48]

Let us consider the position of someone critical of the Austinian approach – i.e. someone who would be sceptical of the philosophical significance of the distinction identified by Austin. A criticism of this kind could be mounted by making use of a more general line of reasoning commonly employed against Austin's methodological approach. This line of argument targets Austin's methodology by claiming that as illuminating as it might be to identify certain ways in which the philosophical use of certain expressions differs – sometimes wildly – from their everyday use, such observations generally lack interesting philosophical consequences.[49] The critic could concede that Austin has successfully identified both the circumstances in which we would *say* that we have evidence for something being the case; as well as the circumstances in which it would *not* be appropriate to *say* that we have evidence for – or that there are signs of – something being the case. The examples of the pig, the shooting, and the storm should make this vivid. But all that Austin has achieved in so doing, the opponent could argue, is to provide an accurate description of a linguistic practice. The opponent could go on to question whether the linguistic point made by Austin has any epistemological consequences. Why think the linguistic phenomena reveals something about the underlying epistemology?

This criticism rests on a conception of Austin's general approach to philosophical disputes, according to which his unwillingness or incapacity to appreciate the concerns which motivate traditional philosophical theorising prevents him from gathering (linguistic) data which is actually relevant for the relevant philosophical inquiry. This conception of Austin's approach is found, for instance, in Jonathan Bennett's early criticism of Austin's methodology. Regarding Austin's survey of the different uses of the term "real" in chapter

[48] Here, Austin's underlying strategy of reading semantical distinctions from distinctions in use could be challenged. For instance, a Gricean might suggest that our unwillingness to characterise one's position when one sees the pig as involving evidence is to be explained by the fact that talking of evidence in those cases might carry unwanted implicatures (see Grice, 1975). This potential challenge to Austin will have to be set aside in this thesis. But an exhaustive defence of his position should advance a response to this worry.
[49] See Bennett (1966) and Ayer (1967) for this type of criticism to Austin's methodology. See also Urmson (1965), Glendinning (2011), Gustafsson (2011), Longworth (2013), and Cavell (1965) for different views on Austin's methodology. For a different angle in criticism of Austin's methodology see Stroud (1984) and Kaplan (2000) for a response to that criticism.

VIII of *Sense and Sensibilia,* Bennett complains that the survey is useless because Austin is unwilling to see the motivations driving the philosophical debate: "in order to show that philosophers are neglecting data relevant to their concerns, one needs to understand what their concerns are; and such understanding requires some measure of intellectual sympathy with modes of thought whose largeness one may find distasteful" (Bennett, 1966: 514). On Bennett's view, Austin's incapacity to appreciate the concerns of philosophers worried about the relation between reality and appearance prevents him from carrying out a linguistic survey which is relevant to the established philosophical debate. On such a conception, then, the irrelevance of Austin's linguistic findings derives from his lack of understanding or sympathy towards what drives philosophical debates. This is the "popular conception" of Austin's methodology that Michael Martin finds in critical engagements with Austin: "a somewhat *ad hoc* and pedantic focus on how words are actually used in ordinary or common language; an obstinate refusal to look at the phenomena which genuinely motivate philosophical concerns, and an insistence that all one must do is use one's words carefully" (Martin, ms, 1).

If this were a correct conception of the Austinian methodology, then one would be well-advised to call into question the relevance for philosophical theorising of Austin's observations regarding our common use of words. We will argue that the "popular conception" is a caricature, and that the criticism mounted on it can be dismissed safely. We can see that the popular conception is not fair to Austin if we focus on the way in which Ayer himself uses it in his reaction to *Sense and Sensibilia*.[50] There, Ayer claims several times that Austin's (largely correct) linguistic observations fall short of engaging with the properly philosophical points he was interested in making. For instance, Ayer agrees with Austin in his observation that it is inappropriate to classify all cases in which subjects might be deceived by appearances as "illusions". Yet, Ayer goes on to claim that "these points are unimportant" (Ayer, 1967: 128), for they fail to engage with the properly philosophical point of whether the argument from illusion shows something of philosophical interest. Elsewhere, Ayer concedes that Austin is right in pointing out that the words "look", "appear", and "seem" are not synonymous – contrary to the way some sense-datum theorist use them. But, again, this point is dismissed by Ayer as irrelevant: "[Austin] has some interesting things to

[50] Ayer (1967).

say on this topic, but nothing that is relevant to the main argument" (Ayer, 1967: 130). As long as the technical sense of "seems" advanced by sense-datum theorists is legitimate, Ayer claims, the linguistic observations made by Austin can be dismissed safely. Nevertheless, what Ayer fails to acknowledge is that Austin's discussion in chapter IX of *Sense and Sensibilia* is largely devoted to challenging the legitimacy of the technical sense of "seems" introduced by Ayer and other sense-datum theorists. There, Austin's challenge is based on the claim that the technical term, as advanced by Ayer, presupposes what the argument from illusion is intended to prove, i.e. that sense-data are the proper objects of perception.[51] Ayer omits this aspect of Austin's work in his response, and makes it seem as if all Austin did was to jot down the different ways "seem", "appear", and "look" are ordinarily used.

Arguably, in the two cases described in the previous paragraph a case is to be made in favour of the relevance of Austin's remarks with respect to the philosophical discussion at hand. Let us focus, nevertheless, on the third instance in which Ayer dismisses Austin's remarks on ordinary language on the grounds that they are irrelevant for the philosophical discussion at hand. This dismissal has to do with Austin's remarks regarding the evidential/non-evidential distinction. After reviewing Austin's discussion on the topic, Ayer remarks:

> All this may be accepted, as a comment on ordinary usage. As a general rule, wen one speaks of having evidence for a proposition *p*, one expects it to be understood that one is not entirely convinced of the truth of *p* […] It would, however, be rash to lay any weight upon this in the present context, since my knowing that *p* is certainly not inconsistent with my having good evidence for it. On the contrary, in very many instances it would not be proper for me to claim to know that *p* unless I did have such evidence (Ayer, 1967: 121).

In this response, Ayer seems to read Austin as arguing that one cannot know *p* on the basis of evidence, but fails to provide sound grounds for such a claim. For Ayer, a survey of the different uses of "evidence" is irrelevant because this survey fails to show that we cannot know that *p* on the basis of evidence. Nevertheless, that is not Austin's target – his discussion of the use of "evidence" is not intended to prove that we cannot know on the basis of evidence. For him, a subject can know about the presence of a pig in, at least, two different ways: by gathering evidence of its presence, or by encountering the beast itself. This is why

[51] See chapter 1, section 1.1.ii of this thesis for detailed discussion of this aspect of Ayer's view.

he says that "one who says 'it's a pig' will sometimes have evidence for saying so, sometimes not" (Austin, 1962a: 116).

Thus, in this instance, it seems Ayer has misidentified the target of Austin's criticism. But what is the target of the discussion, then? And do Austin's observations succeed in engaging with *that* philosophical discussion? A reasonable construal is that Austin's target in this passage is a doctrine about knowledge which seems to be implicit in Ayer's position: "In a nutshell, the doctrine about […] 'empirical' knowledge, is that it has *foundations*. It is a structure the upper tiers of which are reached by inferences, and the foundations are the *data* on which these inferences are based" (Austin 1962a: 105). With respect to this doctrine, it is the purpose of Austin's discussion to put in doubt the assumption that knowledge has *foundations* – when this crucial notion is interpreted in terms of "evidence". Once the target has been characterised along these lines, we can see that Austin's discussion of the everyday use of the notion of "evidence" is indeed relevant for the philosophical discussion. If the upshot of his linguistic survey is that sometimes knowledge (in particular, perceptual knowledge) is not based on evidence, then the "doctrine about empirical knowledge" looks less secure. On this reading, Austin's target is a much more fundamental point to the one identified (wrongly) by Ayer. And it is only when the proper target is brought to the foreground that we can see clearly that Austin's discussion is relevant to the philosophical debate.[52] One might complain still that Austin's discussion of "evidence" might be irrelevant because ordinary use of a term is insufficient to establish that the term tracks an ontological category. This point should be obvious from terms like "witch". We will see that Austin would agree with this remark. His point is not that distinctions in ordinary language establish matters in philosophy (or other theoretical enterprises), his point is merely that the ordinary distinctions can be used as data which has to be explained by our philosophical theories.

We are well advised, then, not to confuse Austin's attempt to challenge some of the most basic assumption on which traditional debates rest, with an unwillingness or an incapacity to understand the debates, or the concerns which motivate them. Perhaps this seeming lack of interest in engaging in philosophical debates – an element central in the "popular conception" of Austin – is better understood merely as a refusal to accept the terms

[52] See Glendinning (2011) for a similar account of the main target of Austin's *Sense and Sensibilia*.

of the debate as they are set. Austin's methodology, then, can be seen as an invitation to step back, slow down and re-consider what is it that we are trying to achieve with our philosophical theories. *One* of many ways in which such re-considerations can be promoted is by looking closely at the different ways in which we ordinarily talk of the phenomena we are trying to understand. These considerations give us reason to put in doubt the "popular conception" of Austin's philosophical method. A positive characterisation of Austin's linguistic method, especially its role in philosophical theorising, will help us understand with more detail what is the basis to think that the evidential/non-evidential distinction identified by Austin reveals something of interest to an epistemologist of perception.

i) Some Remarks on Austin's Methodology

It is patently true that Austin's philosophical approach is characterised by a careful analysis of the different ways in which words and expressions are used in ordinary, non-philosophical, contexts. But there is more to Austin's philosophical methodology. Austin himself explicitly acknowledges that such method is just *one* in the philosopher's arsenal: the method of "examining *what we should say when*" is characterised by himself as "*one* philosophical method" (Austin, 1957: 181, my emphasis). Yet, the philosopher's practice should not be limited to analysing (and accepting) ordinary linguistic practices as they stand. What then is then the role of the careful analysis of the ordinary use of language characteristic of Austin's philosophy? In one way of understanding the Austinian method, the analysis of ordinary language is propaedeutic work necessary for proper philosophical theorising:

> First, words are our tools, and, as a minimum, we should use clean tools, we should know what we mean and what we do not, and we must forearm ourselves against the traps that language sets us. Secondly, words are not (except in their own little corner) facts or things: we need therefore to prise them off the world, to hold them apart from and against it, so that we can realize their inadequacies and arbitrariness, and can re-look at the world without blinkers. Thirdly, and more hopefully, our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth making, in the lifetimes of many generations: these surely are likely to be more numerous, more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of the survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and reasonably practical matters, than any of you or I are likely to think up in our arm-chairs of an afternoon—the most favoured alternative method (Austin, 1957: 181-182).

Austin is making several claims here in an attempt both to characterise, in general, the methodological role of common language analysis, as well as to present the advantages this method can report to philosophy. One claim being made in this passage ("First…") is that one advantage of such methodology is to provide us with a clear understanding of the phenomena to be studied as well as to prevent us from making certain mistakes. For Austin, the starting point of philosophical theorising should be a thorough analysis of how the concepts relevant to our enquiry are ordinarily used. This should lead at the very least to a clear understanding of our ordinary ways of describing the phenomena we are attempting to explain philosophically. A beneficial by-product of knowing well the different ways in which certain concepts are commonly used is that we will be prepared to deal with the "traps" set by language. Austin is not explicit in what he means here by language setting traps. But one way of understanding this claim would be the following. A careful study of the common use of expressions will provide us with an understanding of the main ways in which these expressions are used. But such a study will reveal not only the regularities underlying our use of those expressions; it will also reveal the ways in which certain uses deviate from the norm (see Urmson, 1965). Being aware of divergence as well as the norm will prevent us from taking divergent uses as the norm and vice versa. For instance, in "Other Minds" (1946: 106, fn. 1), Austin notes a divergent use of "signs", namely that we talk of signs of inflation are of the same nature of inflation itself. This diverges from the general rule that according to which we talk of signs (as in "signs of a storm") in the absence of the item the signs are signs of.

More importantly for our present purposes, another claim made in this passage ("Thirdly…") is that distinctions made in ordinary language should be treated with respect by the philosopher, for they are the result of a long history of evolution and adaptation in the description of a wide variety of phenomena. One way of cashing out this remark (a way supported by Austin's philosophy) would be to claim that the ordinary use of language should have initial credibility, and a *prima facie* authority which should guide philosophical theorising. This remark provides us, then, with an avenue to respond to the worry that Austin's linguistic observations fails to reveal anything about the underlying epistemology. The response would be that distinctions which are made in ordinary talk are distinctions to be taken seriously, for they have stood the test of time. It is the job of the philosopher to

identify such distinctions, and, recognizing their importance, she must make sense of them in her theory. She can do so either by incorporating the distinction into their view, or by rejecting the distinction. But in the latter case an adequate explanation of such rejection has to be given. On Austin's view, a revisionary approach to the ordinary use of language requires a special reason for the revision, for instance, the failure to accommodate a given phenomenon without the introduction of new expressions. This shows that for Austin, when there is good reason for it, philosophers may defy ordinary linguistic practices.[53] After all, as robust as ordinary language might be, it is bound to have expressive limitations:

> It is worth bearing in mind, too, the general rule that we must not expect to find simple labels for complicated cases. Here the natural economy of language operates: if the words already available for simple cases suffice in combination to describe a complicated case, there will be need for special reasons before a special word is invented for the complication. Besides, however well-equipped our language, it can never be forearmed against all possible cases that may arise and call for description: fact is richer than diction (Austin, 1957: 195).

On the Austinian approach, then, everyday linguistic practice is to be analysed carefully as a preliminary to philosophical theorising. This analysis should lead to a comprehensive understanding of the way the expressions involved are ordinarily used, and the results should be taken seriously by philosophers. But this attitude of respect does not amount to a complete impossibility of revision. Revisions to ordinary language are justified only insofar as the ordinary language is somehow lacking when it comes to describing the relevant phenomena.[54]

If this is a correct way of understanding the Austinian method, it is hard to see how there could be anything contentious or fundamentally misguided in it. For, on this reading, the role of linguistic analysis in Austin's methodology is quite sensible, as it merely urges us to understand and accommodate the language that is ordinarily used to describe the relevant phenomena we are interested in before embarking ourselves in philosophical theorising. Perhaps the initial worry – that Austin's linguistic remarks lack philosophical significance –

[53] For instance, there are reasons independent of the use of terms such as "witch" to think that they do not track a real entity in the world.
[54] This way of understanding Austinian methodology is advanced by Longworth (2013: §2).

rests on the idea that Austin only makes linguistic observations and accepts them at face value unreflectively. But our analysis of Austin's linguistic methodology shows that this accusation rests on a simplification. For Austin, linguistic analysis is only the first step in philosophical theorising. The attitude of respect towards ordinary language is based on its long history (on its having stood the test of time), and *does not* amount to a complete incapacity to revising it. The attitude of respect advocated by Austin merely requires from philosophers that a good reason is advanced for the rejection of an ordinary way of talking or for the introduction of new, technical, terminology. Austin's insight, then, is advanced as a substantive piece of philosophical theorising. A principle which finds part of its motivation in a well-established linguistic practice. But this does not mean that the principle finds its justification merely in the ordinary linguistic practice. Austin's insight is a piece of philosophical theorising advanced to make sense an established linguistic phenomenon. Its theoretical success will depend on its capacity to play a particular theoretical role in epistemology. Its capacity to accommodate the ordinary linguistic practice is merely one reason to think that the insight is adequate.

Austin's insight, then, is to be treated as a substantial philosophical principle which finds its motivation in the linguistic practice analysed by Austin. Moreover, that Austin's view can accommodate the linguistic practice without revision is a reason that speaks in favour of the view. Nevertheless, in order to assess the view in terms of its theoretical merits, we have to subject the view to philosophical testing. Austin's insight, nevertheless, is a very general and abstract principle. It merely states that non-evidential warrant is different in kind to evidential warrant, and that it is akin to proof. It is now our task to flesh out the insight in a more determinate manner. In the following section, we will provide one such substantiation making use of the Radical Anti-psychologism advanced recently by Mark Kalderon (2011). We will also contrast this substantiation with two possible alternatives.

3.2 Articulating Austin's Insight

The Radical Anti-psychologist proposal that will be advanced here as the preferred way of fleshing out Austin's insight could seem theoretically costly. For it makes a number of commitments which are far from uncontroversial. For example, the view makes very specific commitments about the nature of reasons, as well as the nature (and existence) of truthmaking

entities and their availability through perception. These commitments will be defended in due course. But given the theoretical baggage of Radical Anti-psychologism it would be reasonable to explore whether there is a more economical way of doing justice to Austin's insight. To this effect I will briefly analyse the prospects of accommodating this insight by appealing to Timothy Williamson's views on evidence.

i) Williamson's E=K and Austin's Insight

In traditional mainstream epistemology the notion of justification has been thought to be important as a way of partially elucidating the notion of knowledge. Williamson reverses this order of explanation by proposing that the notion of knowledge can be used to partially elucidate the notion of justification. On the assumption that evidence justifies belief, the proposal that equates a subject's evidence with the propositions known by that subject amounts to the claim that knowledge justifies belief. Williamson's case for equating *S*'s evidence with the propositions known by *S* (*E=K*) rests on the claims that all evidence is propositional, that all propositional evidence is knowledge, and that all knowledge is evidence.[55]

For present purposes I am going to assume that Williamson's case for *E=K* is plausible, for the aim here is not to assess Williamson's *E=K* thesis, but rather to explore whether we could capture Austin's insight by appealing to *E=K*. It is important to note, in favour of this way of interpreting Austin, that the notion of evidence which Williamson intends to capture seems to be congenial with Austin's. Williamson advances his case in favour of *E=K* by appealing to established ways in which the notion of evidence is commonly used. Even though Williamson places a strong emphasis in the technical use of the notion of evidence in science and philosophy of science, he also appeals to the way in which the term is used in medical practice, in courts of law, as well as in ordinary contexts.[56] Moreover, given that Williamson's *E=K* thesis is explicitly about evidence, the application of his view to Austin's insight should be straightforward. We shall now consider whether it appropriately captures everything involved in the insight.

[55] See Williamson (2000: 193-208) for a defence of these claims.

[56] These are precisely the contexts that Austin attends to in establishing the ways we commonly use the notions of "evidence", "signs", and "symptoms"; see Austin (1946: 106-110).

How could we flesh out Austin's insight by appealing to the *E=K* claim? Let us start by considering what this approach would say about evidential ways of knowing, e.g. the case in which we come to know that there is a pig in the office on the basis of seeing its hoofmarks on the carpet. One way of making sense of this case would be to say that the hoofmarks themselves constitute the evidence on the basis of which we form the judgement that there is a pig in the office. On Williamson's view, strictly speaking, this would be incorrect. Williamson would concede that in this case we have evidence for thinking that there is a pig in the office and, moreover, he would concede that the hoofmarks are *the source* of our evidence. Nevertheless, he would construe the relation that holds between the hoofmarks and the evidence for that proposition in a different manner. For Williamson, the hoofmarks do not *constitute* our evidence for that proposition; instead, they *provide* us with evidence in favour of it. For Williamson the evidence would be a proposition that we know, e.g. the proposition that there are hoof-shaped marks in the office's carpet.[57]

Given Austin's insight, things should be different for non-evidential knowing, e.g. the case in which we see the pig itself and thereby come to know that there is a pig before us. On the Radical Anti-psychologist position, for instance, the pig itself constitutes the warrant for making the relevant judgement. But things would be different in the Williamsonian approach. All that follows from the *E=K* thesis is a negative characterisation of non-evidential instances of perceptual knowledge. On the Williamsonian picture, non-evidentially knowing that *p* is *not* to be explained in virtue of us knowing something else which constitutes our evidence for thinking that *p.* To clarify, this does not mean that the Williamsonian approach should be committed to the idea that we could acquire knowledge of the external world in complete absence of any background knowledge whatsoever. Presumably, in order for us to be knowledgeable about the pig, there is a multitude of propositions that we should know. The claim is merely that non-evidential knowledge is not *based* on other things that we know. This is consistent with the claim that we can only acquire such knowledge if we already possess a complex system of background knowledge.

But does this account of the distinction between evidential and non-evidential knowledge do justice to Austin's insight? It seems not, for it fails to capture an essential

[57] The treatment of this case under the Williamsonian view follows his treatment of the case in which a knife provides evidence for thinking someone committed a crime, see Williamson (2000: 195).

feature of the Austinian picture. I argue that the *E=K* approach can easily accommodate the negative claim associated to Austin's insight – i.e. that non-evidential warrant is different in kind from evidential warrant – but that it cannot accommodate the positive claim – i.e. that non-evidential warrant is conclusive – without supplementation. The negative claim would be secured by the fact that under the *E=K* approach evidential knowledge necessarily requires that *S*'s knowledge be based on a proposition known by *S*, whereas non-evidential knowing require *S*'s knowledge *not* to be based on a further proposition that *S* knows. This much would suffice to guarantee that non-evidential warrant is different in kind from evidential warrant. Nevertheless, the *E=K* approach fails to accommodate the positive claim because it is silent about the nature of the grounds on which non-evidential knowledge rests.[58] Thus, the *E=K* approach leaves open the issue of whether non-evidential warrant has the capacity to settle an issue, for it does not say anything about the nature of it. Something has to be added to the *E=K* approach in order to capture the positive claim of Austin's insight. Here I do not want to argue that it is impossible to supplement the view in such a way that it would do justice to the positive claim of Austin's insight. The point made here is simply that the *E=K* approach, on its own, would not suffice to accommodate Austin's insight.

The suggestion that the Williamsonian approach does not do justice to Austin's insight relies on the fact that an appeal to the *E=K* thesis only tells us that non-evidential warrant must be constituted by something other than propositional knowledge, but it is silent on what exactly *does* constitute it. Admittedly, Austin himself does not spell out what constitutes our warrant in non-evidential cases. This is precisely the reason why fleshing out Austin's insight is a task that goes beyond what Austin explicitly said. We looked at Williamson's *E=K* approach in an attempt to do this, but now we have realized that with respect to the positive claim of the insight, Williamson's approach is silent. The moral is that we are only going to succeed if we provide a positive account of what constitutes non-evidential warrant in the perceptual cases at the centre of Austin's epistemology. Only then will we find ourselves in a position to assess whether this kind of warrant is *distinctively*

[58] It is important to note that the *E=K* approach would be consistent with the view that non-evidential knowing is groundless. It is consistent, for example, with the claim that non-evidential knowledge is self-evident, or with the claim that non-evidential knowledge is warranted by default. Importantly, it is also consistent with the claim that this type of knowledge is grounded on warrant which is not independent of one's knowledge.

good, from an epistemic viewpoint. This is precisely the reason why the Radical Anti-psychologist approach is better suited to fleshing out Austin's insight, for it straightforwardly provides us with a positive account of non-evidential perceptual warrant.

ii) Radical Anti-psychologism and Austin's Insight

One of the main tenets of Radical Anti-psychologism is that in central cases of perceptual knowledge, which include the cases that Austin would classify as non-evidential instances of perceptual knowledge, the very items of perception constitute our warrant for judging. On our application of Radical Anti-psychologism to Austin's epistemology, perceivable objects such as pigs, tomatoes, rainbows, shadows, shootings, etc. can constitute our non-evidential warrant for judging. On Radical Anti-psychologism, these worldly items are themselves reasons for judging.[59] The suggestion is that our non-evidential warrant for, say, *p* derives from our being appraised of the reasons there are for thinking that *p*. For example, on this view, the pig itself is a reason for thinking that there is a pig in front of me, and my being aware of it makes me aware of a reason for so thinking. Provided I also have the capacities to recognize the beast as the animal it is, and that the conditions are appropriate for exercising this capacity, in seeing the pig itself, I might find myself in a position to know that a pig is before me.

In an important sense this view is better positioned than the *E=K* approach to do justice to Austin's insight. Unlike the Williamsonian approach, Radical Anti-psychologism could provide us with a positive characterisation of the nature of non-evidential warrant. Let us elaborate now just how a Radical Anti-psychologist could do justice to the insight. Let us start by considering the negative claim associated to Austin's insight (that non-evidential warrant is different in kind from evidential warrant). According to Radical Anti-psychologism, as it has been presented, non-evidential perceptual warrant is constituted by the perceived items themselves. Now, it is clear that this is consistent with saying something similar about evidential warrant. That is, it is consistent with saying that in cases of *evidential* perceptual knowledge, the warrant possessed by the subject is constituted by the worldly

[59] Notice that, here, the Radical Anti-psychologist position is characterised in terms of reasons for judging. The Radical Anti-psychologist position is a view in which (at least some) perceptual knowledge is based on reasons possessed by the subject. On this view, then, this type of non-evidential warrant depends on the reasons there are for thinking something is the case. We will discuss this commitment below in chapter 5.

items of perception.[60] For example, we could say that the evidential warrant possessed by a subject who comes to know that there is a pig in the farm is constituted by the pig's hoofprints on the ground. On this view, just as the pig itself is a reason for thinking that there is a pig in front of us, the pig's hoofprints are evidence for thinking that there is a pig somewhere in the farm. But given our aim of articulating Austin's insight, one potential worry with this account of evidential warrant is that it endangers the capacity of the Radical Anti-psychologist to accommodate the negative claim of Austin's insight. For it is not clear why, on this view, non-evidential warrant would be different *in kind* from evidential warrant, given that in both cases the warrant is constituted by the same kind of entity – the worldly items of perception, such as the pig or the hoofprints.

One way in which we could address this potential problem is by rejecting the proposed account of evidential warrant. We could say that evidential perceptual warrant is not constituted by the objects of perception. We could say, for example, with Williamson, that evidential warrant is constituted by propositions known by the subject. If we were to follow this line, we could accommodate in a straightforward fashion the claim that non-evidential warrant is different in kind from evidential warrant – for according to this line, while evidential warrant would be constituted by propositions known by the subject, non-evidential warrant would be constituted by items perceived by the subject. This is an open, and attractive, alternative for the Radical Anti-psychologist. And I do not want to suggest that we should avoid the Williamsonian approach to evidential warrant. As a matter of fact, Williamson himself has provided good reasons to endorse this account of perceptual evidence.[61] But in the following I am going to argue that the Radical Anti-psychologist has the elements to accommodate the two claims associated to Austin's insight *without* endorsing the *E=K* approach.

Let us assume that, for the Radical Anti-psychologist, non-evidential and evidential perceptual warrant is constituted by the relevant objects of perception. If we want to accommodate Austin's insight within this form of Radical Anti-psychologism we need to provide an answer to the following two questions: If evidential and non-evidential warrant are constituted by the same kind of object, then in what sense can we say that they are

[60] See Kalderon (2011: 227) for a suggestion along these lines.
[61] See Williamson (2000: 196-200).

different kinds of epistemic warrant? And, why is non-evidential warrant epistemically capable of settling an issue, e.g. that there is a pig before me?

In order to see how we could answer these questions we have to look closely at the Radical Anti-psychologist thesis that perceivable objects such as pigs, tomatoes, or rainbows can be reasons for judgement. The Radical Anti-psychologist's case for thinking that these objects can be reasons focuses not only on the objects themselves, but on the *relation* that holds between the objects and the relevant propositions. In other words, the Radical Anti-psychologist argues that the presence of an object – be it a pig or a pig's hoofmarks – can be a reason for thinking that so-and-so is the case *because* there is a *favouring relation* that obtains between the object and the relevant proposition. Here, by a "favouring relation" we understand something along the following lines: a favouring relation *F* obtains between an item *x* and a non-analytic proposition *p* only if the obtaining or existence of *x* increases the likelihood of the obtaining of the state of affairs described by *p*. The pig is a reason for thinking that there is a pig before me because its existence (and its being where it is) increases the probability of the relevant proposition. Similarly, the pig's hoofmarks in the carpet are a reason for thinking that there is a pig in the office because their existence increases the probability of the relevant proposition.

But, importantly, on this version of Radical Anti-psychologism, the kinds of favouring relation that hold between perceived objects and propositions in evidential and non-evidential cases are two *different kinds* of favouring relation. Consider the following example. Let us assume that the relevant proposition in both variants of the case is (*P):* "there is a pig in the office". The way in which the presence of the pig favours *P* is *different* from the way in which the presence of hoofmarks favours *P*. In evidential cases, the warranting items can be things such as the hoofprints in the carpet or the pig food lying on the floor. Now, the favouring relation that holds between these items and *P* is that of *indication*. In good circumstances the hoofprints are a reliable indication of the presence of a pig – hence they are *evidence* of *P*. Importantly, that the footmarks reliably indicate that *P* is consistent with *P* being false – perhaps the pig is now gone, or perhaps a new carpet (hoofmarks included) has been installed in the office in my absence. Note that this is consistent with the pig's hoofmarks standing in a different kind of favouring relation to a *different* proposition. For example, with respect to the proposition that "there are hoofmarks in the carpet" (*R*).

But things are very different in non-evidential cases. In this scenario, according to Radical Anti-psychologism, the warranting item is the pig itself, which is plainly in view. What is important to note about this case is that a *different kind* of favouring relation holds between the pig and *P* – a kind of relation that does not hold between the hoofprints and *P*. Namely, the *truthmaking* relation: the pig itself *makes true* the proposition that *P*. Truthmaking is a different *kind* of relation to that of indication. While the indication relation is consistent with the falsity of the relevant proposition, truthmaking is not. Moreover, we can say that *P* is true *in virtue* of the pig being there, but not in virtue of the hoofprints being there. In this sense, we can appeal to the pig itself to *explain* the truth of *P*.[62] Thus, on the Radical Anti-psychologist view the pig is a reason for *P* because it stands in the truthmaking relation with respect to *P*.

This provides us with the elements to accommodate Austin's insight within Radical Anti-psychologism. Let us start with the negative claim, i.e. the claim that non-evidential warrant is different in kind from evidential warrant. We can accommodate this claim by pointing out that the kind of favouring relation that holds between non-evidential warrants and the propositions they warrant is different in kind to the favouring relation that holds between evidential warrants and the propositions they warrant. The reason why, on this view, the warrant involved in non-evidential cases is *distinctive* (i.e. different in kind to that of evidential cases) lies on the fact that there is a *distinctive kind of relation* which holds between a proposition *P* and a certain object of perception *o*, which only holds in non-evidential cases, i.e. the relation of truthmaking.

But how are we to accommodate the positive claim, i.e. the claim that non-evidential warrant is distinctively *good*? In other words, why is it that my seeing the pig can *settle* the issue of whether a pig is in the office? The key to answering these questions lies in the kind of favouring relation that holds in non-evidential cases between objects of perception and warranted proposition. As we saw, the obtaining of the truthmaking relation between the pig

[62] Perhaps this claim should be qualified, for clearly, on one reading, this would be an inappropriate explanation of the truth of *P*. The kind of case I have in mind, in which this would be an inappropriate explanation, is one in which seeing, to my surprise, a pig in my colleague's office I ask her to explain why on earth is there a pig in her office. In this context, it would be entirely unsatisfactory if my colleague were to say that the answer to my question is the pig itself, for that is what makes true the proposition I want to understand. The kind of explanation I have in mind here in saying that truthmakers (such as the pig) can *explain* the truth of the relevant propositions is that of explaining *in virtue* of what is a proposition true.

being in the office and *P* is inconsistent with the falsity of *P*. We can say, then, that a subject who possesses non-evidential warrant is in possession of warrant which is inconsistent with the falsity of the warranted proposition. Following John McDowell's usage, we can call this kind of warrant *conclusive* (McDowell, 2013). We have, then, a straightforward explanation of why seeing the pig has the capacity to settle the issue of whether there is a pig in the office: the non-evidential warrant afforded to the subject in that perceptual state is conclusive. This type of warrant can settle the issue because it excludes the possibility of the relevant proposition being false.

It is important to clarify that the positive claim associated to Austin's insight maintains only that the non-evidential warrant found in the central cases is conclusive. There is no suggestion that evidential warrant could not be conclusive. Consider a case in which a nomological relation holds between exhibiting the symptoms $s_1,\ldots,s_n$ – the presence of all of which can be established by perception – and having a disease *X*. Suppose that the nomological relation is such that *if and only if* the subject has disease *X* then they exhibit *all* the symptoms $s_1,\ldots,s_n$. If this were the case, it would be plausible to say that being aware of the symptoms $s_1,\ldots,s_n$ amounts to having conclusive evidence for thinking that a subject has disease *X*. After all, the obtaining of the evidence would be incompatible with the falsity of the relevant proposition.[63] Moreover, *ex hypothesi*, this is the sort of evidence that can be acquired through perception.

iii) John McDowell and Austin's insight

I argued that an *E=K* approach to the insight does not accommodate it – as it stands – for Williamson was silent on the nature of non-evidential warrant. This assessment suggested that a positive account of non-evidential warrant was needed to accommodate the insight. The Radical Anti-psychologist picture is *one* view which advances a proposal on those lines. And, as it has been argued, it is capable of accommodating Austin's insight. Nevertheless, I would like to point out that this is not to say that only a Radical Anti-psychologist epistemology could accommodate the insight. As a matter of fact, I would like to argue that the epistemology of perception advanced by John McDowell can also make sense of the two

[63] Others have defended the possibility of conclusive evidence, see Travis's notion of factive meaning (2004) and (2005), and Dretske's treatment of conclusive reasons (1971).

claims associated to Austin's insight. This will show that the Radical Anti-psychologist view is not the only epistemology which can be seen as voicing these ideas from Austin. There might be independent reasons to think that McDowell's epistemology of perception would be incompatible with other parts of the Austinian epistemology. But doing justice to Austin's insight is no such ground.

Some aspects of McDowell's epistemology of perception have been explained before in chapter 2, but it is worth going through some of the details again here. In his epistemology of perception McDowell makes space for a special kind of perceptual episode which plays a central role in explaining how rational subjects acquire perceptual knowledge. McDowell characterises such episodes as ones in which the subject's perceptual state makes a fact manifest to the subject (*good cases*). On the McDowellian picture, these are to be contrasted with cases in which it *merely seems* to the subject as if a fact were made manifest to them (*bad cases*). Good cases not only put subjects in a position to know the fact which is made manifest to them, but the epistemic warrant possessed by the subject in virtue of being in a good case is *conclusive*. On the other hand, for subjects who find themselves in a bad case, a fact is not made manifest to them in that perceptual episode. How could we exploit McDowell's view – that in good cases a fact is made manifest to the perceiver – in order to accommodate Austin's insight?

Let us start with accommodating the positive claim of the insight within a McDowellian approach. This is the claim that perceptual non-evidential warrant has the capacity to settle issues. For McDowell, good cases provide perceivers with conclusive warrant for thinking that the fact which is made manifest to them actually obtains. For instance, consider the following good case: someone *sees that* there is a red sphere before her, the circumstances of observation are optimal, and everything is right perceptually with the subject. In this scenario, the subject would find herself in possession of *conclusive* warrant in favour of the proposition that there is a red sphere in front of her. On McDowell's picture, part of the reason why the warrant is conclusive has to do with the fact that it is *impossible* for the relevant proposition to be false, whilst the subject is in that perceptual state, i.e. one of seeing that the red sphere is there. This account could be used to explain Austin's non-evidential cases of perceptual knowledge. A good case in which we see a pig in front of us is a case in which the fact that there is a pig before us is made manifest to us in

perception. As such, we would find ourselves in possession of conclusive warrant for thinking that there is a pig in front of us. Part of the explanation of why this is so, analogously, has to do with the fact that is not possible for us to be in that perceptual state *and* for the proposition that there is a pig in front of us to be false. The warrant provided by good cases has the capacity so settle an issue because being in that state is incompatible with the falsity of the relevant proposition. Thus, when I see that a pig is before me I have conclusive warrant for so thinking. Thus, it seems the McDowellian approach can accommodate the positive claim of Austin's insight.

Here, it is important to note that a salient difference between Radical Anti-psychologism and McDowell's approach has been uncovered. McDowell's approach can make sense of (the positive claim of) Austin's insight by construing non-evidential perceptual cases as cases in which we see *that* something is the case – that is as cases of propositional seeing. As we saw above, the Radical Anti-psychologist position construes these cases as cases in which we *see* the pig – that is as cases of object perception. For the Radical Anti-psychologist object perception is epistemologically significant by providing us with reasons for judging. McDowell thinks that such an account of the epistemological significance of perception falls prey to the Myth of the Given – in McDowell's eyes, a charge powerful enough to expose the whole project as inadequate. This is a fundamental locus of disagreement between both views, and we will explore with detail in chapter 6 whether there are sufficient grounds to be convinced by McDowell's case. But for the moment let us continue with the question of whether McDowell's approach can make sense of Austin's insight.

We have argued that McDowell can accommodate the positive claim, but what about the negative claim associated to Austin's insight, i.e. that non-evidential warrant is different in kind from evidential warrant? Let us start with the evidential case, i.e. the one in which the subject comes to know that there is a pig on the basis of seeing its hoofmarks. Using the McDowellian approach we could say that in such a scenario the subject possesses, at best, inconclusive warrant in favour of the propositions that there is a pig in the office (*P*). After all, being in this perceptual state is compatible, for instance, with the pig having left the office. The fact (provided it is a fact) that there is a pig in the office is not made manifest to the subject. As we saw before, in the non-evidential case, the subject would have conclusive

warrant in favour of *P*. In this case, the fact that there is a pig in the office is perceptually made manifest to the subject. This difference might provide us with the elements to accommodate the negative claim within McDowell's approach. In non-evidential cases the fact described by the warranted proposition is made manifest to the perceiver. Whereas in evidential cases, the fact described by the proposition warranted is *not* made manifest to the perceiver. In evidential cases, then, the warrant depends on something external to the perceptual state the subject is in. For instance, the warrant had in virtue of seeing that there are hoofmarks in the office depends on them being a reliable indicator of porcine presence – something independent of the subject seeing that there are hoofmarks in the carpet. On the other hand, in non-evidential cases, the warrant does not depend on such an external element. If the subject is in a state in which she sees that there is a pig in the office, then that by itself determines that she has the relevant warrant. This gives us grounds, then, to say that in the McDowellian approach evidential warrant is different in kind from non-evidential warrant: evidential warrant depends on an element external to the perceptual state, whereas this is not the case for non-evidential warrant.

Conclusion

Here, I do not want to scrutinize the merits of McDowell's epistemological picture of perception, apart from the way in which it can make sense of Austin's insight. If in developing an epistemology of perception we have to decide between Radical Anti-psychologism or the McDowellian picture, their capacity for accommodating Austin's insight would not be a decisive criterion, for both views can accommodate it. This shows that Radical Anti-psychologism is not the only way of fleshing out Austin's insight. For all we know there might be many other ways of doing so, different from the views surveyed here. The conclusion of this section should be, then, that Radical Anti-psychologism is not the only correct way of capturing Austin's insight, but merely that it is *one* way of doing it. If the Radical Anti-psychologist view is going to stand out as a plausible epistemology of perception, then it is not enough to show that it can make sense of Austin's suggestion, we also have to show that the view is tenable in the contemporary epistemological landscape. This task will be undertaken in the remainder of the thesis. The Radical Anti-psychologist alternative will be defended from challenges, and some positive argument will be advanced

in favour of its most distinctive claims. In so doing we will advance a partial case for thinking that this view provides us with a plausible and original account of perceptual knowledge.

Chapter 4 – Radical Anti-psychologism and Perception of Concreta

So far I have presented some of the main tenets of the Radical Anti-psychologist picture, but I haven't explained systematically how they fit together into a coherent epistemology of perception. This task will be undertaken in the first part of this chapter, making emphasis on the way the view is advanced by Mark Kalderon (2011). This will allow us to identify the central claims of Radical Anti-psychologism. As it will become clear, some of these core claims are controversial. In the remainder of this thesis we will carry out a detailed defence of these claims. This will place us in a good position to provide a plausible way of fleshing out the passive element in Austin's epistemological picture. Thus, a defence of Radical Anti-psychologism will get us closer to an epistemology of perception along Austinian lines. This defence will begin in the second part of this chapter, where we will look more closely at one of the main commitments of the view, i.e. the claim that in perception we are aware of concrete entities. But first, let us present the Radical Anti-psychologist view in a more systematic fashion.

4.1 Spelling out Radical Anti-psychologism

In general terms, the Radical Anti-psychologistic view can be characterised as an epistemology of reasons at the service of perceptual knowledge – or at least at the service of some central cases of perceptual knowledge. In a nutshell, the view holds that some of the items we are aware of in perceptual experience constitute valid reasons in favour of making certain judgements. On this view, the epistemological significance of perception consists in making the subject aware of reasons for judging. According to Kalderon, in central cases, perception affords perceivers with reasons which can ground knowledge of their environment: "Sensory awareness makes the subject knowledgeable of its object in the sense that it makes knowledge about its object *available* to the perceiving subject" (Kalderon, 2011, 225). This formulation raises the issue of how to understand the idea that perception makes knowledge "available" for the perceiver, *vis-à-vis* McDowell's claim that perception puts us in 'a position to know'. In chapter 2 we distinguished two ways in which the notion of "being in a position to know" could be interpreted and concluded that McDowell means by this that

perception provides subjects with conclusive warrant for judgement.[64] We will argue below that Kalderon's use of the notion is congenial with McDowell's. We will see that, for Kalderon, perception makes knowledge available to the perceiver by providing the subject with conclusive reasons for the relevant judgements. Below we will explore further the relation between this aspect of Kalderon's view and Austin's thesis that perception is only one out of two elements which contribute to placing the subject in the best possible position for judging. For Austin, let us remember, perceptual knowledge requires successful perception, on the one hand, and the subject's active involvement in exploiting the warrant afforded by perception, on the other. But first, let us explore the several aspects which make up the Radical Anti-psychologist position.

The Radical Anti-psychologist view maintains that the epistemological significance of perception consists in making perceivers aware of reasons for judging. Now, among the things that we are aware of in perception we find concrete entities such as cats or blackberries (i.e. physical objects); a cat eating a blackberry (i.e. events); and the cat's softness (i.e. property instances). As Kalderon points out, in an Austinian spirit, these entities do not constitute a unified ontological category. For instance, a reason for thinking that events are different from material objects lies in the fact that they seem to "fill time" differently: on the endurantist picture, for example, material objects do not unfold through time and are wholly present at any time interval over which they endure, whereas events unfold through time and are not wholly present at any of the time intervals over which the event unfolds.[65] That the objects of perception do not fall into a unified ontological category is exacerbated when we note that there are many other concrete entities which are also suitable objects of perceptual awareness but do not straightforwardly fall into any of the previous categories – for example rainbows, shadows, and flashes, among others.[66] This position echoes Austin's claim that material objects are not a good paradigm of the type of things that we perceive: "pens are in many ways though not in all ways unlike rainbows, which are in many ways though not in

[64] See p. 60

[65] See, for example, Mourelatos (1978), Vendler (1957), for the view I sketch here. Of course, this picture has been contested – perdurantists, for instance, would argue that we should think of material objects as filling time in a way similar to events. For the perdurantist picture see Lewis (1976). For recent contributions to the debate see Steward (2015), Brewer (2015), and Hofweber and Velleman (2011)

[66] See Kalderon (2011): 222 for a discussion about the ontological differences between the different objects of (visual) perception. See also Austin (1962) on the topic of the variety of the potential objects of perception.

all ways unlike after-images, which in turn are in many ways but not in all ways unlike pictures on the cinema-screen – and so on, without assignable limit" (Austin, 1962: 4). Here Austin seems to be making the claim that any attempt to provide an ontological criterion which groups all (and only) potential objects of perception in a unified ontological category will encounter counterexamples. To be clear, there are certain respects in which, for instance, rainbows are similar to material objects, such as cats or blackberries – for instance they are alike in that they do not unfold through time in the way events do. Yet there are important dissimilarities which discourage considering them the same kind of thing – rainbows do not occupy space in the same way cats do: arguably, whereas it is possible to touch a cat, it is not possible to touch a rainbow.

For Austin, as well as for Kalderon, there is not just *one kind* of thing that we perceive. As far as it goes, this much can be considered common ground among many philosophers of perception. For instance, even sense-data theorists might maintain that in perception we are aware of many different types of thing – events, physical objects and property instances. What is distinctive to the sense-data view is that, for some of its defenders, we only perceive these concrete things by virtue of perceiving sense-data. So strictly speaking, for them, we only "immediately" (or "directly") perceive one kind of thing, i.e. sense-data, although we do perceive indirectly many other things.[67] Critics of sense-data theories might challenge this way of accommodating the idea that we perceive many different sorts of thing. Naïve realists, for instance, would argue that we can perceive all the familiar things we encounter in the environment without the involvement of sense-data. Nevertheless, regardless of the potential disagreements among philosophers of perception, the claim that we perceive many kinds of thing could be endorsed by most of them. At this point we have not reached yet a controversial claim, nor the most distinctive aspects of Radical Anti-psychologism.

Now, *among* the many things that we perceive, on the Radical Anti-psychologist position, we find the concrete entities listed above; moreover, on this view, at least some of these entities *are* reasons for judging. In other words, perceptual experience provides us with reasons for judging insofar as it makes us aware of *concreta*, for concreta can be reasons for judging. Note, nevertheless, that this is consistent with the claim that not all reasons are

[67] See Snowdon (1992), and Foster (2000), for a discussion of direct and indirectness in perception.

concreta, and also with the claim the claim that perception might play a fundamental role in making the subject aware of those reasons. For instance, the view is consistent with the claim that non-concrete entities – e.g. propositions – might also be reasons for judging.

The notion of *concreta* is central in the characterisation of Radical Anti-psychologism. As a first approach to a delineation of this category we can say that we are thinking of concreta as particulars which are spatiotemporally located (Kalderon 2011). Although, as it will be noted, the matter of giving a precise way of distinguishing the concrete from the abstract is not a straightforward issue. Moreover, there are many concrete entities which are not plausible objects of perception, such as very small objects of very quick events. More importantly, this characterisation of concreta (i.e. as spatiotemporally located entities), might obscure a feature which is crucial for concreta to play the role that Radical Anti-psychologists wants them to. Namely, that concreta do not exhibit the kind of generality that, for instance, concepts do. All these are issues which will be addressed in detail in the second part of this chapter.

Radical Anti-psychologism, thus, is a distinctive way of articulating the view that perception affords the subject with reasons for belief – its distinctiveness lies in the claim that some of those reasons are concreta. As such, the view should be contrasted with views which favour the idea that the reasons afforded to the subject by perception are facts (where these are understood as non-concrete entities, see Dodd 2009), propositions, or the subject's experiential state. According to Radical Anti-psychologism, for instance, in seeing the white cat in front of me I am in possession of a reason for judging that there is a white cat in front of me *because* the cat itself *is a reason* for making that judgement. This view is a form of Anti-psychologism because it rejects that reasons need to be psychological states of the subject – on this conception, reasons can be worldly entities (see Dancy 2000). And it is a *radical* form of anti-psychologism because it maintains that the external reasons *can be* concreta. Therefore, on the Radical Anti-psychologist view when we see a cat in front of us our reason to think there is a cat in front of us is the cat itself, *not* the experiential state of seeing a cat, *not* a belief caused by the experiential state, *not* any form of representational content that might accompany the perceptual state, *nor* the proposition that there is a white cat in front of me.

It is important to note that the commitment to concrete entities, as opposed to facts or propositions, as the reasons afforded to us by perception is *not* inconsistent with endorsing an intentional theory about the nature of perceptual experience. Thus, adoption of Radical Anti-psychologism does not beg the question against intentionalist accounts of perception. Very broadly, according to intentionalism, the phenomenological character of perceptual experience is explained entirely in virtue of the intentional content associated to the relevant experiential state.[68] The Radical Anti-psychologist claim that some of the reasons we are aware of in perception are concreta need not be inconsistent with that fundamental tenet of intentionalism. For it is possible to hold *both* that the concreta we are aware of in perception are reasons for making certain judgements, *and* that the phenomenal character of the relevant perceptual states is to be explained entirely by virtue of the intentional content of those states. For instance, it would be possible to maintain that being aware of a concretum requires being in a state with intentional content with veridicality conditions; moreover, it could be claimed that this intentional content suffices to explain the phenomenal character of that experiential state. Yet, consistent with this, it could be claimed that the concretum itself constitutes the reason that is provided to us by virtue of being in that perceptual state, and *not* the intentional content associated to that state, *nor* the fact or the proposition individuated by that intentional content. On this view, the role of the intentional content associated to that state is to make the subject aware of the reason (i.e. the concretum) there is for judging that *p*.

So far, we have identified the following claims in the Radical Anti-psychologist picture: a) among the things that we perceive we find concreta, and b) concreta can be reasons for judging. This provides the view with the elements for advancing the following claim about the epistemological significance of perceptual experience: c) perceptual experience is epistemologically significant partly because, at least in some cases, it makes us aware of reasons (i.e. concreta) for judging. As it stands, this set of claims (a)-(c) constitute the bare essentials that characterise the Radical Anti-psychologist view as an epistemology of perception. Yet, Kalderon advances a further significant claim in support of claim (b), that concreta can be reasons for judging, namely the claim that d) concreta are truthmakers. In Kalderon's view, if we are going to conceive of concreta as reasons for judging, then we have

[68] See Robinson (1994), Siegel (2010), Schellenberg (2011), and Fish (2010) for characterisations of intentional theories of the nature of perception along these lines.

to account for their normative force – that is we have to explain why the existence of the relevant reasons make it appropriate for the subject to make the relevant judgements. And it is precisely by introducing (d) that he attempts to undertake this explanatory task. In the remainder of this theses we are going to be looking closely into these claims which make up the core elements of the Radical Anti-psychologist view.

It should not be thought, nevertheless, that the Radical Anti-psychologist epistemology, as presented by Kalderon is exhausted by (a)-(d). It is true that, for Kalderon, we can appeal to claims (a)-(d) to explain, at least partly, why perceptual experience is epistemologically significant. But this is not to say that a complete account of *how* our perceptual knowledge is warranted can be given merely by appealing to (a)-(d). This is in line with the Austinian idea presented before, according to which a complete account of perceptual knowledge has to appeal both to the fact that the subject perceives her environment as well as to the fact that the subject has done enough to be in a position to exploit the warrant afforded to her by perception. Let us remember that Kalderon characterises the epistemic position of a perceiving subject as one in which the subject has a *potential for knowledge* which can be *actualized* (Kalderon 2011: 225). In perceiving her environment, a subject is in a position to *gain* knowledge about that environment, although the experiential state itself does not constitute knowledge. In Kalderon's view, the subject can actualize that potential by successfully exercising the appropriate conceptual and recognitional capacities. Importantly, lacking the relevant capacities does not mean that the subject's experiences are epistemically insignificant. If the subject were to eventually acquire the required capacities, then nothing would prevent her, in principle, from actualizing the knowledge potential provided by her previous experiences. In Kalderon's words:

> If visual awareness takes particulars as objects, it is not a form of propositional knowledge. But that does not mean that vision, so conceived, lacks epistemic significance. Vision can be a source of knowledge insofar as the perceiver can *recognize* the object of perception for what it is. When I look at the ripening tomato, the tomato is present in my awareness of it. Moreover, if I possess the appropriate *recognitional capacities*, in being so aware of the ripening tomato, I can come to know various things about it—that it is yellowish red, say (Kalderon, 2011: 225, my emphasis).

It is clear that in Kalderon's Radical Anti-psychologism, there is room for agential elements in an account of how a subject acquires perceptual knowledge. For instance, on his

view, for us to know that there is a tomato before us it is not enough to be perceptually aware of a tomato, minimally we also have to recognize it as the object it is. As such, then, although the view is not necessarily committed to other agential elements playing a role in the subject's acquisition of knowledge, nothing prevents the inclusion of such elements in a Radical Anti-psychologist position. For the time being, the point I want to highlight is that Radical Anti-psychologism, and in particular Kalderon's version of the view, is consistent with the general Austinian project in which agential elements have an important place in explaining how perceptual knowledge is acquired.

It is time now to begin our defence of the main tenets of Radical Anti-psychologism identified before. In the remaining chapter of this thesis we will discuss these claims, motivate their adoption and defend them from extant objections. We begin in this chapter by discussing claim (a) of the view, i.e. the claim that concreta are objects of perception. The remaining claims which make up the Radical Anti-psychologist view will be discussed in subsequent chapters. In Chapter 5 we will discuss claim (c), that the epistemological significance of perception is to be explained partly by virtue of the fact that it makes us aware of reasons (i.e. concreta). We will then discuss extensively claim (b), that concreta can be reasons for judging, in Chapter 6. Our defence of this claim will deserve an extended treatment given that it is the most distinctive claim of Radical Anti-psychologism. Finally, we will discuss claim (d), that concreta are truthmakers – a claim which is meant to provide support for (b) – in Chapter 7.

4.2 Perceptual awareness of *concreta*

Perhaps the least controversial claim of the Radical Anti-psychologist position is that *among* the things that we perceive we can find concrete entities. It is important to note that its plausibility derives precisely from its being a rather weak claim; note that the claim is not that there is only one kind of entity which is always the object of perceptual awareness, nor that concreta constitute a unified ontological category. The claim is merely that *among* the things that we perceive we find concrete entities. Moreover, the claim is not that it is not possible to perceive things other than concreta. Thus, the position does not beg the question against approaches in which not only do we perceive concreta, such as the sun and the

horizon, but also the *fact* that the sun is setting.[69] But if the claims is this minimal, what is its significance within Radical Anti-psychologism? It is still important to explore the connections of this claim with the rest of the view.

i) The Scope of Radical Anti-psychologism

In order to get a clearer understanding of the scope of the claims made by Radical Anti-psychologism we need an account of what concreta are. That is, we could provide a principled way of characterising the entities that we talk about when we talk about concreta. But as it will become obvious, despite the plausibility of the claim that among the objects of perception we find concrete entities, it is rather difficult to provide a straightforward way of picking out the entities we are interested in. As a cautionary note I want to emphasize that in the following I do not attempt here to advance a watertight definition of *concreta*. The definition I advance will provide us with a working notion strong enough for our purposes here. It will be more important to explain the sense in which concreta are entities which lack the kind of generality that, paradigmatically, concepts have. For this feature of concreta is crucial if they are going to play the theoretical role that the Radical Anti-psychologist wants them to play.

Let us start by having a look at certain remarks made by Gottlob Frege regarding some of the differences between seeing the sun rising and seeing *that* the sun is rising. On Frege's view, *strictly speaking*, we can only see the sun itself – a concretum. The sense in which we see *that* the sun is rising is bound to be, on Frege's view, very different from the sense in which we see the sun. As mentioned before, here we will not follow Frege on the impossibility of perceiving non-concrete entities, such as *that* the sun is rising. Yet in advancing his view, Frege provides us with useful elements to make sense of the differences between the sun rising, and *that* the sun is rising. As part of his broader project, Frege attempts to introduce the idea that, apart from mind-independent physical entities such as trees and windows, and mind-dependent entities such as my perception of the tree and my headache, we should include in our ontology a third kind of entity, *thoughts*, which are taken to be, in a first approach, mind-independent, but non-physical entities. These thoughts,

[69] That is, the view allows for an understanding of facts where these are non-concrete entities. See Frege (1956), Dodd (2002). Arguably McDowell endorses a version of this view in his (1996).

although immaterial and abstract, can be expressed in material forms, e.g. by writing down or uttering a sentence which expresses the thought in question.[70] According to Frege, we can perceive the material expressions of thoughts, but we cannot *perceive* the thoughts themselves. In the course of this discussion Frege makes the following remarks, where he advances potential criteria to mark a distinction between abstract and concrete entities:

> A thought is something immaterial and everything material and perceptible is excluded from this sphere of that for which the question of truth arises... But do we not see that the sun has risen and do we not then also see that this is true? That the sun has risen is not an object which emits rays that reach my eyes, it is not a visible thing like the sun itself. That the sun has risen is seen to be true on the basis of sense-impressions. But being true is not a material, perceptible property (Frege, 1956: 292).

Significantly, in this passage Frege points to not just *one*, but several different features which are distinctive of *thoughts*, features which are not shared by concrete entities. We have the suggestion that unlike the sun, *that* the sun has risen is "immaterial". We also have the suggestion that the sun has certain causal powers – it emits rays which can reach someone's retinas – which the relevant thought lacks. Related to these points is the claim that the thought *that* the sun has risen, unlike the sun itself, is something for which the question of truth arises, i.e. it is something which is susceptible of being true or false. Are these remarks useful to delimit the class of concreta which is relevant to the Radical Anti-psychologist's claims? I will argue that the materiality and causal efficacy remarks made here can be used in a working definition of the relevant class. I will argue that this conception of concreta will allow us to explain why they can play the theoretical role that is assigned to them in Radical Anti-psychologism.

Now, providing a way to distinguish the concrete from the abstract is not a straightforward matter. The criterion we will endorse here is not intended to provide us with a watertight definition of concrete and abstract entities. The difficulties in providing such criterion have many sources and this is not the place to address all of them. For instance, it

[70] See Frege (1956), especially: "The thought, in itself immaterial, clothes itself in the material garment of a sentence and thereby becomes apprehensible to us. We say a sentence expresses a thought" (Frege, 1956: 292).

is generally accepted that an appropriate definition should be extensionally adequate. There is great deal of agreement on whether many paradigmatic entities are abstract or concrete: material objects, such as rocks or trees are generally agreed to be concrete, whereas mathematical objects (if they exist) are often considered abstract (Rosen, 2014). But some cases are especially controversial, such as universals. For Platonists universals are paradigmatic abstract entities (Armstrong, 1989), whereas for an Aristotelian they might be considered concrete – according to MacBride (1988) the Aristotelian should think of them as spatiotemporally located. On the other hand, the distinction between concreta and abstracta has been carved in many different ways.[71] This variation might be explained by the fact that the distinction is relevant for many different philosophical debates, and is informed by different philosophical commitments. Some suggest that there might be more than one way of providing an extensionally adequate classification, thus leaving ample room for independent commitments to decide which definition should be endorsed (Rosen, 2014; MacBride, 1988). These issues might make it impossible to provide a single criterion which will satisfy all philosophers interested in the distinctions. But fortunately, that is not the aim our definition will seek to accomplish. Our aim here will be to provide a definition which can make sense of the list of perceivable concreta advanced by the Radical Anti-psychologist. Let us remember that in this list we found things such as cats and blackberries (i.e. physical objects), a cat eating a blackberry (i.e. events), the cat's softness (i.e. property instances), as well as things such as rainbows, shadows, and flashes of light. As we will see, the definition we will favour is not free of problems. We will briefly consider these and provide potential responses. Nevertheless, it will be more important, given our purposes, to highlight the features of concreta which allows them to play the theoretical role assigned to them by the Radical Anti-psychologist, namely why can they be reasons for judging.

Here we will look into two of the main ways in which philosophers have tried to characterise the distinction between the abstract and the concrete – namely the spatiotemporal location and the causal efficacy criteria (Hale 1988). A version of these approaches can be found in the Frege passage previously quoted, where he characterises the sun as something that we can see, but *that* the sun has risen as something we cannot see. Let us remember, firstly, that for Frege the sun is material, whereas that the sun has risen is immaterial – this

[71] For instance, Hale (1988) compiles a list of twelve ways in which the distinction has been attempted.

remark might suggest a criterion of "materiality" to define the concrete. Second, for Frege, the sun has certain causal powers, which the thought that the sun has risen lacks, in particular it emits rays which can reach someone's retinas – this remark might suggest a "causality" criterion to define the concrete. There is, nevertheless, a good reason to not use the criterion of materiality (as it stands) to help us define concreta. As Austin correctly pointed out, the notion of "material object", as it is commonly used in philosophy, does not track a common use of the notion (Austin, 1962a). For instance, we might want to classify shadows and rainbows as concrete entities, but it is not so clear that the common man would regard rainbows or shadows as "material objects". To avoid these difficulties, we can flesh out the materiality criterion as appealing to the notion of being spatio-temporally located. We would have, then, two ways in which we could attempt to mark the difference between the concrete and the abstract: by appeal to spatio-temporal location, and by appeal to causal efficacy. After all, an important aspect of *thoughts* – the entities that Frege wishes to use as contrast to the non-conceptual – is that they have no location and are atemporal.[72]

Let us begin by considering the causality criterion and its potential shortcomings. One way of carving the distinction by appeal to causality could go as follows: concreta can be involved in causal interactions, whereas abstracta cannot (Hale, 1988). But one reason to doubt this criterion is that it might yield incorrect results for objects widely considered to be abstract, e.g. games, languages, and fictional characters. Consider the game of chess, which has endured several changes throughout its history – for instance it seems that castling was introduced at some point in the 15th century and adopted its modern form around the 17th century. If such rule changes are to be construed as changes in the game caused by players or legislators, then the game of chess should be considered a concrete entity by the causality criterion. We can address these worries by refining the criterion to focus on causal efficacy: concreta are causally efficacious, whereas abstracta are causally inefficacious. By adopting this criterion, we could accommodate the fact that chess has endured some changes throughout its history without the unfortunate consequence that it should, therefore, be considered a concretum. So long as we can maintain that the game of chess itself makes nothing happen, we will be able to maintain that it is an abstract entity (Rosen, 2014: 12-13).

[72] This is echoed by Travis when he points out that "that the sun has set (in Rostock) may be, in some sense, *about* a location. But *it* has none. The sun, perhaps, is in the sky" (Travis, 2007: 231).

This way of carving the distinction attracts two immediate responses. The first one is that there might be many entities which are causally inefficacious but which we would not take to be, therefore, abstract. For instance, in a particular understanding of certain conscious episodes, their phenomenal character is considered an epiphenomenon (Jackson, 1982). But it is not so clear that this would give any weight to the idea that the phenomenal characters of those conscious episodes are abstract. This puts pressure in the revised causal criterion. It could be objected that, strictly speaking, this view merely maintains that mental epiphenomena do not make a causal contribution to our behaviour, which does not imply that they are causally inefficacious altogether (Robinson 2006, 2015). According to this response, mental epiphenomena would not be straightforwardly characterised as abstract by the criterion analysed here. But more importantly, the second response to the causal efficacy criterion is that problems arise when we consider the issue of which are the *relata* of the causal relation. Worryingly, it seems that many of the options would yield inappropriate results when used as a tool to identify the abstract. Take as an example a common conception in which the relata of causal relations are events (Davidson, 1967). It is not so clear that, on this approach to causality, we could maintain that physical objects (such as the sun or a cat) are concrete entities. For they are not events, and strictly speaking, on this interpretation of causality, only events are causally efficacious. In order to avoid this difficulty, it could be argued that if an entity *constitutes* or is *part of* a causally efficacious event, then that thing counts as being itself causally efficacious. For instance, insofar as a cat can be a constituent of a causally efficacious events (such as the cat jumping over the table), then the cat itself is to be considered a causally efficacious entity. This would allow us to classify the cat as concrete, not abstract. Yet, this response invites criticisms. Consider, for instance, the event of judging that the sun has risen. Let us assume that this type of event could be causally efficacious (with Davidson, 1963: 694). This would mean, under the operative suggestion, that its constituents are to be considered concrete. A constituent of this event is the proposition that the sun has risen. Thus, we arrive to the unfortunate consequence that this proposition is concrete. I will not pursue this discussion further, for the issue cannot be settled here. What I want to highlight with this discussion is the difficulty in appealing to causal criteria to identify the abstract. The underpinning claims about causation bring with them many delicate issues in metaphysics which cannot be settled in this investigation.

Perhaps the spatiotemporal criterion will fare better in providing us with a distinction of concrete and abstract entities. We can formulate this criterion as follows: concrete entities are spatiotemporally located, whereas abstract entities are not (Hale, 1988). Some paradigmatic abstract objects, such as numbers and propositions, surely lack a spatial and temporal location; arguably it would be absurd to wonder where can we find these entities or question when will they cease to be. Nevertheless, it has been suggested that this criterion too will yield inappropriate results for many entities widely considered to be abstract (Hale, 1987). Again, games, languages, and fictional characters give rise to problems. It seems correct that these entities lack a spatial location, but is it correct to say that they are also atemporal? Consider the game of chess. It would be right to say – despite the uncertainty as to origin – that chess originated, in its modern form, in a certain place and at a certain time – perhaps in Southern Europe in the 15th century. It would also be true to say that the game has endured some changes throughout its history. It is therefore not obvious that abstract entities should be characterised in terms of existing altogether "outside" space-time (Hale, 1987). Of course, this does not mean that we cannot attempt a solution to this problem. For instance, we could suggest that it is wrong to think about the "invention" of chess in those terms. It could be argued, for instance, that the game of chess, being and abstract object as it is, is atemporal and has no location. What has been characterised here as the invention of chess should rather be described as its discovery, something which can be traced back to a particular moment in time. Alternatively, we could construe chess' "invention" as the invention of a practice that uniquely selects chess as its abstract analogue. Arguably, something similar could be said about fictional characters and languages, with varying degrees of plausibility. Bob Hale (1987) considers a similar response and argues that such a solution does not fit neatly with the way we talk and think about the history of chess or the English language. He argues that this proposal would describe the historical changes of English as "really a record of a succession of replacements of one language by another" (Hale, 1987: 49).

Now, although this way of talking would be at odds with ordinary language, it is worth asking if the current proposal makes a claim which would be inconsistent with ordinary talk. How shall we explain, from the perspective of ordinary language, the historical changes in the English language or the game of chess? Surely the reason why chess today is different

from its 15th century version is down to a difference in the rules which constitute the game now with respect to the rules which constituted the game then. That the set of rules has changed is not inconsistent with ordinary talk. But really this is all that was implied by the current proposal. We can decide, for good reason, to call those different sets of rules "chess" or "English". But this linguistic convention is consistent with explaining the changes merely as successions of one set of rules by another. I will not pursue further the discussion, for the issue cannot be settled here. I merely want to sketch a possible way in which we can define concreta and abstracta, noting the kind of difficulties that the criterion faces.

The proposed definition of concreta as spatio-temporally located particulars advanced here provides some clarity to the notion of concreta which is crucial for the Radical Anti-psychologist's purposes – it provides us with a criterion that classifies as concrete the list of paradigmatic objects of perception. Nevertheless, the features discussed so far – i.e. causal efficacy and spatiotemporal location – obscure a feature of concreta which is crucial for the purposes of the Radical Anti-psychologist, namely their lack of generality. We will shortly explore this feature more closely. But before doing so it will be helpful to examine, very briefly, some reasons why not all concreta might be suitable objects of perception on a Radical Anti-psychologistic position.

The Radical Anti-psychologist claim is that *some* concreta are suitable objects of perception, which suggests that *some* concreta might not be suitable objects of perception for creatures like us. One criterion which can help us delimit, *within* the class of concreta, which of these entities are suitable objects of perception, for creatures like us, lies completely outside the purview of philosophy. Once we have appealed to spatiotemporal location to define the concrete, we are left with many concrete entities which need not be objects of perceptual awareness from a Radical Anti-psychologist perspective. Many of these entities are not perceivable due to the natural limitations of our perceptual capacities; for instance, we cannot be perceptually aware of very small objects (say molecules) or very fast events (say the cinema screen going black in between frames). The issue of precisely which concrete entities lie beyond the grasp of our perceptual capacities is something that could only be settled empirically, not from an armchair. But an adequate understanding of these limitations will play an important part in determining which concrete entities can be perceived by creature like us.

ii) Lack of Generality as the Mark of the "Non-conceptual"

We have characterised concreta as spatiotemporally located entities. On Radical Anti-psychologism, perception of concreta is epistemologically significant because they can be reasons for judging. An account of why concreta can play this theoretical role – that of being reasons – at all will be advanced in chapter 6. Our case there will depend on the claim that concreta can be truthmakers – a claim which will be defended in chapter 7. Now, on Radical Anti-psychologism, concreta have to play the dual role of being reasons *and* objects of perceptual awareness. I will suggest that lack of generality (in a sense to be explained in what follows), together with our proposed criterion for a concrete/abstract distinction, will allow us to sketch an explanation of why concreta can play this dual role in Radical Anti-psychologism.

Let us remember that, for Frege, thoughts, unlike concrete entities, are susceptible to be regarded as true or false. Part of the idea here is that thoughts are truth-evaluable partly because they possess some kind of *generality* that concrete entities – such as the sun – lack altogether. Note, nevertheless, that this does not mean that everything which possesses this kind of generality will be, therefore, truth-evaluable – e.g., concepts, which exhibit this kind of generality. Following Charles Travis (2007) we can use the label of "the *conceptual*" to designate everything that exhibits the sort of generality that will be characterised in the following. According to this conception, an item *x* belongs to the class of the conceptual if there is, as a matter of necessity, a *range* of possible circumstances which would qualify as falling under that conceptual item, i.e. a range of circumstances which would "satisfy" *x*. Take the concept of *being a pig* as an example. There are indefinitely many objects which could qualify as falling under that concept. That is, there are many ways in which an animal could be such that *it* would be considered a pig. Importantly, this kind of generality is not only exhibited by concepts such as *being a pig*; it is also exhibited by items such as *that* the pig is on the sofa. These are precisely the "thoughts" identified by Frege. In a similar way to concepts, there is a range of circumstances which would qualify as circumstances in which the pig is on the sofa – i.e. there are indefinitely many ways in which that animal and that piece of furniture could be, such that their being in one of those ways would count as a case of the pig being on the sofa. For instance, the pig could be black or pink, the sofa could be a

chesterfield or a cabriole, and yet all these variations would count as instances of the pig being on the sofa. When a particular circumstance qualifies as one in which the pig is on the sofa we say that the thought or proposition that the pig is on the sofa is true. This is how the question of truth comes to bear on *some* of these conceptual entities, namely thoughts (in Fregean jargon). If the circumstance that obtains is one which falls under the range of circumstances specified by a thought, we say that the thought is true; otherwise it is false. Now, it seems that "the conceptual" contains not only items which are truth-evaluable, for, as noted before, apart from thoughts we also have concepts. Concepts are not in the business of being true or false. Rather, they are satisfied or unsatisfied by the obtaining of particular circumstances or the existence of particular objects.

Before continuing we should point out, following Travis, that there is an additional kind of generality that items which belong to the conceptual need not exhibit. For instance, a concept, or a thought, could be "particular" in the sense that they could necessarily be about a specific item. For example, the concept of being Aristotle is necessarily only satisfied by Aristotle. But the fact that this concept can only be satisfied by a particular man, does not mean that it lacks the generality which has been identified as the mark of the conceptual. For there is still an indefinitely large range of possible *ways* in which the man picked out by "Aristotle" could be, which would satisfy the concept, i.e. there are indefinitely many ways in which Aristotle could have been different to the way he actually was and still be Aristotle. Travis calls this feature "specificity", and is a feature of concepts, not particulars. On his view, then, a conceptual item is general by necessity, yet it can be specific – i.e. it can be about a specific circumstance or object. Moreover, their being specific in no way implies that they are not general in the sense which is distinctive of "the conceptual" (Travis, 2007: 123-127).

This characterisation allows us to trace a distinction between "the conceptual" and "the non-conceptual". On the one hand, we have elements which exhibit the kind of generality described in previous paragraphs, and on the other hand, we have the non-conceptual – which is characterised precisely by the fact that it does not exhibit the kind of generality that the conceptual exhibits. We have, then, a conception in which the non-conceptual is not susceptible of being true or false, or having instances. Travis exploits in

this connection the metaphor of "Frege's line", i.e. a distinction which places the conceptual on one side of the line and the non-conceptual on the other:

> To the right of Frege's line is the conceptual. What is there to the left? What *instances* (first-order) conceptual generalities. Such as that piece of meat. A piece of meat is not in the business of being instanced. So treating it would be bad grammar. Of course, of any given piece of meat, there is a concept of being it… That for which there is thus no range of cases I will call the *non-conceptual* (Travis, 2007: 232).

According to Travis, there is no associated range of circumstances which instantiate the non-conceptual. Paradigmatic cases of concreta, such as material objects, events, and property instances belong on this side of Frege's line. Particular material objects – such as a pig – or particular events – such as the pig walking in the field – have no instances. Rather, they are the instances of first-order generalities such as the concept of being a pig, and the proposition that a pig walks in the field. These remarks seem to capture a natural way of thinking and talking about concepts and objects – hence Travis' remark that treating a piece of meat as something which has instances is "bad grammar".

Yet, this distinction could be challenged by a suggestion that even concrete entities exhibit the generality described by Travis. Such a challenge could be mounted by appealing to the fact that material objects can change through time while maintaining their identity. Let us consider this possible challenge. The criticism could start by noting, for instance, that a particular pig can differ in many ways while remaining the same pig. For instance, a pig can be arranged or constituted at time t_1 in a particular way w_1, say lying down on the floor. But at time t_2 it could be arranged or constituted in a different way w_2, say standing up and having lost half of its left ear. There are in principle indefinitely many ways the pig could be $w_1 \ldots w_n$. That there is a range of ways in which the same entity can be, the challenge goes, shows that concreta *do* have, after all, the kind of generality which is distinctive of "the conceptual". This challenge would, then, seem to construe these ways of being, $w_1 \ldots w_n$, as instances of the pig.

A straightforward way of responding to this challenge would be to deny that the different ways a material object can be *are* instances of that material object. More positively, we can construe these ways of being of the pig, $w_1 \ldots w_n$, as all being on a par with each other,

in the sense that none of them is an instance of any other, i.e. the pig being in way w_1 is not an instance of the pig being in way w_2. Think of the difficulty in selecting one of these ways w_x as the one which is instanced by all other ways of being – could we make sense of the idea that the pig lying down on the floor is an instance of the pig standing up having lost half of its left ear, or vice-versa? Naturally, we need not deny that the many ways in which a particular object can be are all instances of *something*. But that *something* need not be the particular object itself, nor a way of being of that object; after all it would be natural to say that each way of being, $w_1 \ldots w_n$, seems to be an *instance* of indefinitely many conceptual generalities. E.g. the conceptual generalities "being *that* pig" or "being *a* pig" could be instanced by the different ways – $w_1 \ldots w_n$ – in which the pig could be. In other words, the idea that different ways of being are instances of something *does not* force the conclusion that they are instances of non-conceptual entities. It is possible, thus, to account for the fact that there are many ways a pig can be, without thereby maintaining that *a given* way in which the pig is possesses the kind of generality which is a mark of the conceptual.

Let us bring this discussion back to our central issue here, namely perception of concreta. It seems clear that perceivable concreta fall on the "non-conceptual" side of Frege's line. Events, property instances, and physical objects are things which have no generality. Their relationship to the conceptual is that they are the instances which can satisfy or fall under one or another generality. The same goes for less straightforward entities such as rainbows, flashes, shadows, etc. But, importantly, not everything on this side of the line is a concretum. Presumably, for instance, some of the abstract entities considered in the previous section might fall on the non-conceptual side. Arguably, numbers, and fictional characters, despite being abstract, lack generality.

I suggested at the outset of this section that focusing on the lack of generality of concreta would help us explain their theoretical role in Radical Anti-psychologism. Now, part of the explanation why concreta are suitable objects of perception might appeal to their spatiotemporal location. For instance, their spatiotemporal location might feature in an explanation of their capacity to impinge our sense organs. On the other hand, and following Frege's suggestion, the question of truth arises only for some elements in the conceptual, i.e. thoughts or propositions. On the other side of Frege's line, among other things, we find the concrete. These entities can instantiate conceptual generalities, and in so doing they make

them true or false. For a thought or position to be true is nothing more than having an instance in the historical world. On the Radical Anti-psychologistic position concreta are reasons for judging in virtue of being truthmakers for the potential propositions judged. Frege and Travis' conception makes space for this Radical Anti-psychologistic approach. Nevertheless, it should be made clear that this does not constitute yet an argument in favour of the Radical Anti-psychologistic position. This is merely a systematic presentation of the different parts of the view, how they fit together and how some parts support others. Arguments in favour of the view will be advanced in the following chapters.

Conclusion

Let us take stock. In the first part of this chapter we identified some of the main claims of Radical Anti-psychologism and explained how they fit together into a coherent epistemology of perception, which can help us flesh out the passive element in Austin's epistemological outlook. In the second part of this chapter we looked closely into one of these main claims, namely, the claim that among the items we are perceptually aware of we find *concreta*. The main task, then, was to bring some clarity to the notion of concreta. To that end, we advanced a definition based on the spatiotemporal criterion, which, if not watertight, nevertheless proves useful for our purposes here. Then, inspired by Frege and Travis, we approached the notion of concreta from a different (non-definitional) angle, focusing on the idea that lack of generality is the mark of "the conceptual". We argued that this is a crucial feature of concreta vis-à-vis the theoretical role assigned to them in Radical Anti-psychologism. What has been achieved with this discussion is to get a more precise idea of what concreta are and why they are important in the Radical Anti-psychologistic position.

Chapter 5 - Perceptual Knowledge is Based on Reasons

In the previous chapter we began the task of exploring and defending some of the main claims of the Radical Anti-psychologistic picture. Such a task will be continued in the present chapter. The exposition and defence of this view is being carried out with the aim of fleshing out the epistemology of perception we found in Austin. In the previous chapter, we had a close look at the claim that in perception we are aware of concreta, and discussed its limits and some of its implications. We noted there that such a claim is not distinctive of the Radical Anti-psychologistic position, for many other views would accept that the concrete entities that populate the world can be objects of perceptual awareness. Similarly, in this chapter we will scrutinize a claim which is not exclusive to the Radical Anti-psychologist position – it is, as a matter of fact, one of the central claims in many forms of internalist epistemologies. This is the claim (c) in our reconstruction of Radical Anti-psychologism, namely that at least some central instances of human perceptual knowledge constitute an epistemic achievement which is based on reasons possessed by the subject. Although (c) is not a claim distinctive of the Radical Anti-psychologistic position, given other core background commitments of the view, we have a reading of (c) which does make it a distinctively Radical Anti-psychologist claim. Let us remember that claim (a) is the claim that in perception we are aware of, among other things, concreta. Whereas claim (b), which has not been discussed in detail yet, is the claim that concreta can be reasons in favour of making certain judgements. With these claims in place the Radical Anti-psychologist can advance a reading of (c), according to which at least in some cases the *reasons* on which our perceptual knowledge is based are constituted by concreta. We can use the label (c*) to refer to claim (c) when it is read under the guise that perceptual knowledge is, at least *sometimes*, based on concreta. It is important to note that the move from (a) and (b) to either (c*) or (c) is not strict (i.e. there is not a deductive inference which could take us to (c*) or (c), from (a) and (b)). The role of (a) and (b) in the Radical Anti-psychologistic picture is not, thus, to figure as the premises of an argument which could lead us to conclude (c*). Rather, their role is to clear the ground, and provide the elements, for advancing claim (c*).

Given that there is no strict implication from (a) and (b) to either (c) or (c*), an opponent of Radical Anti-psychologism could challenge (c) while conceding (a) and (b) – she could concede that concreta can be both reasons for judging and potential objects of perception. Yet she could maintain that this is irrelevant in an account of perceptual knowledge, for perceptual knowledge has nothing to do with reasons. Given that (c*) is a stronger claim – and implies – (c), it is also possible to challenge (c*) while conceding (a) and (b). In this chapter I want to focus our discussion on claim (c), for I want to look into the motivations for adopting an epistemology of reasons with respect to perceptual knowledge. I also want to look into the standard objections against such a view of perceptual knowledge. Although claim (c*) is not a logical consequence of (a) and (b), its plausibility does depend on the plausibility of the case in favour of these claims (especially (b)) as well as the plausibility of the case in favour of (c). A defence of (a) has been carried out in the previous chapter, and a more detailed scrutiny of claim (b), that concreta can be reasons for judgement, will be undertaken in the following chapter.

In the first part of this chapter we will contrast the view that perceptual knowledge is based on reasons with some externalist theories of perceptual knowledge, a prominent way of understanding how perceptual knowledge is warranted, which do not appeal to reasons possessed by the subject. First, we will advance some simple remarks to motivate the view that perceptual knowledge is based on reasons possessed by the subject. Then, we will discuss some of the standard challenges launched by externalist epistemologies to argue that such an account is untenable. In particular we will look into the regress problem argument and the hyper-intellectualism accusation. The former argues that a reasons epistemology leads to a vicious infinite regress of reasons. The later maintains that a reasons account of perceptual knowledge places requirements for perceptual knowledge which are too demanding – so demanding that that the majority of the perceptual knowledge we take ourselves ordinarily to possess is not really knowledge. We will argue that reasons epistemologies – and Radical Anti-psychologism in particular – have the resources to respond to both challenges. In the second part of this chapter, we will look into a potential tension between endorsing an Austinian epistemology of perception and adopting (c), a claim which is at the centre of the Radical Anti-psychologist view. The tension arises from Austin's apparent rejection of the claim that knowledge is grounded on reasons. We argue that the tension is only apparent, for

it takes its foothold by exploiting a merely terminological discrepancy between Austin and the Radical Anti-psychologistic position. Usefully enough, this discussion will lead us to consider the role that recognitional capacities have in perceptual knowledge acquisition, and its implications with respect to possible requirements of warrant articulation for perceptual knowledge. In turn, this discussion will help us advance a more robust response to the externalist challenges addressed in the first part of the chapter and will provide a spring board for the discussion in the following chapter.

5.1 Radical Anti-psychologism and Externalist Epistemologies

I will begin by suggesting that reflection on particular cases provides some of the more compelling reasons there are for thinking that the perceptual knowledge enjoyed by adult humans is sometimes based on reasons.[73] Suppose that an expert birdwatcher spots a goldfinch on a tree and comes to know, thereby, that there is a goldfinch in the garden. Suppose further that she possesses abundant reasons for making that judgement – something which is made evident by her articulation of those reasons (let us suppose that our birdwatcher is quite an eloquent individual). I want to suggest that there is absolutely nothing extraordinary about this case. And a natural way of explaining why the subject in our example possesses knowledge would be to appeal to her possession of those reasons. Further considerations about this case provide additional reasons to think that a reasons account is appropriate. If, contrary to the hypothesis, the subject's standing was not based on reasons, then it would be feebler than it seems reasonable. For instance, it seems reasonable to think that the expert birdwatcher's judgement is securely grounded, in the sense that she is in a position to neutralize many possible counter-considerations. If someone were to suggest to her that the bird might not be a goldfinch, but a different red-headed bird such as a woodpecker – the expert birdwatcher might be able to neutralize this challenge by pointing out that the bird's peak is not pointy enough for a woodpecker. Similarly, a natural explanation of why the expert birdwatcher can defend her claim to know in this way is that her epistemic standing is grounded on reasons possessed by her. We should clarify that eloquent articulation of the possessed reasons need not be a requirement in a reasons

[73] See Conee and Feldman (2001) for this type of defence of an internalist epistemology, in general, not just about perceptual knowledge.

epistemology. This aspect is exploited in the present example merely to bring out the intuition that in these cases the goodness of the subject's epistemic standing depends on her possessing those reasons.

Even though the reasons account seems to be able to provide a natural account of this type of cases, opponents of the view have argued against it by finding problems with the view. Here we will look closely at two of these challenges and provide a response to them. For instance, opponents of the view might argue that a reasons epistemology is not tenable on the basis that it exhibits an internal flaw which makes it inadequate to account for the phenomenon of knowledge. This is the path followed by the infinite regress argument. Other type of criticism suggests that a reasons account is inadequate because it cannot give an adequate account of many of the cases we want to explain. This is the path followed by the hyper-intellectualism argument.[74] Before presenting and assessing these arguments let me briefly say something about the epistemological outlook from which many of these criticisms are advanced, i.e. epistemological externalism.

In its most general form, externalist epistemologies maintain that a subject can know, or warrantedly believe, that *p*, even in cases in which the subject would be unaware of reasons that there might be in favour of *p*. Sometimes the view is supplemented with the claim that subjects can know that *p* even if they are incapable of *citing* any reasons in favour of *p*.[75] For instance, according to reliabilist theories of knowledge, a subject's knowledge that *p* does not depend on the subject possessing the reasons there might be in favour *p*.[76] On this view, as long as the relevant belief – i.e. the belief that *p* – is the result of a belief-forming mechanism that is reliable in the circumstances in which it is deployed, the subject might know that *p*. Of course, depending on the particular view, further conditions might have to be satisfied if the subject is to count as knowing that *p*. A belief-forming mechanism is reliable when it produces an appropriately high proportion of true beliefs. Thus, on such a

[74] See Goldman (1999), Alston (1986), and Plantinga (1996) for arguments against internalism which differ from the ones we will analyse here. See Conee and Feldman (2001) for a response to these criticisms.
[75] For this characterisation of externalism see Armstrong (1973), as well as BonJour (1980) for a critical assessment of Armstrong's position. See also Brandom (2000) for a critical assessment of the main thesis of externalism and reliabilist.
[76] For instance, Goldman's (partial) analysis of the notion of justified belief (1979): 102. According to his analysis, if a subject's belief that *p* at *t* is the product of a reliable belief-forming process, *and* there is no alternative or additional reliable belief forming-process available to the subject which would have had as a result the subject not believing *p* at *t*, then the belief is justified (Goldman, 1979: 102)

conception of knowledge, subjects might acquire propositional knowledge despite being unaware of (and despite being incapable of articulating) the reasons there are in favour of their beliefs. Since there is no immediate requirement for being reliable that one possesses reasons, nor that one is able to articulate them, one can meet the reliability condition without meeting those other conditions.

It is important to note that it is possible to uphold an externalist epistemology *without* accounting for perceptual knowledge along externalist lines. For the way we characterised externalist epistemologies does not imply a commitment to the general claim that *all* types of knowledge should be accounted for along externalist lines. As long as *some* types of knowledge follow the externalist paradigm a *form* of externalism can be upheld. To be an externalist it might suffice, for instance, to maintain that testimonial knowledge is to be accounted along externalist lines. This would be compatible with claiming that perceptual knowledge is based on reasons that the subject possesses. Therefore, our characterisation leaves open the possibility for an externalist position in which perceptual knowledge, nevertheless, is based on reasons that the subject possesses. It goes without saying, nevertheless, that many externalist epistemologists think that a correct account of perceptual knowledge should follow the externalist paradigm. We will discuss a view of this kind below, when we look into Tyler Burge's account of perceptual knowledge.

In a similar fashion, the Radical Anti-psychologist position (a type of reasons epistemology) is not committed to the position that an externalist account of knowledge cannot be right about *some* cases of knowledge or belief. As a matter of fact, there are good reasons to think that true beliefs produced by a capacity to, by and large, truly represent the world, should be regarded *positively* from an epistemic point of view – they would be the product of a *truth conducive* procedure after all – even if the subject lacked reasons for the resulting beliefs. As is often pointed out by externalist epistemologists, these notions might be useful to characterise what is *epistemically right* in the reliably-produced true beliefs of creatures incapable of articulating the reasons for their beliefs, such as small children and higher animals.[77] Radical Anti-psychologism is not inconsistent with this minimal point.

[77] For instance Burge (2003: 515).

Nevertheless, a conflict between *some* versions of externalism and the kind of reasons epistemology advanced by Radical Anti-psychologism might arise when we consider the specific question of under what paradigm should we place adult human's perceptual knowledge. Sometimes externalist epistemologists insist on the more specific point that this sort of perceptual knowledge should be understood along externalist lines. When this further step is taken, then, there is an obvious conflict between Radical Anti-psychologism and this sort of externalist epistemology. In favour of a reasons epistemology we have the straightforward account of cases such as the expert birdwatcher's knowledge that there is a goldfinch on the tree. In order to undermine the plausibility of a reasons account of perceptual knowledge, externalist epistemologists tend to advance arguments such as the infinite regress argument and the hyper-intellectualism argument. We will explain how these arguments are supposed to work shortly.

I will argue that a correct understanding of the claim that perceptual knowledge is, at least sometimes, based on reasons possessed by the subject shows that these worries are unfounded. In particular, I will be suggesting that claim (c) should be read in a rather minimal way, such that the alleged problems raised by the standard externalist challenges do not represent significant problems for the version of Radical Anti-psychologism defended here. It should be noted here that I do not intend this discussion to be an exhaustive rejection of the arguments which have been advanced to favour an externalist epistemology, nor is it an attempt to refute externalist epistemology. In responding to these standard objections I merely want to highlight one way in which the particular view defended here could deal with the problems raised by common objections. This will also help delineate more precisely what kind of view Radical Anti-psychologism is, and place it within a broader philosophical debate.

i) The Regress Problem

The regress problem in epistemology is commonly characterised as the problem which arises when epistemological views allow for a potential infinite regress of the grounds on which particular pieces of propositional knowledge are warranted. Consider, for instance, an account of knowledge according to which in order for *S* to know that *p*, *S* has to *know* that the reasons which warrant her adoption of *p* actually obtain. Suppose that all knowledge

needs to be grounded on reasons possessed by the subject. Suppose, moreover, that the obtaining of those reasons is described by *q*. This means that *S'*s knowledge that *p* is based on *S*'s knowledge that *q*. If we apply the same reasoning to *S*'s knowledge that *q*, and to all new pieces of knowledge which arise in the warranting chain, we are faced with an infinite, and seemingly vicious, regress.

There are several ways in which this problem can be dealt with in epistemology, and not all epistemological approaches advance a solution to the problem. For instance, infinitist approaches endorse the strategy of claiming that there is nothing problematic with an infinite regress of warrants, a hard sell for many epistemologists.[78] But a straightforward way of dealing with the problem is to attempt to solve it. For instance, coherentist approaches have attempted to solve the problem by arguing that there is not an infinite number of warrants which ground our knowledge. Instead, coherentists claim that there is a warranting chain which eventually comes back in a circle.[79] Unlike the potential infinite regress, the warranting circle is not vicious, or so they argue. Alternatively, foundationalist approaches attempt to solve the problem by introducing ending points to the warranting chains. The terminating points of the warranting chains are constituted by so-called "basic beliefs". Different brands of foundationalism have characterised basic beliefs in different ways. There are three prominent alternatives. The first is that basic beliefs do not need reasons to constitute knowledge – on this view not all knowledge ought to be grounded on reasons. Second, that basic beliefs are self-warranted in virtue of being self-evident. On this position all knowledge should be grounded on reasons, but not all reasons need to be independent of the knowledge they ground. Finally, the claim that basic beliefs are warranted by *something* other than a belief, which is not itself in need of warrant. On this position, all knowledge need to be grounded on reasons, but not all reasons are afforded by a state of knowing (nor by a state which requires reasons to be grounded).[80] Here a clarificatory point is in order. Classic foundationalist theories of knowledge traditionally advance the additional claim that every non-basic piece of knowledge ought to be grounded, ultimately, on the basis of a basic belief.

[78] See Klein (2000, 2003) for a defence of "infinitism". See BonJour (2009), and Ginet (2013) for criticisms.
[79] See BonJour (1985) and Lehrer (1990, 2005).
[80] See Pryor (2013), Alston (1989), BonJour & Sosa (2003), and Fumerton (2000) for explicit defences of basic beliefs and foundationalism, and Zalabardo (2006) for a characterisation of the Regress Problem and the available responses to it.

This aspect of the foundationalist picture will be left out in the present work, for we are interested here only in the foundationalist account of basic beliefs as regress stoppers. Now, how do externalist epistemologies respond to the regress problem? And how could they exploit their response to it in an argument against reasons epistemologies? In the following, we will look at these questions in turn.

Externalist epistemologies usually appeal to a *stopping point* in the warranting chain and are, in this sense, a form of foundationalism. They argue that there is a special kind of knowledge – *basic* knowledge – which is non-inferentially warranted. A common way of defining non-inferential knowledge is as follows: a piece of knowledge is non-inferentially warranted when its warrant need not be constituted by further beliefs of the subject.[81] On the externalist conception it is usually claimed that the obtaining of a relevant fact, of which the subject need not be aware in any way, ensures the warranted status of the relevant piece of knowledge. Take, for instance, Goldman's reliabilist approach. On a view like that, a subject's knowledge that *p* can be warranted simply by virtue of the fact that it is the product of a reliable belief-forming process, where one need not in addition be knowledgeable about the reliability of this process.[82] This type of view could stop the regress, the reasoning goes, because a fact (such as the fact that the belief is the upshot of a reliable mechanism) is not the kind of thing that stands in need of warranting support. This type of warrant is non-inferential precisely because other beliefs that the subject possesses need not constitute the warrant for the relevant piece of knowledge.

Very schematically, this is a standard externalist response to the regress problem. But how could an externalist use her response to the regress problem in order to advance an argument against a conception of perceptual knowledge along a reasons epistemology? Often epistemological arguments which appeal to the regress problem take the form of an inference to the best explanation, which in turn rests on discrediting alternative explanations.[83] In other words, arguments tend to take the form of finding problems in competing theories, in order to argue that a given position is the only way in which we can deal with the regress problem. We can restrict the scope of possible positions by assuming that the appropriate way of

[81] See Alston (1989: 21), and BonJour (1985: 18), for a definition of non-inferential warrant along these lines.
[82] As well as by virtue of the fact that there are no alternative reliable belief-forming processes available to the subject which could have had as a result the subject not endorsing that belief. See Goldman (1979).
[83] See BonJour (1999) for this description of the dialectic which turns on the regress problem.

dealing with the regress problem is by introducing regress stoppers. The argument would, then, look as follows:

i) Any viable account of basic knowledge must be able to deal with the regress.
ii) Any view which deals with the regress must be either reasons based or externalist.
iii) Reasons accounts of basic knowledge cannot stop the regress.
iv) Therefore, the correct account of basic knowledge is an externalist account.

On the further assumption that perceptual knowledge is basic, we have the conclusion that the correct account of perceptual knowledge is an externalist account. Faced with this argument it would be natural for a reasons epistemologist to question the credentials behind premise (iii) of the above argument. The following line of reasoning might be used by the externalist to sponsor claim (iii). An essential aspect of a reasons epistemology is that knowledge is grounded on reasons possessed by the subject. On a reasons epistemology, basic knowledge that, say, *p* should be grounded on reasons possessed by the subject. But how are we to understand the notion that a subject "possesses" a reason? A flat-footed suggestion would be that the subject possesses a reason insofar as she *knows* that the reason obtains. But this approach to basic knowledge would fall to the regress problem sketched in the outset of this section. Suppose the subject's reasons for knowing that *p* (where this is a basic piece of knowledge) are described by *q*. Then her possessing those reasons would amount to her knowledge that *q*. But if she knows that *q* she must have reasons for it. A vicious regress looms. Here, it is important to note that the regress arises as the result of the adoption of the following two claims: first, the claim that all knowledge should be grounded on reasons possessed by the subject, and, second, the claim that possession of reasons amounts to knowing that the relevant reasons obtain.

One way to respond to this line of reasoning is to point out that some versions of the reasons epistemology do not hold these principles, nor principles similar to the ones which give rise to the regress problem. In particular, we can point out that the version of Radical Anti-psychologism advanced here does not endorse the claim that possession of reasons amounts to knowledge that the relevant reasons obtain. Arguably, this would result in the Radical Anti-psychologist conception of basic perceptual knowledge avoiding the regress

problem. To see why, first, it should be clear that the way in which perceptual knowledge is warranted on the Radical Anti-psychologist conception should be considered non-inferential. On the Radical Anti-psychologist conception, the reasons that constitute the warrant which grounds a piece of basic knowledge are the very objects of perception which make true the warranted proposition. *S*'s knowledge that there is a pig in front of her can be warranted by the pig itself, for, on this conception, concreta can be reasons. Moreover, for the subject to possess that reason (i.e. the pig), she does not need to be in a state of belief (nor knowledge) with respect to any proposition involving the pig. In other words, the possession of the relevant reason is afforded to the subject not by her being in a state of belief about the pig, but by a state of perception of the pig (*Cfr*. Kalderon, 2011: 227).

The Radical Anti-psychologist, thus, can reject the claim that possession of reasons requires knowledge of those reasons. Against this position, it could be argued that for a subject to form the relevant judgement, for instance that there is a pig before her, there are certain beliefs she must possess – for instance the belief that pigs are animals. This remark, nevertheless, can be endorsed without challenging the non-inferential status of the warrant proposed by the Radical Anti-psychologist. For any beliefs subjects should have for them to be in a position to judge that *p,* need not constitute the warrant for their knowledge that *p*. Non-inferential warrant only requires that no beliefs *constitute* the warrant on which a piece of knowledge rests. That is, we can allow for certain beliefs to function as enabling conditions for making the relevant judgements. In the example above, that is just the role that we can assign to the beliefs about pigs. Thus, the kind of warrant advanced by the Radical Anti-psychologist should be considered non-inferential. That pieces of knowledge warranted in this way can serve as regress stoppers could be shown by pointing out that the items which constitute the warrant are not the kind of thing which stands in need of warranting support. For a pig is not the kind of thing which could be warranted or unwarranted. Nevertheless, against this attempt to stop the regress, it could be argued that even though the reasons which ground our perceptual knowledge are not the kind of thing that needs warrant, the *way* in which the subject is aware of those reasons might be something that stands itself in need of warrant. But, it could be replied, in a similar fashion, that a perceptual state (unlike a state of believing or knowing) is not the kind of thing which stands in need of warrant. My seeing the pig is not the kind of thing which can be warranted or unwarranted.

Granted, perhaps the last claim is not so straightforward within the framework of a belief account of perception, according to which being in a perceptual state is to be identified with the acquisition of a belief. For these views, a subject perceives, for instance, a property *P* if and only if she acquires the belief that something is *P*.[84] On such a conception of perception, given its intimate connection to belief acquisition, talk of a perceptual state being warranted might make sense insofar as talk of beliefs being warranted makes sense. For instance, a suggestion would be that a perceptual state is warranted or unwarranted insofar as the concomitant beliefs are warranted or unwarranted. Here, I am going to set aside these views on the nature of perception. In the current debate, such views are widely regarded as untenable on the basis of considerations such as the following: someone who knows (and therefore believes) that the lines in the Müller-Lyer illusion are of equal length, would nevertheless *see* them as unequal – as a matter of fact she could not help but seeing them as unequal. Endorsing the belief theory of perception would leave the subject, in cases like this, with inconsistent sets of beliefs.

ii) Hyper Intellectualism

The argument that appeals to the regress problem is one major objection which could be advanced from an externalist epistemology against an epistemology of reasons. But it seems that the Radical Anti-psychologistic position has the elements to avoid this alleged problem. What about the second standard objection identified before – the one that claims that a reasons account of perceptual knowledge is bound to advance a hyper-intellectualized conception of this sort of knowledge? For instance, Tyler Burge has advanced a form of this reasoning to argue in favour of his own externalist account of perceptual knowledge – and against a reasons account. Burge's account attempts to occupy a middle ground between a reasons account of perceptual knowledge and a reliabilist approach such as the one advanced by Goldman. For Burge considerations about the reliability of certain belief-forming mechanisms are relevant for his account, but that is not the central feature in his epistemology of perception. Very briefly, for Burge a subject is *entitled* to hold a perceptual belief when the non-conceptual representational content afforded by a perceptual episode is appropriately

[84] See Fish (2010: 53) and Armstrong (1968).

transformed into a conceptual or propositional content which preserves crucial elements of the truth conditions of the original representational content. Burge calls this process *conceptualization,* and the process only leads to warrant if it is a reliable process (Burge, 2003: 522-526). For Burge, the process of conceptualization leads to warrant partly by virtue of being a reliable process of belief formation. But his account does not stop as soon as we reach reliability; for him, the process of conceptualization provides the subject with warrant only when reliability is achieved in the appropriate manner. What is crucial for the proper functioning of conceptualization is the preservation of the verticality of the perceptual representations, and preservation of reference to the singular elements in perceptual representations (Burge, 2003: 540-542).

Now, even when Burge's view is not an instance of classical reliabilism, it is still a form of externalism insofar as it holds that even adult human perceptual knowledge is such that it does not require the knower to be aware of the reasons there might be in favour of her perceptually based knowledge. For Burge, the special kind of epistemic warrant he labels "perceptual entitlement", which is the result of the process of conceptualization, exhibits the following characteristic: "[it] need not be fully conceptually accessible, even on reflection, to the warranted individual. The individual need not have the concepts necessary to think the propositional content that formulates the warrant" (Burge, 2003: 504). So, in a similar way to Goldman's reliabilist approach, a perceptual knower can be entirely unaware of the grounds there might be, which would warrant their adoption of the relevant belief. Moreover, the subject might be unable to articulate that warrant. What is essential, on Burge's view, for the warrant of a perceptual belief is whether or not it was formed in an appropriate way.

But what is Burge's argument to dismiss a reasons account of perceptual knowledge? Burge thinks that his externalist account of perceptual knowledge is partially warranted by the fact that any account of perceptual knowledge more demanding than his would provide us with an inadequate, hyper-intellectualized, elucidation of perceptual knowledge.[85] In particular, on Burge's view, reasons epistemologies would fall prey to this problem. Let us have, then, a closer look into his case for the accusation of hyper-intellectualism advanced against reasons epistemologies of perception.

[85] This kind of objection against reasons epistemologies is very common in externalist approaches. See, for example, Alston (1980, 1986: 144), Vogel (2000), Goldman (1999).

Not all versions of reasons epistemology would impose the requirement that for a subject to possess perceptual knowledge she must be able to articulate the reasons which ground her knowledge. Some views might maintain that it suffices if the judgement is grounded on reasons of which the subject is aware, independently of her capacity to articulate those reasons. Here, nevertheless, I will assess the more demanding version of the view, according to which the subject must be able to articulate her warrant. We will see that this more demanding version can deal adequately with the hyper-intellectualism worry. Let us call knowledge understood in conformity with the demanding epistemology of reasons "reflexive knowledge". Having reflexive knowledge, in this sense, simply means that the subject must have the capacity to give *some* appropriate expression to the reasons which ground their relevant belief if they are required to do so. It has been argued that a construal of perceptual knowledge as reflexive, in this sense, would have the consequence that many adult humans, all pre-conceptual children, and "higher animals" would be prevented from having said knowledge. This line of attack exploits the commitment that subjects must be capable of articulating the reasons on which the relevant piece of knowledge is grounded. For example, McDowell, explains Sellars' conception of perceptual knowledge as reflexive – a conception McDowell himself endorses – as follows:

> If someone has a bit of knowledge of the sort Sellars is concerned with [i.e. knowledge that is distinctive of rational animals], she can state not only what she knowledgeably believes, but also how her believing it is rationally grounded in a way that shows the belief to be knowledgeable (McDowell, 2011: 10).

So, on this account of reflexive knowledge, the knower must be in a position in which she can make explicit the grounds on which her knowledge is based. Once this much has been endorsed by the reasons epistemologist, the externalist can launch the following attack. Many subjects who surely have perceptual knowledge, such as pre-rational children and non-linguistic higher animals, will be incapable of giving expression to the grounds on which their knowledge is warranted – for they simply lack the conceptual capacities to entertain such grounds and, furthermore, lack the linguistic capacities to articulate them. Moreover, the attack usually argues that a reasons account of perceptual knowledge is too demanding not only with respect to such knowers, but also with respect to many rational adult humans. But surely we want to concede that perceptual knowledge is an epistemic achievement which

is within reach of these creatures, pre-linguistic children, and most adult humans. Nevertheless, according to this criticism, lacking the conceptual and linguistic capacities required to give expression to their perceptual warrant would prevent many of these creatures – adult humans included – from having perceptual knowledge. Therefore, the argument concludes, the account of perceptual knowledge as reflexive is inadequate insofar as it would prevent, if it were true, too many subjects from having perceptual knowledge at all.

I want to start by noting that we can identify two related but independent objections being raised here against a reasons account of perceptual knowledge. The first is that it would prevent many pre-linguistic children and higher animals from having perceptual knowledge. The second is that it would prevent even many adult humans from enjoying this kind of knowledge. As we will see, we will treat these objections as independent since they rest on different grounds. The former rests on the assumption that a uniform account of perceptual knowledge should be advanced for rational and non-rational animals. The latter rests on the idea that the requisites imposed by a reasons epistemology are overly demanding even for rational adult humans. I think both criticisms are objectionable insofar as their plausibility depends on an inadequate – i.e. non-obligatory – construal of the sort of requirement put forward by a reasons epistemology regarding the capacity of the knower to articulate the warrant that grounds her knowledge. We will take these criticisms in turn.

Let us start by noting that the first criticism only works on the assumption that we should give a uniform account of perceptual knowledge across rational and non-rational animals. This is an assumption which might be challenged by a reasons epistemologist. The conclusion that a reasons account is inadequate when applied to higher animals and pre-linguistic children, on the basis that they lack the linguistic and conceptual capacities to articulate their warrant, can only be reached under the assumption that the scope of the reasons account of perceptual knowledge ranges over *all* instances of perceptual knowledge. Tyler Burge acknowledges explicitly that this assumption is in play in his own case against reasons epistemologies. Thus, he thinks that the following is a requirement which should be met by any plausible epistemology of perception:

> A viable conception of warrant and knowledge must include both primitive and sophisticated types. A condition of viability is that such a conception apply to

> animal and child perceptual belief, and knowledge, as well as to mature instances of belief and knowledge (Burge, 2003: 505).

Of course, if we think that the same account we advance for the perceptual knowledge enjoyed by rational adult humans is to be extended to the perceptual knowledge enjoyed by young children and higher animals, then reasons epistemology will certainly face a problem of hyper-intellectualization – for lacking the required linguistic and conceptual capacities would prevent them from qualifying as knowers. But it is not obvious at all that we should advance the same account of perceptual knowledge across rational and non-rational animals.

As a matter of fact, there seems to be an unwarranted move in Burge's passage. The two sentences that compose the passage seem to be treated by Burge as equivalent, but they clearly are not – we will explain why shortly. Alternatively, it could be thought that the passage is to be read as if the first claim implied the second; but similarly, the implication clearly fails. We could concede that an adequate conception of perceptual knowledge should account for both "primitive" and "sophisticated" types – that much seems to be an innocuous requirement for a comprehensive epistemology. But conceding this much does not commit us to the claim which is advanced immediately after by Burge, namely that *the same epistemological account* should be given for both instances of knowledge. In principle, there is no reason to think that an adequate epistemology should not advance different treatments for the primitive and the sophisticated cases. After all, differences in the rational capacities of the knowers are reasons to advance different accounts to the ensuing knowledge. It is, thus, open to the reasons epistemologist to claim that the account of perceptual knowledge as reflexive is to be understood as an account which applies exclusively to rational agents, such as adult humans, and that a different account – perhaps an account modelled along externalist lines – should be advanced for the "primitive" cases. If this is so, then, the mere fact that pre-linguistic children and higher animals are incapable of articulating the reasons that ground their perceptual knowledge should not be considered a reason to think the account is inadequate.[86]

Burge does not provide very much in the way of argument for thinking that an adequate account of perceptual knowledge should advance the same treatment for

[86] Here I am following one line of defence advanced by John McDowell (2010, 2013) against Burge's charge of hyper-intellectualization.

sophisticated and primitive cases. He rightly points out that a philosophical outlook in which higher animals and pre-linguistic children are denied certain perceptual and cognitive capacities – examples of which are knowledge, belief, and perception, among others – should be regarded as inadequate. He also sensibly suggests that an adequate account of perceptual knowledge should not divorce human perception and cognition from its animal roots (Burge, 2003: 503-503). What is not clear is that a reasons account of perceptual knowledge would necessarily be guilty of these sins. For instance, it is not inconsistent with Radical Anti-psychologism to concede that higher animals have perceptual knowledge nor that pre-linguistic children are perceptually aware of the world around them. Moreover, it is open to the Radical Anti-psychologist to regard the reflexive knowledge had by adult humans as a *species* of a *genus* which does include the non-reflexive knowledge enjoyed by other creatures. A move which has been defended by McDowell: "giving a special account of the perceptual knowledge of rational animals is consistent with regarding perceptual knowledge in rational animals as a sophisticated species of a genus that is also instantiated more primitively in non-rational animals and pre-rational human children" (McDowell, 2010: 20). It is not clear that an account like this could be seen as divorcing human perception and cognition from its animal roots. A view like this could claim, for instance, that both types of knowledge (sophisticated and primitive) depend on the successful operation of perceptual capacities – capacities which are shared by rational and non-rational beings. This might give us one reason to think that such a view does not divorce human cognition from its animal roots.

Moreover, and more importantly, there are good reasons for advancing an account of perceptual knowledge in which there are important differences between primitive and sophisticated types. Consider, for instance, the following line of reasoning. It seems reasonable to grant that in the presence of a predator, certain animals and young children could acquire knowledge about the presence of danger, knowledge which would be based on their perception of the predator. Similarly, adult humans could get to know the same thing – that the present situation is dangerous – on the basis of their perception of a predator. Nevertheless, it is possible to find important differences in those ways of knowing. Saliently, the adult human's knowledge will typically be sensitive, in a way that other creatures could not be, to the presentation of counter-considerations that would speak against her putative

piece of knowledge. If someone points out that the tiger is actually behind a reinforced glass wall, her judgement regarding the presence of danger can be adjusted in light of this information, provided she understands the remark. Perhaps they will abandon the initial belief and form the new belief that there is no danger after all, or no significant danger *for them* after all. It is not so clear that the knowledge (or warranted belief) had by young children and higher animals could exhibit this kind of sensitivity to counter-considerations. One way of explaining this difference, due to McDowell, consists in conceiving young children and higher animals as being merely aware of reasons, and the beliefs they hold as a response to those reasons. But, on this view, importantly, their beliefs are not *based on* those reasons, they are merely a response to them. In order for a belief to be based on a reason, the subject must exhibit the desired sensitivity to counter-considerations described before. On the other hand, adult humans should be regarded as being aware of reasons *as such,* and forming their beliefs not only in response to those reasons, but formed on the basis of those reasons. Being aware of reasons *as such* implies that a subject understands their role in grounding her beliefs. Thus, when counter-considerations are advanced the subject can appreciate the impact they have in their reasons, or in the way the reasons support relevant beliefs (McDowell, 2006: 128-129). Considerations like these do speak in favour of an account of perceptual knowledge in which there are important differences between sophisticated and primitive types.

But the second way of reading the hyper-intellectualization charge does not rely on the assumption that the same account should be given for sophisticated and primitive types of perceptual knowledge. Let us remember that the second way of presenting the charge maintains that the requirement to articulate one's warrant is too demanding even for adult humans. The argument is simply that even in sophisticated cases a reasons account would give rise to a hyper-intellectualized conception of *that kind* of perceptual knowledge. The charge rests on the assumption that the capacity to cite the reasons on which the relevant perceptual knowledge rests requires the possession of far too sophisticated concepts; concepts which many rational adult humans might lack. For instance, Burge seems to suggest that a reasons account would be committed to the idea that for a subject to have perceptual knowledge she should be in possession of the following concepts: "*reliable, normal condition, perceptual state, individuation, defeating condition*" (Burge, 2003: 528). Sure, if

an account requires possession by subjects of these technical terms as a requisite for them to qualify as knowers, indeed that would be a hyper-intellectualized conception of perceptual knowledge. But it is simply a mistake to think that a reasons account of perceptual knowledge necessarily requires that the subject be capable of articulating her reasons using such sophisticated concepts. Consider the following formulation of the relevant requirement, advanced by McDowell:

> Spelled out in connection with the capacity to know the colours of things by looking at them, the requirement is that someone who gives expression to such knowledge by saying, for instance, "That's green" must be able to vindicate the authority with which she speaks by saying something like "I can tell a green thing when I see one" (McDowell, 2011: 12).

It should be clear that a capacity to say something along these lines when we are asked to provide our grounds for thinking that something is green hardly requires the possession of sophisticated concepts on the part of the subject. If we understand the requirement of being able to articulate the reasons we have for our perceptual knowledge along these lines, then it seems that the charge of hyper-intellectualization advanced by the externalist epistemologists is groundless. Being able to say, at least, something along those lines when our perceptual knowledge is questioned does not require from us to possess any of the sophisticated concepts in Burge's list.

This construal of the requirement to articulate one's warrant might attract a criticism in the opposite direction. It could be argued that in many cases an incapacity to go beyond this minimal articulation could signal a lack of knowledge. The view which requires merely a minimal articulation of one's warrant might be sufficient for many everyday cases. Moreover, a reason to favour this position is the observation that someone's knowledgeability might not be necessarily accompanied by a high degree of eloquence. But although this might be true, what do we make of other cases in which, it seems, a deeper articulation is required if we are to consider the subject knowledgeable? Consider, for instance, the case of the expert ornithologist who claims to know that, in her latest field research, she was able to establish the presence of goldfinches in a location further north to what was considered their natural habitat. Arguably for such a subject to count as knowing this proposition she must be able to articulate her reasons for so thinking, with a considerable

degree of detail and exhibiting a considerable degree of conceptual sophistication. The articulation requirement, for a reasons epistemologist, might differ from context to context. But, then, an interesting question will be why in ordinary cases of perceptual knowledge, the minimal articulation suffices? It would be good to have a positive, and specific, explanation of why the bar is not put higher for these cases. McDowell does not provide such an explanation. But we will see in the second part of this chapter, that some remarks by Austin might help us do just that. We will see that, for Austin, the role of recognitional capacities in perceptual knowledge acquisition allows us to explain why a minimal requirement of articulation is appropriate for many ordinary cases of perceptual knowledge.

In summary, in responding to these objections commonly raised from an externalist perspective against a reasons epistemology we have done two things. First, we provided a defence of the Radical Anti-psychologist view from standard attacks, and, secondly, we delineated the view with more precision. On the one hand, we have explained how the Radical Anti-psychologist can deal with the regress problem by advancing a non-inferential account of perceptual warrant. On the other hand, we have explained how the view can deal with the accusation that the resulting account hyper-intellectualizes perceptual knowledge. But apart from challenges against the plausibility of a reasons account of perceptual knowledge, we also face potential worries, internal to the project we aim to defend here. In the following section we will discuss a worry to the effect that endorsing a reasons epistemology would be inconsistent with certain aspects of Austin's epistemology. This discussion will also allow us to provide a more robust response to the charge of hyper-intellectualization considered in this section.

5.2 Reasons Epistemology and Austin

Let us now consider whether there is a potential inconsistency between endorsing both an Austinian epistemology and a reasons epistemology such as Radical Anti-psychologism. In explaining how there is no such inconsistency we will also look into some interesting suggestions made by Austin regarding the way in which we should understand the requirement that a rational subject who possesses perceptual knowledge should be able to articulate the warrant that grounds it.

One salient remark made by Austin in "Other Minds" is that, in ordinary talk, the question used to enquire for the grounds on the basis of which a belief is held is very different from a similar question which enquires for the grounds of a piece of knowledge:

> There is a singular difference between the two forms of challenge: '*How* do you know?' and '*Why* do you believe?' We seem never to ask '*Why* do you know?' or '*How* do you believe?' (Austin, 1946: 78).

As we have seen before, a distinctive trait of Austin's philosophy is that of taking very seriously ordinary ways of speaking. He thinks that this difference in the relevant challenges reveals something deep about the nature of knowledge and its difference from belief. One suggestion advanced by Austin is that in saying "I know" we are doing something more than merely describing our mental state – as we seemingly do when we say "I believe". For Austin, when we say "I know" we are also putting ourselves on the line in a distinctive way – at least in a way that we do not when our claim is merely to believe. For Austin, a claim to know (if indeed correct) has the capacity to transmit our knowledge to another subject, and, moreover, the hearer is entitled to endorse the relevant proposition as knowledge. Or, alternatively, the hearer would be entitled to complain with her source if it turns out that it was not knowledge after all (Austin, 1946: 97-103). Nevertheless, I do not want to focus here on this aspect of Austin's discussion. Instead I want to focus on what Austin thinks these challenges teach us about the different ways in which knowledge and belief are epistemically grounded.

In summary, following Austin's terminology, he wants to suggest that, strictly speaking, believing is based on reasons whereas knowledge is not. This idea is advanced as a response to the observation that we enquire for the reasons in favour of something by asking "why", and that something entirely different is asked when we use "how". Nevertheless, Austin's view on the matter is not so straightforward, for he notes that we sometimes do talk of "reasons for knowing":

> Some of the answers to the question 'How do you know?' are oddly enough, described as 'reasons for knowing' or 'reasons to know'… despite the fact that we do not ask 'Why do you know?' But now surely, according to the Dictionary, 'reasons' should be given in answer to the question 'Why?' Just as we do in fact give reasons for believing in answer to the question 'Why do you believe?' However there is a distinction to be drawn here. 'How do you know that IG Farben worked for the war?' 'I have every reason to know: I served on the investigating

> commission': here, giving my reasons for knowing is stating how I come to be in a position to know (Austin, 1946: 81).

In this passage Austin highlights a linguistic phenomenon, according to which the way in which we cite reasons for our beliefs is different to the way in which we cite reasons for our knowledge. It is tempting to read Austin as concluding that talk of "reasons for knowing" is a mere *façon de parler*. After all, he suggests that when we articulate our "reasons" for knowing, instead of listing our reasons (as we do when we spell out our reasons for believing) we explain *how* is it that we came to be in a position to know. There is indeed one way in which this reading of Austin can be justified. Such a reading, though, depends on the peculiar use of the notion of "reasons" adopted by Austin. I will be suggesting that it is this use which gives an appearance of conflict with the Radical Anti-psychologist position. Moreover, I will argue that it takes nothing but some ironing out of the terminology to dispel the appearance of conflict. But doing so should not distract us from the fact that Austin is making an interesting suggestion with respect to the way in which we usually articulate our "reasons" for knowing.

Let us start by explaining Austin's idiosyncratic use of the notion of "reason" and how it gives rise to an apparent conflict with Radical Anti-psychologism. On Austin's view, the notion of a "reason" should be understood along the lines of evidential warrant, a notion discussed above. There, we construed the notion of evidential warrant as warrant that favours adoption of a belief in virtue of *indicating* that the relevant proposition might be true, i.e. something that points to the obtaining of the relevant fact, but does not necessarily establish it. As we just saw, Austin thinks that we respond to a how-do-you-know-challenge at least partly by explaining how we came to be in a position to know. But the case of belief is rather different, on his view: "Reasons for *believing* on the other hand are normally quite a different affair (a recital of symptoms, arguments in support, and so forth)" (Austin, 1946: 81). For Austin, "reasons" are assimilated with evidence, i.e. something that speaks in favour of *p*, but that might fall short of settling the issue. On the other hand, certain central cases of perceptual knowledge (such as the pig case) involve warrant which does not fall short of settling the issue.

In "Other Minds" Austin tentatively advances the stronger idea that knowledge in general, and not only some central cases of perceptual knowledge, ought to be grounded in

conclusive warrant. For instance, he remarks that someone could say the following if a subject who claims to know something provides an inadequate response: "his next riposte will be… something such as 'Then you *don't* know any such thing', or 'But that doesn't *prove it*: in that case you don't really know it at all'" (Austin, 1946: 78; my emphasis). Here Austin is suggesting that we come to know on the basis of proof, but we come to believe on the basis of "reasons" (i.e. considerations that fall short of proving the truth of a proposition). On this understanding of "reasons", then it becomes clear why perceptual knowledge (and perhaps even knowledge in general) cannot be based on reasons. When I know that there is a pig in front of me by virtue of seeing it, I do not have reasons to think that there is a pig before me – I have proof of it.

Now, it should be obvious that even though on Austin's view, strictly speaking, perceptual knowledge cannot be based on "reasons", there is no real inconsistency between his view and a Radical Anti-psychologistic approach. The Radical Anti-psychologistic claim that perceptual knowledge is based on reasons does not amount to the claim that the grounds on which knowledge is based fall short of *proving* the relevant proposition. Far from it, the reasons which ground perceptual knowledge, on this approach, are as strong as proof. Let us remember that, on the Radical Anti-psychologist view, concreta can be reasons for making a judgement in virtue of them being *truthmakers* for the relevant proposition. The relation of support between the *concretum* and the proposition suffices for proving the relevant judgement, for it is a matter of metaphysical necessity that the proposition be true if the relevant concretum exists. I want to suggest, then, that there is a merely apparent conflict between Radical Anti-psychologism and an Austinian epistemology. For it only takes some ironing out of the terminology to dispel the illusion of conflict. The Radical Anti-psychologistic position could endorse Austin's terminology and claim that perception is epistemically significant because it makes us aware of non-evidential warrant for making world-directed judgements. Having made this clarification, we will carry on talking of the warrant afforded by perception in central cases as "reasons" for the sake of consistency.

i) Articulation of Reasons and Recognitional Capacities

Now, in the course of making this clarification we have encountered an aspect of Austin's thought which might be relevant for the discussion in the first part of this chapter. Namely,

the extent to which a subject should be able to articulate her warrant if she is going to qualify as a knower.

Austin argues that a relevant feature of the way in which we justify our claims of knowledge is that we normally do so partly by explaining how it is that we came to be in a position to know such a thing. This feature seems to have special ramifications for the case of perceptual knowledge. Austin suggests that in explaining how it is that we came to know something on the basis of perception, say that the bird on the tree is a guacamaya, there are at least a couple of things which are relevant in an explanation of *how* we came to know such a thing: firstly, an explanation of how is it that we came to be in a position, in general, to recognize guacamayas visually, and, secondly, an explanation of how is it that we can recognize *that* bird in the present circumstance as a guacamaya (Austin, 1946: 79-80). Austin thinks that these two requirements arise for the case of perceptual knowledge because acquisition of perceptual knowledge depends on the appropriate exercise of our perceptual recognitional capacities.

Perceptual knowledge differs in this way from other forms of knowledge, such as mathematical knowledge or testimonial knowledge. For instance, in the case of mathematical knowledge acquired by grasping a proof in favour of the relevant theorem, an explanation of how we came to know that, say, there are infinitely many primes, will not involve the subject's deployment of any perceptual recognitional capacities. One natural explanation of how we know this theorem would be to say something along the lines of "I did A-level Maths". This would convey the idea that in school we learned to understand mathematical proofs to a degree which allows us to know the truth of the relevant theorem. If someone challenging our claim to know, nevertheless, wants to push the challenge further, perhaps we could respond by sketching or by developing in detail (depending on our interlocutor's patience) a proof for the relevant theorem.

In the framework of a reasons epistemology, we have to specify the different ways in which a subject should be able to articulate their warrant to count as a knower. Nevertheless, such an articulation might take different forms for different types of knowledge, or for different contexts. On Austin's view, everyday perceptual knowledge is based on having developed the relevant recognitional capacities and exercising them successfully in a particular circumstance. In the Austinian framework, this peculiarity of perceptual

knowledge seems to follow from the general idea that perceptual experiences are "silent" or "dumb":[87]

> Uncritical use of the direct object after *know* seems to be one thing that leads to the view that… sensa, that is things, colours, noises, and the rest, speak or are labelled by nature, so that I can literally *say* what (that which) I *see*… It is as if sensa were *literally* to 'announce themselves'… But surely this is only a manner of speaking…: sensa are dumb, and only previous experience enables *us* to identify them. If we choose to say that they 'identify themselves'…, then it must be admitted that they share the birthright of all speakers, that of speaking unclearly and untruly (Austin, 1946: 97).

According to Austin, perception presents us with something that, by itself, does not *speak to us*. Something that cannot simply be taken in as it is presented. *Sensa*, on Austin's view, do not identify themselves. It is *us* who have to identify them as the things they are, and our capacity to identify them depends on our previous experience and our upbringing, i.e. on our previous encounters with similar things and our having learned properly to identify them as the things they are. That this type of perceptual knowledge is acquired on the back of recognition explains why in meeting the challenge "how do you know?" the subject's response might involves an explanation of *how* they can recognize the things they perceive as the things they are. We need not agree with Austin that perceptual knowledge is based on recognition *because* perceptual experience is "silent" or "dumb". But, similarly, we do not need to accept that explanation to agree that recognitional capacities have an important role in an account of how perceptual knowledge is warranted.

We will assume here, with Austin, that recognitional capacities are crucial in an account of how perceptual knowledge is acquired. What are the implications of this position with respect to the ways in which a how-do-you-know-challenge could be met? According to Austin, two types of response are common: the first one is a specification of how we learned to recognize, say, guacamayas by sight ("I used to work in my home city's zoo", "I studied zoology", "they are a common bird back home"). The second one, is a specification of how I can recognize *that* particular bird, in the present circumstance, as a guacamaya ("from its colourful plumage", "from the shape of its beak"). It should be clear that the two

[87] This idea appears at least both in *Sense and Sensibilia* (1962: 11) and in "Other Minds" (1946). See Travis (2004) for an original development based on this view, and Schellenberg (2011) for a criticism of Travis.

responses are not competing responses – instead they can be complementary in the sense that we can advance both in responding to a how-do-you-know-challenge. With respect to the second type of response Austin says the following:

> If you have asked "How do you know it's a goldfinch?" then I may reply "From its behavior", "By its markings", or, in more detail, "By its red head", "From its eating thistles". That is, I indicate, or to some extent set out with some degree of precision, those features of the situation which enable me to recognize it as one to be described in the way I did describe it. (Austin, 1946: 83).

When we respond to a how-do-you-know-question not only do we say how we came to be in a position to know the relevant sort of thing. When we are asked "how do you know that bird is a guacamaya?" we could indeed say something along the lines of "because I studied zoology". But at least some times we would be required to say more about the specific situation – not something about how we acquired the capacity to recognize guacamayas, but something about what is so special about that particular bird that allows me to recognize it as a guacamaya. Perhaps our interlocutor wants to *learn* to tell guacamayas by sight. In such a circumstance the remark that we studied zoology will be utterly unhelpful. Rather we should point out to some of the characteristics that we pick up on to recognize it as a guacamaya. The colourful plumage of the bird might be the feature that allows me to recognize it as a guacamaya, or perhaps its song allows me to do so. And if our linguistic capacities allow it, we could convey this by saying something along the lines of "I can recognize it as a guacamaya by its plumage ". It will depend on each subject's capacities how detailed such a response can be. But it is crucial for Austin that the response need not be eloquent or detailed at all. In other words, we can very well have the relevant recognitional capacities for telling certain objects without being capable of explaining *with great degree of detail* what is it about the objects that allow us to recognize them as such:

> Our claim in saying we know (i.e. that we can tell) is to *recognize*: and recognizing, at least in this sort of case, consists in seeing, or otherwise sensing, a feature or features which we are sure are similar to something noted (and usually named) before, on some earlier occasion in our experience. But, this that we see, or otherwise sense, is not necessarily *describable* in words, still less describable in detail, and in non-committal words, and by anybody you please… So, when I say I can tell the bird "from its red head", or that I know a friend "by his nose", I imply that there is something *peculiar* about the red head or the nose, something peculiar to goldfinches or to him, by which you can always tell them or him…

> often we know things quite well, while scarcely able at all to say "from" what we know them, let alone what there is so very special about them (Austin, 1946: 84-5).

This suggestion by Austin is in line with the remarks made earlier regarding knowers' capacities to articulate their warrant. For Austin, it is a consequence of the fact that perceptual knowledge is based on recognitional capacities that the subject *need* not be able to be highly articulate when she justifies her claim to know. Having a recognitional capacity, and exercising it appropriately on a given occasion, is consistent with the subject being incapable of explaining in detail the way in which his recognition occurred.

When we discussed McDowell's own interpretation of a reasons epistemology requirement with respect to the knower's capacity to articulate their warrant we found a similar position. For McDowell, subjects should be able to articulate their warrant rather minimally if they are to count as having reflexive perceptual knowledge. For McDowell, a response along the lines of "I can tell a green thing when I see one" is a good enough articulation of the knower's warrant. This general suggestion is in line with the Austinian approach. But Austin's understanding of reflexive perceptual knowledge provides us with something that is absent in the McDowellian approach. It provides us with an explanation of why in the central cases of perceptual knowledge such a minimal response is enough to justify the relevant knowledge claim. For Austin, the fact that perceptual knowledge is acquired through the exercise of recognitional capacities explains why the knower's capacity to articulate their warrant is rather undemanding. Possession and successful exercise of recognitional capacities do not necessarily come in hand with the capacity to articulate *in detail* the grounds on which a particular piece of perceptual knowledge is based. A recognitional capacity can be successfully acquired and exercised even while lacking the capacity to articulate with detail the way the recognitional capacity works.

This appeal to recognitional capacities in perceptual knowledge makes manifest the importance they have in an Austinian epistemology of perception. The appeal will naturally suggest to the reader questions regarding the nature and the conditions of success of these capacities. I have also claimed that recognitional capacities belong to the *active* element in the optimal position advanced by Austin to account for incorrigible perceptual knowledge. Unfortunately, as noted before, a detailed analysis of this element will be left for another

occasion. We will be unable to explore how recognitional capacities fit into a developed framework of the active element in the optimal position. Nevertheless, the issue regarding the nature of recognition and the extent to which it is to be considered an active capacity will emerge again in the following chapter, when we discuss how can the Radical Anti-psychologist respond to the charge of falling prey to the Myth of the Given. There we will provide a start on how to think about recognitional capacities, but we will fall short of providing a complete account of the active element in the optimal position.

Conclusion

In summary, at the outset of this chapter we advanced some reasons in support of the claim perceptual knowledge is based on reasons. We argued that this position provides a natural explanation of the expert birdwatcher's example. Then, we defended the position from two standard objections advanced from an externalist epistemology perspective. The first one regarding the regress problem, and the second regarding the hyper-intellectualization problem. There we argued that a reasons epistemology, and Radical Anti-psychologism in particular, have the elements to respond to the challenges satisfactorily. In the second part of the chapter, we looked into a potential tension between Radical Anti-psychologism and Austinian approach to perceptual knowledge. We argued that the tension is only apparent for it rests merely on a terminological disagreement. This discussion opened the way for a closer look into the role that recognitional capacities have in perceptual knowledge acquisition for Austin. Moreover, some of his remarks, we argued, can be used to provide a more robust response to the hyper-intellectualization problem discussed in the first part of the chapter.

In the following chapter we will defend the most distinctive claim of the Radical Anti-psychologist picture, namely the claim that concreta can be reasons for knowledge. We will explain how we can make sense of concreta as reasons within the contemporary philosophical discussion of reasons. Also, we will argue that the view can avoid the charge of falling prey to the Myth of the Given, as it is advanced by McDowell. In this latter part of the chapter our discussion regarding recognitional capacities will become relevant again.

Chapter 6 - Concreta are reasons for judging

In the previous two chapters we have defended some key commitments of the Radical Anti-psychologistic picture; namely, the claim that among the objects of perceptual awareness we find concreta, as well as the claim that, in some central cases, perceptual knowledge is based on reasons that the subject possesses. These commitments, as we noted before, are not exclusive to Radical Anti-psychologism. But in this section we will have a close look at the most distinctive claim advanced by Radical Anti-psychologism: that concreta can be reasons for making certain judgements about the perceived environment. In this chapter I will assume that concreta can be truthmakers in the course of my argument in favour of the claim that concreta can be reasons for judging. We will leave a critical discussion of this assumption, and the way if figures in a Radical Anti-psychologistic picture, for the following chapter. This chapter will be divided into two parts. In the first part I will argue in favour of the claim that concreta can be reasons. I will do so by making a case for thinking that concreta can play the theoretical roles typically ascribed to reasons – i.e. that reasons have normative force and that they can play a motivational role. In the second part I will address a potential worry that arises for Radical Anti-psychologism insofar as it embraces the claim that concreta can be reasons. Namely, the worry that the view falls prey to the Myth of the Given. Here I will focus on the version of the challenge advanced by John McDowell. I will defend the view from multiple arguments by McDowell based on that accusation. I will conclude by suggesting that the Austinian approach defended here (supplemented by Radical Anti-psychologism) can be used to develop an original account of the role the agent has in perceptual knowledge acquisition.

6.1 The Normative Force and Motivational Role of Concreta

We can frame the discussion to be undertaken in this part of the chapter in the following terms: assuming that concreta are truthmakers, can perceived concreta be *reasons* for the perceiver – reasons that the subject can exploit in making a judgement about her perceived environment? On Radical Anti-psychologism, the answer is positive, and it appeals precisely

to the fact that concreta are truthmakers in support of such a response. I would like to start this section by advancing a line of reasoning in favour of such a positive answer.

Let us start with the notion of a judgement or a belief being well-founded. In Alan Millar's sense this is for it to rest on a "firm foundation".[88] On this view, there are at least two elements which contribute for a judgement being well-founded: in the first place there has to be a good reason in favour of the relevant proposition, say *p*, of which the subject is aware – i.e. an item, the existence of which "favours" the truth of *p*; and, secondly, the subject's judgement has to rest on *that* good reason. The contribution of each element might become clear if we pay attention to cases in which these elements are absent. A judgement might be defective because it is based on a "bad reason" – i.e. an item whose existence fails to favour the truth of the relevant proposition (Millar, 2014: 3). Consider a case in which I see a tapir, but I mistake it for a pig and judge accordingly. My judgement, in this case, would fail to be well-founded because it rests on a bad reason – something that does not favour the truth of the judged proposition. Moreover, in this case, I do have access to good reasons for thinking that a tapir is before me, on which I could have based my judgement. But for the judgement that there is a pig before me to be well-founded, it does not suffice that I have access to the appropriate reason. In addition, I have to base my judgement on that (good) reason. Consider a case in which I see the pig in front of me, but I base my judgement that a pig is before me on the ill-founded belief that an evil demon has ensured that an invisible pig will follow me everywhere I go. Here, my possession of a good reason for thinking that there is a pig before me does not suffice to render my judgement well-founded. In addition to possession of a good reason, I must base my judgement on that reason.

These two elements are closely connected to two central notions in the contemporary philosophical discussions about reasons – i.e. that reasons have *normative force* and that they play a *motivating role* in action and thought. The idea is that the notion of a *reason* is relevant, at least, in the context of *justifying* an action or a judgement, as well as in the context of *explaining* why an agent performed a given action or made a particular judgement. The former context is meant to be the one in which the notion of the normative force of a reason

[88] See Millar (2014) for the conception of well-founded belief I will be using here: "to be justified in believing something in this sense amounts to having an adequate reason to believe it and believing it for that reason" (Millar, 2014: 1).

is in play, whereas the latter is the context in which the motivational role of a reason in a subject's practical and cognitive life is in play. For instance, the gin and tonic in the glass in front of me (or, alternatively, *that* there is gin and tonic in the glass in front of me) can make it *appropriate* for me to drink it (under the right circumstances) and can *justify* my judgement or belief that there is a glass of gin and tonic in front of me. This is what we mean by saying that reasons have normative force – that in certain circumstances they favour acting in a given way or making a certain judgement.

But we also appeal to reasons in contexts in which the invoked reason *does not* make the relevant action or judgement appropriate – i.e. cases where the invoked reasons do not favour doing or thinking as we did. In these contexts, the cited "reasons" might help us understand what the subject did or thought. Think, for instance, of a case in which, being under the false impression that there is gin and tonic in the glass, I take a sip only to discover that it is instead filled with gasoline.[89] In this case, the gasoline in the glass (or, alternatively, *that* there is gasoline in the glass) does not make it appropriate for me to drink it nor does it justify my judgement that there is a glass of gin and tonic in front of me. Nevertheless, in *explaining* – i.e. making intelligible or rendering rational – my action or my judgement we could appeal to a "reason". We could say that my reason for drinking the gasoline is that I (mistakenly) took it to be gin and tonic. Notice that this formulation of the reason which explains the subject's action is ambiguous between two readings: on one reading the subject's reason is her (mistakenly) *taking* the gasoline to be gin, whereas on the second reading the subject's reason is the gin-looking gasoline in the glass (or alternatively, that the gasoline in the glass looks like gin). This disambiguation will be relevant in the following discussion. For the time being note that in this scenario we could say that my false impression renders my action reasonable (in the sense that it explains it) even if it does not make it an appropriate action. It is important to note that the kind of explanation we are considering here is a *rationalizing explanation*, i.e. one which (if successful) renders the target *explanandum* (the subject's actions or judgement) reasonable (Davidson 1963). Contrast this type of explanation with other kinds of explanation, which do not render the explanandum reasonable. Consider a subject who is hit on her head by a rock, which causes her to believe that there is an infinite number of primes. This type of explanation does not render the

[89] This example is due to Bernard Williams (1979).

subject's belief reasonable – for citing the relevant causal process fails to exhibit a rational standing of the subject, i.e. a standing grounded on reasons. In the remainder of this section, for the sake of brevity, I will use "explanation" to refer to rationalizing explanation.

i) Difficulties for Unified Accounts of Reasons

Much of the recent literature on reasons stems from this dual role of reasons, and many of the problems that particular theories of reasons face arise from the difficulty of accommodating the normative and motivating roles that reasons seem to have in the lives of rational agents (Dancy, 2000; Hornsby, 2008; McDowell, 2013; Roessler, 2014; Wallace, 2009). To illustrate, we can consider the difficulties faced by views which attempt to provide a unified account of the normative force and motivational role of reasons. A unified account of reasons would be an account in which the entities that constitute reasons have normative force *and* play a motivational role. Such a unified account might be desirable merely on the basis of theoretical economy. In addition, it could be pointed that such a unified account might be desirable for it could provide us with a straightforward explanation of cases in which the items which favour my doing or thinking Φ are also the reasons which motivate (or explain) my so doing or thinking.

How might such an account look, and what potential difficulties might it face? On the one hand, we have the case in which the subject drinking from the glass can be explained by appeal to the true consideration that it contains gin and tonic (let us call this case, following current philosophical jargon, the "good case"). On the other hand, in the "bad case", we can explain the subject drinking from the glass by appeal to the fact that the subject is under the false impression that the glass contains gin and tonic. How to provide a unified account of reasons, capable of accommodating good and bad cases? Let us consider, in turn, anti-psychologistic and psychologistic accounts of reasons.

We might start by paying attention to the good case. In that scenario, it is easy to identify something that favours (and, thus makes appropriate) the drinking of the content of the glass, i.e. a normative reason. Namely the gin and tonic in the glass (or, alternatively, *that* the content of the glass is gin and tonic). On this view, it is a mind-independent aspect of reality what renders the action appropriate. Following Jonathan Dancy's (2000) terminology, let us call this approach a form of anti-psychologism about reasons. Sticking to the good case,

what about the motivating reason? The anti-psychologistic approach could suggest that the motivating reason for drinking the gin is also the mind-independent aspect of reality characterised before – i.e. the gin and tonic in the glass. Of course, this should be accompanied by the claim that this mind-independent aspect of reality can motivate the subject's action only insofar as the subject is aware of it. For instance, when the subject *knows* that there is gin and tonic in the glass we can say that this mind independent aspect of reality not only renders the relevant action – i.e. the drinking of the glass – appropriate, but also that it motivates it (McDowell, 2013b; Roessler, 2014). Nevertheless, problems might arise for the anti-psychologistic approach when to it comes to accommodating the bad case. It might be suggested that in such a case, it is not clear that there is a normative reason which would favour the action (i.e. the drinking of the gasoline). But still, as noted before, we want to say that, in some sense, the action is reasonable. And one way of making sense of this intuition is to suggest that there is a motivating reason in play in this scenario, even if there is not a normative one. An immediate candidate to be the operative motivating reason is the false belief that the glass is filled with gin and tonic. This would indeed make the action intelligible, even if it does not justify it.[90] But making this move would mean that this version of the anti-psychologist approach has failed to give a unified account of reasons. For in the good case, the operative reason was constituted by a mind-independent aspect of reality (the gin and tonic in the glass). But in the bad case the operative reason was constituted by the subject's (false) belief, a mind-dependent aspect of reality. The point of this discussion is not to raise an unsurmountable objection against anti-psychologism. I only want to illustrate the kind of problem that might arise for a unified account of reasons.

A similar problem might arise for the psychologist. Let us consider a form of psychologism which maintains that psychological states of the subject, such as beliefs, are the operative motivating reasons in bad cases. From this perspective, what should we say about the good cases? If she is to provide a unified account, a defender of psychologism must say that the motivating reasons in those cases are psychological states too. Does this imply that psychological states are also the normative reasons in good cases? There seems to be something wrong in holding that the reasons which make the relevant action – i.e. drinking

[90] See Shope (1983:ch.3) and the introduction to Papas & Swain (1978) for a discussion of the no false lemmas principle in epistemic justification which might lend support to this claim.

the contents of the glass – appropriate is, say, the *belief* that the glass contains gin and tonic. That belief itself is not something which could make the relevant action appropriate, for having that belief is consistent with there not being gin and tonic in the glass. The presence of gasoline in the glass, independently of whether or not the agent believed that it contained gin and tonic, would make it inappropriate to drink from it. Facing this problem, the psychologist might respond that the claim that psychological states are reasons should be understood as being limited to motivating reasons. Roessler characterises versions of psychologism which endorse this amendment as "two-concept views".[91]

By making this move psychologism would give up the aim of providing a unified account of reasons. Moreover, endorsing the amendment (i.e. that only motivating reasons are psychological states of the subject) seems to give rise to additional problems for the defender of this version of psychologism. It might seem initially plausible to maintain that in the good case the motivating reason for drinking from the glass is the subject's belief that there is gin and tonic in it, especially when we look at it from a third-person perspective. An explanation in these terms on behalf of someone else might seem correct: *S* drank from the glass *because S* believed there was gin and tonic in it. But the initial plausibility seems to fade when we look at the situation from a first-person perspective.[92] Consider the oddity of the following explanation: I drank from the glass because I *believed* there was gin and tonic in it. It might be true that the subject holds the relevant belief in those circumstances, but it would be odd if a subject appeals (merely) to their belief in order to explain why she acted as she did. Being in that situation, even if I did believe that the glass contained gin and tonic, I surely want to appeal to the gin and tonic in the glass (or, alternatively, to the fact *that* there is gin and tonic in the glass) as the reason for which I drank from it, not merely my believing it.[93] In good cases, when I tried and succeeded in drinking my gin and tonic, I would

[91] One of the characterizing features of the two-concept view is that, on this view, "'Motivating reason' statements are neutral on whether the agent has a normative reason for doing what she does" (Roessler, 2014: 3). See also McDowell (2013b: 14) for a similar explanation of how one might arrive to such a view.
[92] See Wallace (2006) for a detailed discussion of these perspectives and their importance for reason explanation.
[93] This line of attack against the "two-concept" view follows from certain considerations advanced by Jonathan Dancy (2000). Dancy advances a principle he denominates the "normative constraint" which is to be met by any philosophical account of reasons. According to it, "a motivating reason, that in the light of which one acts, must be the sort of thing that is capable of being among the reasons in favour of so acting; it must, in this sense, be possible to be a good reason" (2000: 103). For a thorough defence of the constraint and an attack on the two-concept view see Dancy (2000), especially ch. 5.

underplay my hand if in explaining my reasons I merely quote my belief that there was gin and tonic in the glass. This way of talking seems most appropriate for bad cases: –'Why did you drink the gasoline?' –'I thought (believed) it was gin and tonic.' But less so with good ones –'Why did you drink the gin and tonic?' – 'Because I though (believed) it was gin and tonic?'. Again, the point of the discussion in these paragraphs is not to raise an unsurmountable objection against psychologism. I merely want to illustrate the kind of problem that might arise for such a unified account of reasons.

In this section, I have explained how some problems might arise for psychologistic and anti-psychologistic accounts of reasons. The upshot of the discussion is that good and bad cases seem to give rise to tensions when we try to provide a unified account of reasons (normative and motivating) across good and bad cases. It seems that the psychologistic approach gives the most natural account of bad cases, whereas anti-psychologism gives the most natural account of good cases. Here I will not try to articulate a unified account of reasons in the face of these worries. In the following I will advance an anti-psychologistic account of well-founded judgements. I will place the resulting view within the dialectic described in this section and will defend it from objections.

ii) An Anti-psychologistic Account of Well-founded Judgements

Where does this leave the notion of a well-founded judgement which is under discussion? Let us remember that a judgement is well founded when the (motivating) reason on which the judgement is based *is* a good (normative) reason. It follows from this characterisation of well-foundedness that there are at least some cases in which normative *and* motivating reasons *coincide*. In the case of a well-founded judgement, the reason that justifies my judgement *is also* the reason for which I form the judgement. Here I will not advance a conclusive defence of this claim, my primary aim will be to place this claim in the wider debate about reasons to show that it is a live and attractive option. Perhaps less controversially, I will assume that normative reasons are constituted by non-psychological aspects of reality – i.e. I will endorse anti-psychologism with respect to normative reasons. Notice that these two claims – i.e. that normative reasons are mind-independent aspects of reality and that in well-founded judgements normative and motivating reasons coincide –

entail the result that in the case of well-founded judgement the reasons which justify and the reasons which motivate are non-psychological aspects of reality.

Before presenting an anti-psychologistic conception of good cases let me say something brief in favour of anti-psychologism about normative reasons in general. Perhaps the strongest reason to favour this position is that they provide a straightforward explanation of many paradigmatic cases of rational actions and judgements. Moreover, this provides us with a reason to prefer anti-psychologism over psychologism since on many of these cases psychologism would give a clearly incorrect account of normative reasons. Let us consider a case: let us imagine a case in which you have a normative reason to help someone because they are in danger. What might be the feature of the situation which grounds your normative reason to help them? In other words, what is it about the situation which makes your helping them an appropriate thing to do? It seems that the crucial aspect of the situation which makes your helping them appropriate is that they are in danger. Had you misjudged the situation – for instance if the subject was not in danger but was an actor shooting a film – then your helping them might not be appropriate, regardless of your beliefs about it. Your believing them to be in danger is not the relevant aspect of the situation which provides you with reasons for acting (or judging).

Perhaps the strongest objection to an anti-psychologistic account of normative reasons is that, supposedly, this picture gives wrong results systematically in false beliefs or misguided desires scenarios. According to this objection, when your belief that someone is in danger is false you lack reason to help them because they are not in danger. Yet, we want to say that your helping them is, in some sense, reasonable. You acted "as a sensible person would have done" (Dancy 2000: 62). But this observation does not force the Radical Anti-psychologist to concede that beliefs (or other psychological sates) can also be normative reasons. Let us remember that a normative reason is one that renders the making of certain action or the making of certain judgement *appropriate*. Even though it would be rational for a subject to help someone who they (falsely) believe to be in danger, merely having that belief would not render the action appropriate. The anti-psychologist can explain why, in these circumstances, it is reasonable for the subject to help *without* conceding that in those circumstances the action was appropriate, nor that the relevant belief rendered it appropriate. For instance, Jonathan Dancy suggest that we can explain why helping is reasonable even in

false belief cases by appealing to an objective reason which forbids the combination of certain beliefs and actions. Dancy suggests that in false belief cases there is indeed a normative reason grounded on a mind-independent aspect of reality to help *if* we believe someone is in danger. On Dancy's view, what there is a reason for is not to exhibit the following belief/action complex: believe that *S* is in danger *and* not help them. Importantly, this strategy does not imply that the subject has a reason to help – that this would be an inappropriate action is determined by the *fact* that *S* is not in danger.[94]

One question which arises for Dancy's explanation here is what is the aspect of non-psychological reality which gives me reason *not* to exhibit that belief/action complex, and how might I be aware of that reason in such a way that when I act I do so in the light of that reason? We can find a straightforward answer for good cases: the gin and tonic in the glass, *S's* being in danger are the aspects of non-psychological reality which give me reason to drink or help. Those are things I can readily be aware of and they are the reasons which motivate me to act and which render my action appropriate. It is not clear that Dancy can give such a straightforward answer for the relevant cases. I will argue below that there are more straightforward ways of dealing with this type of case.

What about the assumption that in well-founded judgements normative and motivating reasons coincide? As we noted before, the attempt to provide a unified account of motivating and normative reasons across good and bad cases seemed to be the source of a tension which gives rise to problems for psychologistic and anti-phycologistic accounts of reasons. How can we square this conception of well-foundedness within a dialectic which makes it difficult to conceive of such *coincidence*? There are a number of things which could be said to make space for the conception of well-foundedness we are endorsing here. Let us start by noting that the claim is rather minimal in the sense that it merely maintains that the coincidence holds in good cases. As such, the view is silent on what is the correct account of bad cases. One way of making space for our view within the broader debate would be by casting aside the ambition of a unified account of normative and motivating reasons across good and bad cases. Let us suppose that indeed the operative motivating reasons in bad cases are psychological states of the subject. It is open to us to claim that this does not imply

[94] See Dancy (2000, ch. 3) for a detailed exposition of this line of response.

anything about the operative motivating reasons in the good cases. Introduction of a sort of disjunctivism about motivating reasons could be used as a defensive move to avoid the attempt to generalize from what goes on in the bad cases (Hornsby, 2008; McDowell, 2013b; Roessler, 2014).

But perhaps the strategy described above concedes too much by granting that the motivating reasons in bad cases are to be identified with psychological states of the subject. An alternative way of making space for the view that in well-founded judgements motivating and normative reasons coincide consists in rejecting that in bad cases the operative motivating reason is a psychological aspect of reality. This move would deprive the generalizing strategy described in the previous paragraph from any materials to advance the generalizing step. Consider, again, the bad gin and tonic scenario. What is the reason for maintaining that in this case a belief about the contents of the glass are the operative motivating reasons for the subject drinking its content? Part of it is the alleged absence of a normative reason, i.e. there seems to be no aspect of the mind-independent world which renders the action appropriate. But does this mean that, therefore, we are to look for the motivating reason in the subject's psychology? There is no immediate reason to think that the answer to this question should be positive. We saw before Dancy's proposal for scenarios similar to these. I think he is right in rejecting that false beliefs provide us with a normative reason to drink the gasoline. Nevertheless, I suggested that his own response faced problems when it came to identifying the aspect of non-psychological reality which grounds the normative reason not to exhibit the relevant belief/action complex. I want to propose here a different way of dealing with bad cases in the face of the generalizing strategy which threatens to infect good cases. In the gin and tonic scenario there is at least one plausible non-psychological aspect of reality which could be appealed to in a straightforward explanation of why the subject acted as she did, namely the gasoline in the glass (or, alternatively, that there is gasoline in the glass) and the way it looks. There are facts about the gasoline and about the subject which explain why this mind-independent item in the world motivated the subject to form the relevant judgement or to perform the relevant action. They can explain it, despite not being a *normative* reason for the subject to drink it or judge that there is gin and tonic in the glass. In this particular case, that gasoline looks very similar to gin and tonic as well as the subject's incapacity to distinguish gasoline from gin and tonic in those

circumstances, help us understand *how* the gasoline in the glass (or, alternatively, that there is gasoline in the glass) constitutes the operative motivating reason for the subject's judgement or action.

Now, although this strategy could be used to accommodate within an anti-psychologistic framework many of the cases which are thought to spell trouble for the view, the strategy has its limitations. Notably, think about a case in which there is no glass, no gin and tonic, nor gasoline in the table; suppose it is all a hallucination. Yet the subject makes the judgement that there is a glass of gin and tonic in front of her and even tries to reach for it only to discover thin air. There is something unsatisfactory about maintaining that the operative motivating reason in these cases is a mind-independent aspect of reality, for there is no clear candidate which could play the role. Perhaps in these cases, the anti-psychologistic position will have to concede that the operative normative reasons have to be psychological states. Alternatively, we could maintain that, in these cases, not only there is no normative reason, but there is no motivating reason either. Arguably, in order to prosper, this suggestion would have to advance reasons to dismiss a possible *ad hoc* charge. Moreover, it would have to explain why normally we would be willing to concede that a hallucinating subject would act and belief *rationally* when she takes her hallucinations at face value and acts accordingly. Unfortunately, I have no space here to pursue these questions further.

Let us summarize what has been achieved by the defensive strategy deployed in the previous two paragraphs. We saw that it is possible to identify the motivating reasons in some bad cases as mind-independent aspects of reality. Many of the bad cases which are thought to spell problems for anti-psychologism could be subsumed under this model, although perhaps not all of them – for instance some hallucinatory cases. But even if it is not possible to subsume all the bad cases within this framework the basis on which the generalizing step is made has been effectively put into question. Thus, the discussion above shouldn't be read as a positive nor a conclusive defence of the view that in well-founded judgements our normative and motivating reason is a mind-independent aspect of reality. Rather it should be read as a way of establishing it as a live and interesting view within the current philosophical debate about reasons.

iii) Back to Radical *Anti-psychologism*

With this understanding of a well-founded judgement in place, let us have a closer look at the way in which the notion could be applied within a Radical Anti-psychologist framework. Let us consider a case in which I form the judgement that there are oranges on the kitchen counter on the basis of the perceptual experience of oranges I undergo when I go to the kitchen. In these circumstances, the judgement would be well-founded if the reason which justifies the making of the judgement is *also* the reason which explains (at least partly) why the subject made that judgement – i.e. the oranges on the counter (or, alternatively, that there are oranges on the kitchen counter).

In talking about reasons having normative force we have been assuming that there is a dimension of evaluation associated with them. Actions and judgements can be evaluated along many dimensions of evaluation, and reasons have their normative power relative to those dimensions. The action of donating to charity, for instance, can be evaluated from a moral perspective as well as from financial perspective (among many others).[95] An element of the mind-independent world might be a normative reason to do Φ when evaluated from the financial perspective, but not from the moral perspective. For instance, fossil fuels being cheap might be a good reason, from a financial point of view, to use them to generate electricity. But the same thing (i.e. fossil fuels being cheap) is *not* a good reason, from a moral point of view, to generate electricity. I submit that the appropriate dimension of evaluation required to assess the normative force of reasons in the case of judgements and beliefs is that of promoting the aim of *veridicality*, that is promoting the aim of having a true worldview. That this is the appropriate dimension of evaluation for reasons for judging follows from a "veritistic" assumption about the fundamental aim of cognition. According to this, the fundamental aim of a cognitive system (such as ours) is to represent the world in a veridical manner. Thus, in general terms, an element of non-psychological reality *E* will constitute a reason for making a judgement that *p* only if the obtaining of *E* favours or points to the truth of *p*.

With this very general understanding of well-founded judgements, reasons, and their normative and motivational role in place, we could mount a defence of the claim that

[95] See Alvarez (2010: 9-19) for a discussion of this dimension of normative reasons.

perceived concreta can be reasons for judgement, by explaining how concreta both can have normative force and can also play a motivational role in the subject's cognitive life. Let us start with the normative force of concreta. I mentioned that, in the context of judgement and belief, a reason's normative force has to do with the way it promotes the aim of veridicality. So a relevant question to ask is whether there is a relation that obtains between concreta and the truth of propositions which could be exploited in grounding concreta's potential normative force for judging – i.e. is there a relation between concreta and the truth of certain propositions which could be exploited by a subject who wishes to attain the aim of veridicality in her worldview? And the immediate answer to this question is affirmative, for we have assumed that concreta can be truthmakers for propositions. This *alethic* relation between concreta and propositions provides us with a ground to construe concreta as having normative force in favour of judging. According to this view, the truth of certain propositions is necessitated by the existence of concreta. For instance, the pig is a reason with normative force in favour of the judgement that there is a pig before me precisely *because* the pig's being there makes the relevant proposition true.

Now, for a judgement to be well-founded it is not enough that there is a reason with normative force which justifies the making of the judgement, it is also necessary that *that very* reason explains why the subject makes the judgement they do. In practical cases, minimally, it would be reasonable to say that a good reason can render an action intelligible only if the subject is in some way aware of the reason which motivates the action. For instance, in the case of drinking from the glass on the ground that it contains gin and tonic, the action is going to be "well-founded", minimally, only if the subject is aware of the fact that the glass has gin and tonic. If this is correct in the practical case, similar considerations could be upheld for the cognitive case. For the subject's perceptual judgement to be well-founded it is not enough that there is a concretum which constitutes a normative reason for making a judgement, in addition the subject's judgement has to be based on the relevant concretum. Which means that the subject must, minimally, be aware of the relevant concretum. I want to suggest that the Radical Anti-psychologist picture has the elements to satisfy this requirement too. For on the Radical Anti-psychologist view, in central cases of perceptual knowledge, the subject must be perceptually aware of the concretum which constitutes the reason in favour of judging. On this view, it is precisely the perceptual

awareness of *concreta* which makes us aware of the reasons there are for making a judgement. That perception makes us aware of concreta allows us to explain how concreta, despite not being psychological states of the subject, could motivate the subject's making of a particular judgement. We turn not to explore the plausibility of the conception defended so far in the face of a different type of objection.

6.2 Austin Inspired Epistemology and the Myth of the Given

The discussion in the first part of this chapter provides us with the following simple reason in favour of the claim that concreta can be reasons for making certain judgements: on the Radical Anti-psychologist approach it is possible to make sense of the idea that perceived concreta have normative force and can play a motivational role, two features which characterise *reasons for judging* in contemporary philosophical discussions of reasons. Being able to make sense of concreta as reasons for judging within the contemporary philosophical debate on reasons is a minimum for the viability of the Radical Anti-psychologistic option. The absence of major obstacles for holding such a view would put us in a position in which we could start making a positive case in its favour either by arguing that the view is compulsory in some sense, or that it brings with it advantages no other view can offer.

But the path is not yet clear of obstacles. There is at least one relevant approach to perceptual knowledge which would dismiss the position we are defending and any argument in its favour from the get-go – the epistemological project of John McDowell. He would regard our attempt to make space for the Radical Anti-psychologist conception of perceptual reasons as a dead-end, for the view we put forward would be classified by him as a view which falls prey to the Myth of the Given. For McDowell, any view which endorses the Myth is bound to fail not only in making intelligible the idea that we have knowledge of the empirical world, but also in making intelligible the idea that the empirical world has a bearing on our objective thought about it. In a nutshell, and in vey general terms, falling prey to the Myth of the Given consists in endorsing the view that the conceptual capacities that are necessary for mature human's knowledge "are operative only in *responses* to experiences, not in experiences themselves" (McDowell, 2008: 258, emphasis added). On the contrary, McDowell's view is that the correct way of understanding the idea that empirical judgements are "rationally intelligible" *in the light of experience* is one in which the relevant conceptual

capacities are "operative *in experience itself*, not just in judgements in which we respond to experience" (McDowell, ibid. emphasis added). For McDowell the capacity of perceptual experiences to provide the subject with reasons for judging depends on the actualization of these conceptual capacities in experience. But for the Radical Anti-psychologistic position advanced here, some of the items of perception themselves (i.e. concreta), can be the relevant reasons for judging, and they are so *not in virtue* of any conceptual capacities being exercised in perceptual experience. On this conception, the epistemological role of perceptual experience consists in making the subject aware of the mind-independent reality that surrounds her, for some of those items are reasons for judging. On this view, *contra* McDowell, experience can play this epistemic role without any conceptual capacities being exercised in it.

I take it that this characterisation captures the main point of disagreement between McDowell's view and views which would be characterised by him as endorsing the Myth of the Given (Radical Anti-psychologism amongst them).[96] I want to start by looking more closely into some of the arguments advanced by McDowell for rejecting views that fall within the characterisation of "falling prey to the myth of the given". I will argue that McDowell's arguments leave the Radical Anti-psychologistic proposal untouched. For his reasons for rejecting views which endorse the "myth of the Given" do not straightforwardly apply to the Radical Anti-psychologism espoused here.

Before addressing these issues, let me say something brief about the strategy I will use here to deal with the charge of falling prey to the Myth of the Given. In his defence of Radical Anti-psychologism Mark Kalderon also addresses this worry, but in a different manner. The main difference between these approaches is that Kalderon uses an "indirect" strategy, whereas I use a direct one. Kalderon's strategy consists in looking closely at views which are tailor-made to avoid the Myth (Sellars' and McDowell's) and argue that they, too, fall prey to the charge. He considers this to be a strong reason to think that, after all, "the Myth of the given is no myth" (Kalderon 2011: 221). Kalderon opts for this indirect strategy because he considers this is the best we can do in a context where there is no agreement on how to understand in general terms what the Myth amounts to. A situation which cannot be

[96] See Kalderon (2011: 220) for the case that Radical Anti-psychologism is a form of the Myth.

settled by appeal to the origin of the conception, for Sellars, the originator of the notion, does not advance a general understanding of it. In this context, Kalderon points out, a direct defence of Radical Anti-psychologism from a particular understanding of the Myth could be challenged on the basis that the view falls prey to the Myth on a "distinct and potentially superior understanding of it" (Kalderon 2011: 220). I share Kalderon's scepticism about the Myth of the Given being a real myth after all. The way I see it, my attempt to advance a direct response on behalf of the Radical Anti-psychologist against the charge of falling prey to the Myth (in McDowell's understanding of it), is complimentary to his defensive strategy. Kalderon's considerations provides us with good reason to doubt that, in general, showing that a view endorses the Myth of the Given will suffice to discredit the view. Nevertheless, specific arguments have been directed against views which allegedly endorse the Myth of the Given, some of these arguments point out to some defects exhibited by these views, beyond their endorsement of the Myth. Thus, in McDowell we find arguments to the effect that views which endorse the Myth cannot give an adequate account of the epistemic responsibility a subject must exhibit if her judgements are to be knowledgeable. On other parts, he argues that views which endorse the Myth simply cannot given an adequate account of how experience warrants perceptual judgements. Being able to respond to these specific arguments is complementary to Kalderon's strategy, and it helps us build a positive case in favour of the Radical Anti-psychologist position.

McDowell's general project aims to make space for a view in which perceptual experience has the epistemological role of grounding perceptual knowledge. In order to do so he aims to strike a balance between two unacceptable views: on the one hand, a coherentism or idealism (exemplified by Davidson's coherence theory) in which perceptual experience has no justifying role at all for perceptual knowledge; and, on the other hand, a simple empiricism in which experiential inputs are conceptually unstructured. He thinks that much of the modern epistemological tradition has been swinging from one unacceptable view on the matter to another, where the movement from one to the other has been marked by an exaggerated reaction to the perceived failures of the opposite view. He recommends to break from this swing by rejecting some of the terms which shape the discussion. On his account, each view is motivated both by a correct and valuable insight as well as by an overreaction to the failures faced by the opposite view. Thus, the empiricist side of the dialectic is

motivated by the correct idea that for empirical thought (and knowledge) to be objective at all (i.e. about the mind independent world) perceptual experience must play a justifying role in the way we acquire empirical knowledge. Its mistake, according to McDowell, lies in conceiving perceptual experiences as exercises of mere sensibility with no involvement of conceptual capacities – this conception, McDowell thinks, makes it so that perceptual experiences cannot stand in justifying relations with judgements at all. On the other side of the dialectic – i.e. on the coherentist side – we find a diagnosis of what is wrong with the empiricist view. This diagnosis is that perceptual experiences as conceived by the empiricist, i.e. as states devoid of conceptual content, cannot stand in justificatory relations with beliefs and judgements. This diagnosis flows from the general commitment that only conceptually structured states (such as beliefs, in Davidsons's view) can provide the subject with reasons for belief and judgement. From McDowell's point of view, this is a correct insight by the coherentist. But this view comes with problems. Namely, that it renounces the empiricist's insight which helps us ground empirical thought in objective, mind-independent, reality. How can we make sense of our beliefs being about the objective reality if our alleged avenue of contact with the empirical world (i.e. our perceptual experiences) cannot provide us with justifications for our judgements and beliefs about said world?[97]

This is the way the tension between these forms of empiricism and coherentism plays out in McDowell's picture. Moreover, he maintains that the only way out of the seesaw consists in challenging some of the elements on which this dialectical swing depends. For McDowell, this can be achieved while retaining the insights each view advances. On the one hand, McDowell wants to hold on to the empiricist claim that perceptual experience provides us with some constraint for empirical thought in the form of justificatory relations with beliefs and judgements. On the other hand, he holds on to the claim advanced by Davidson (which allegedly has Sellarsian and Kantian ancestry) that only elements which find themselves in the "space of reasons", i.e. elements with conceptual content, can stand in the relevant justificatory relations to thought. McDowell thinks that the reason why, within the dialectic, it seems as if we can only choose *one* of these insights is the assumption of a conception of perceptual experience in which conceptual capacities are not involved at all. A rejection of this assumption on which the dialectic described in the previous paragraph

[97] See McDowell (1996), especially the Introduction and Ch. 1 for a detailed characterisation of this dialectic.

depends on allows for the adoption of a view which, allegedly, has both the advantages of coherentism and empiricism with none of the problems. McDowell's own proposal, then, is to advance a conception of perceptual experience inspired by Kant, according to which conceptual capacities are (passively) actualized in experience. This view is designed to allow experiences to play the double role of belonging to the space of reasons while providing the relevant constraints which ground empirical thought in objective reality.

Now, it should be clear that McDowell's overall case for the view he endorses depends on rejection of the traditional alternatives within the dialectic, finding an insurmountable difficulty in each of them. Here, I want to focus on, and challenge, the way in which he rejects the empiricist side of the dialectic. I want to look more closely at McDowell's stated reasons for rejecting views which maintain *both* that perceptual experience can justify our empirical judgements, *and* that perceptual experience does not involve the (passive) actualization of the perceiver's conceptual capacities. These views are classified by McDowell as views which endorse the Myth of the Given. The Radical Anti-psychologist approach advanced here would be classified by him as falling within this class, for it insists that we can account for the epistemological significance of perception without endorsing the claim that conceptual capacities are actualized in it (Kalderon, 2011: 220). In the following I will look closely at three arguments which have been advanced by McDowell against views which endorse the Myth. The first of them rests on a general characterisation of the Myth – which McDowell thinks shows that endorsement of the Myth is incoherent. The other two arguments attempt to point out specific failings that views which endorse the Myth will necessarily exhibit.

i) McDowell's General Characterisation of the Myth

What does it meant to say that an epistemology of perception endorses the Myth of the Given? And why is endorsement of the Myth sufficient reason to reject an epistemological account of perception? These are not straightforward questions to answer. The very notion of the Myth of the Given – as well as the attack directed against views which endorse it – has its origin in Wilfrid Sellars' work on the epistemology of perception.[98] As it has been noted by

[98] Especially his "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" (1956).

interpreters, one of the main problems about this notion, and the consequent attack mounted on it, is that Sellars himself does not advance a positive general characterisation of the notion of Givenness.[99] McDowell (2008) does address this problem by characterising the notion of Givenness in general terms. He suggests that such a general characterisation makes it obvious that endorsement of the Myth is "incoherent" (2008: 256). It is not clear, however, that his general characterisations of the Myth are consistent with one another. For instance, after pointing out that we do not find a general characterisation of Givenness in Sellars, he advances the following suggestion:

> Givenness in the sense of the Myth would be an availability for cognition to subjects whose getting what is supposedly Given to them does not draw on capacities required for the sort of cognition in question (McDowell, 2008: 256).

According to this formulation, the Myth consists in the view that we have a capacity c_1 which makes some sort of knowledge k_1 available to us, where having knowledge of the sort k_1 requires the actualization of capacity c_2, *and* that successful exercises of c_1 – i.e. exercises which do make knowledge of the sort k_1 available to the subject – do not involve actualizations of c_2. Radical Anti-psychologism seems to endorse this form of the Myth. For they hold that perceptual experience (c_1) makes *reflexive* knowledge about the perceivable mind-independent world available to the subject (k_1). They also hold that having knowledge of that sort does require the actualization of conceptual capacities (c_2), but they deny that perceptual experiences involve the actualization of conceptual capacities. In other words, for the Radical Anti-psychologist having reflexive perceptual knowledge requires actualization of our conceptual capacities in judgement, but denies that these are exercised in perceptual experiences. However, it is not so clear that endorsing the Myth, as this characterisation has it, would be a deficiency of an epistemology of perception. After all, we have been articulating a Radical Anti-psychologist epistemology, a coherent account of the epistemological significance of perception, which does seem to embrace the Myth and is not straightforwardly false. We need a reason to think that endorsement of the Myth on this "weak characterisation" involves an unsurmountable flaw in an epistemology of perception. In the absence of a convincing reason to think that endorsing the Myth involves a

[99] See McDowell (2008) and Kalderon (2011).

fundamental mistake, the argument by McDowell against views which endorse the Myth is inconclusive. Let us call it the "weak characterisation" of the Myth.

This characterisation of the Myth does apply to Radical Anti-psychologism, but unfortunately does not seem to establish that endorsing the Myth would lead to incoherence. This task is taken up explicitly in the following passage (which immediately follows the one previously quoted) McDowell stresses the point that the general characterisation of the Myth does show itself to be obviously incoherent:

> If that is what Givenness would be, it is straightforward that it must be mythical. Having something Given to one would be being given something for knowledge without needing to have capacities that would be necessary for one to be able to know it. And that is incoherent (McDowell, ibid).

Now, it seems that McDowell takes this passage to be a mere elaboration of the previous one. But I want to argue that this characterisation of the Myth is not identical, nor is it equivalent, to the "weak characterisation" advanced before. More importantly, it seems the characterisation does not apply to the Radical Anti-psychologism espoused here. Before explaining why the two characterisations are not equivalent, let us explain what this new characterisation maintains. On this general characterisation of the Myth – let us call it the "strong characterisation" – the Myth indeed shows itself to be mythical. According to it, the Myth consists in thinking that we have a capacity c_1 which makes some sort of knowledge k_1 available to us, where having knowledge of the sort k_1 requires the actualization of capacity c_2, *but* where the subject lacks the capacity c_2 altogether. This is a straightforwardly incoherent idea. On this conception, a capacity *makes available* knowledge of one kind, while at the same time the subject lacks a capacity required for having that kind of knowledge. How, then, could this capacity make the relevant knowledge *available* to the subject, if the subject *cannot* have that knowledge? When applied to the perceptual case we would have the following picture: perception (c_1) makes reflexive knowledge (k_1) available to the perceiver, where possession of this type of knowledge requires possession of conceptual capacities (c_2). Yet according to the operative characterisation of the Myth this type of knowledge could be made available to the subject by perception even if the subject lacked conceptual capacities altogether – i.e. capacities required to have that very knowledge which is supposedly made available.

But I want to argue that the strong and weak characterisations of the Myth are not equivalent. On the strong characterisation, the subject lacks altogether the capacity c_2 required for having the knowledge supposedly made available by c_1. But the weak characterisation is consistent with the subject having the capacity c_2 – for the weak characterisation only requires that the capacity c_2 not be *actualized* in exercises of capacity c_1. No obvious incoherence arises for the weak characterisation, for on this conception of the Myth, the subject may possess the capacities required for having the relevant knowledge. Thus, McDowell's claim that the Myth shows itself to be mythical would only be correct of the strong characterisation. Moreover, there seems to be plenty of space for views which do not instantiate the strong characterisation, but merely the weak one. For instance, on the Radical Anti-psychologist position we have been sketching, perceptual knowers have the conceptual capacities which are required for making of judgements about the perceived mind-independent world. This view holds that these capacities are not actualized in perceptual experience. But clearly, this does not force the view to the claim that the subject must, therefore, lack conceptual capacities altogether. The version of Radical Anti-psychologism defended here is one in which perceptual experience makes knowledge available for subjects who possess the relevant conceptual capacities, which would avoid endorsement of the problematic, strong characterisation of the Myth. These views would be impervious to McDowell's criticism, for the charge of incoherence only would apply to them if they endorsed the strong characterisation of the Myth.

ii) Specific Problems with Endorsement of the Myth

But this is not the only argument advanced by McDowell against positions which endorse the Myth of the Given. Further arguments by McDowell attempt to locate fundamental mistakes in views which endorse the Myth and argue that their mistakes can be attributed to their acceptance of the Myth. These arguments move away from the general characterisation of the Myth and focus on finding specific alleged defects of views which endorse the Myth. On this understanding of the charges, even if the general notion of the Myth is not incoherent, endorsement of the Myth gives rise to unsurmountable problems for the views which endorse it. Some of the arguments from McDowell, then, attempt to find problems for views which endorse the Myth in its weak characterisation. Let us have a look at a couple of such

arguments. The first one rests on a conception of reasons which is directly at odds with the Radical Anti-psychologist position:

> The idea of the Given is the idea that the space of reasons, the space of justifications or warrants, extends more widely than the conceptual sphere. The extra extent of the space of reasons is supposed to allow it to incorporate non-conceptual impacts from outside the realm of thought. But we cannot really understand the relations in virtue of which a judgement is warranted except as relations within the space of concepts: relations such as implication or probabilification, which hold between potential exercises of conceptual capacities. The attempt to extend the scope of justificatory relations outside the conceptual sphere cannot do what it is supposed to do (McDowell, 1996: 7).

Here, McDowell is appealing to a particular way of understanding the notion of the "space of reasons" in order to exclude experiences as conceived by the "Given theorist" as genuinely belonging to said space. On McDowell's account, only elements that belong to the "space of reasons" can stand in *justificatory relations* with judgements, or beliefs. This much may be conceded by the defender of Radical Anti-psychologism (and perhaps other "Given theorists"). She will maintain that, nevertheless, elements which lack conceptual content (which do not belong to the "space of concepts"), elements such as concreta, *are also to be found* in the space of reasons. And, thus, concreta also stand in justificatory relations with judgements, or beliefs. Thus, the Radical Anti-psychologist position is one in which "the space of justifications or warrants, extends more widely than the conceptual sphere" (McDowell, ibid).

But here we might wonder what is the basis on which McDowell circumscribes the space of reasons to the conceptual sphere? What is the reason for denying that elements such as concreta truly belong to the space of reasons? A claim implicit in the passage above, but made explicit elsewhere, might help us give the beginning of an answer to these questions: "[e]mpirical justifications depend on rational relations, relations within the space of reasons" (McDowell, 1996: 6). In other words, the claim is that (a) in order for an element to stand in a *justificatory relation* to a judgement, then it has to stand in a *rational relation* to it - that is the kind of relation that *reasons* stand to judgements. This much could be conceded by the defender of Radical Anti-psychologism (and other Given theorists) and should be considered common ground between McDowell and his opponents. He then goes on to focus on some paradigmatic examples of rational relations that hold between elements of the conceptual

sphere, namely *implication* and *probabilification*. And then he seems to make the further claim that (b) only elements that stand in relations *similar enough* to those of implication and probabilification can stand in rational relations to judgements. The final step in the argument seems to be the claim that (c) given that elements not belonging to the conceptual sphere (for instance, concreta) do not stand in relations of implication or probabilification (nor in relations similar enough to those) with respect to judgements, then these elements cannot stand in rational relations to judgements.

As said before, it seems that claim (a) can easily be conceded by someone who endorses the Given, as long as they hold on to a conception in which perceptual knowledge rests on reasons as described in the previous chapter. Given our commitment here to an epistemology of reasons we will not challenge this aspect of McDowell's argument. Perhaps it is possible to mount a challenge to McDowell's reasoning by challenging claim (c). It could be argued, for example, that McDowell is wrong in claiming that elements outside the conceptual sphere cannot stand in relations similar enough to those of implication or probabilification with judgements. Here, the Given theorist could appeal to the way we ordinarily talk, for it seems that sometimes we make reference to concreta as a way of indicating that it is highly probable that something else is the case. For example, we might appeal to the rain as something that makes probable that the tennis match will be cancelled – "I think the match will be postponed, just look at the rain!". Nevertheless, I will not be following this path here. Instead I want to focus on a challenge to claim (b) from our reconstruction of McDowell's argument. Thus, I want to challenge the claim that only elements that stand in relations similar to those of implication or probabilification can stand in rational relations to judgements and, thus, provide justifications or warrants for those judgements.

Now, in the passage quoted, unfortunately, we do not get much of an argument from McDowell in favour of (b). All McDowell has to say here is that "we cannot really understand the relations in virtue of which a judgement is warranted except as relations within the space of concepts" (McDowell, ibid) and he moves on to mention the paradigmatic relations of implication and probabilification. We can concede that these relations are indeed paradigmatic instances of rational relations. But this should not be confused with a claim that any other instance of rational relation needs to be, thus, similar to the paradigmatic examples.

That guitars and violins are paradigmatic examples of musical instruments is no reason to think that any other musical instrument is going to be similar to these. We need a further reason to think that only elements in the conceptual sphere, or elements which stand in relations similar to the paradigms, can stand in rational relations.

A gap between "rational relation" and "conceptual relation" needs to be filled in the argument advanced by McDowell. One way of trying to get more from McDowell would be to inquire why the relations of implication and probabilification are rational relations. Why does the fact that a conceptual item stands in an implying relation with the proposition that *p* provides the subject with warrant for the thought that *p*? Why does the fact that a conceptual item stands in a probabilifying relation with the proposition that *q* provides the subject with warrant for the thought that *q*? How is that relevant for a subject who wishes to attain knowledge of the world? A natural response could bring into focus to the way in which the obtaining of those relations could be exploited by a subject who wishes to attain knowledge of the world. Indeed, a commonality of the relations of probabilification and implication is that the obtaining of elements which stand in those relations to specific propositions favour the *truth* of those very propositions. But if this feature, i.e. "favouring the *truth* of a thought", is the relevant feature which makes a relation a rational one, then there is no good reason to exclude from this class the relation of *truthmaking*. For if an element stands in a truthmaking relation with a thought, that is an excellent way of favouring the truth of the relevant thought. In other words, that this relation obtains is something that could be exploited by a subject who wishes to attain knowledge of the world. This line of reasoning presents us, then, with an alternative to McDowell's narrow understanding of rational relations. Once we establish that rational relations are such in virtue of exhibiting a connection to truth – a connection which can be exploited by rational beings looking to attain knowledge – we are left with no reason to exclude truthmaking from the class of rational relations. And, thus, we are left with no reason to exclude concreta from the space of reasons, for they too can stand in rational relations to thought, i.e. the truthmaking relation.

It is possible that the passage discussed is not intended by McDowell as a stand-alone argument against the Myth of the Given. The final phrase of the passage quoted – "the attempt to extend the scope of justificatory relations outside the conceptual sphere cannot do what it is supposed to do" – might be read as a clause to be expanded in the paragraph that follows.

In that paragraph, McDowell goes on to argue that embracing the Myth would leave us with a view in which perceptual experiences are incapable of providing justifications for our empirical judgements – for all experience can do, in views which endorse the Myth, is to give us exculpations for them. McDowell points, correctly in my opinion, that in elucidating perceptual knowledge we are after reasons which justify our perceptual judgements, not merely after excuses which can be given when we fail to attain knowledge. That views which endorse the Myth can provide us nothing but excuses, McDowell thinks, shows that such views are untenable. This is the second argument that we shall examine here. But before doing so I will say a few words about McDowell's way of thinking about the legitimacy of the use of empirical concepts in an empiricist framework.

Following Kant's characterisation, McDowell thinks of the faculty of understanding as fundamentally spontaneous or active, whereas sensibility is understood as fundamentally receptive or passive (Kant, 2007; McDowell, 2006:127-8). On this understanding, perception is passive because in experience we receive something which is there to experience independently of our experience of it.[100]

We explained before that McDowell endorses the traditional empiricist claim that input from experience is necessary if we are going to account appropriately for the objectivity of our empirical thought. On this view, thought's interaction with experience is required if we want to legitimize our use of empirical concepts as something other than "moves in a self-contained game" (McDowell, 1996: 5) – or, in Kantian jargon, as empty thoughts. The external constrain which is meant to keep within bounds the freedom of the understanding comes from the input provided by perceptual experience. Experience is meant to provide empirical thoughts with content, lending legitimacy to the application of concepts. Now, in order to provide the required constraint for thought, experience has to be able to stand in rational relations to thought. On McDowell's story this amounts to experience having to stand in conceptual relations to thought. This leads McDowell's to a conception in which experience involves the (passive) actualization of conceptual capacities. Here it is important to note that McDowell's insistence that conceptual capacities are *passively* exercised in experience follows from his commitment to the idea that sensitivity is a passive faculty. In

[100] See Kalderon (2017) for a recent suggestion for thinking that there is an active element to perceptual experience.

his view, it is fundamental that conceptual capacities are passively actualized in experience, for otherwise perceptual experiences could not provide the required constraint on the active exercise of conceptual capacities exhibited in thought: "In fact it is precisely because experience is passive, a case of receptivity in operation, that the conception of experience I am recommending can satisfy the craving for a limit to the freedom that underlies the Myth of the Given" (McDowell, 1996: 10).

This detour will allow us to understand better the second argument by McDowell against theories which endorse the Myth. For McDowell, there is something fundamentally wrong in the way in which the Given theorists implement the idea that experience puts an external constraint to the otherwise free exercise of conceptual capacities:

> What we wanted was a reassurance that when we use our concepts in judgement, our freedom—our spontaneity in the exercise of our understanding—is constrained from outside thought, and constrained in a way that we can appeal to in displaying the judgements as justified. But when we make out that the space of reasons is more extensive than the conceptual sphere, so that it can incorporate extra-conceptual impingements from the world, the result is a picture in which constraint from outside is exerted at the outer boundary of the expanded space of reasons, in what we are committed to depicting as a brute impact from the exterior […] What happens there is the result of an alien force, the causal impact of the world, operating outside the control of our spontaneity. But it is one thing to be exempt from blame, on the ground that the position we find ourselves in can be traced ultimately to brute force; it is quite another thing to have a justification. In effect, the idea of the Given offers exculpations where we wanted justifications (McDowell, 1996: 8).

This is a rich and difficult passage. Perhaps the fundamental claim can be summarized as follows: endorsement of the Myth of the Given cannot provide us with the right kind of constraint on empirical thought, for the sort of relation instantiated between experience (as conceived by the Given theorists) and thought falls short of providing justifications for judgements made on the basis of experience. Let us unpack this claim further. We find in the passage the claim that extending the space of reasons beyond the conceptual sphere (a move which is tantamount to endorsing the Myth of the Given) commits us to the idea that experience cannot be understood as nothing but a brute causal impact from the exterior. The suggestion is, then, that experiences can, at most, bring about judgements about the empirical world; a process of which we seemingly have no control, for it is beyond our spontaneity. On

such a view, we cannot be blamed for having the judgements about the world we end up having, for their formation is beyond our control. Nevertheless, not being liable for our empirical judgements is not the same than being justified in holding them – this much is common ground. But is the argument effective against theories which endorse the Myth?

Implicit in McDowell's reasoning is the claim that a judgement can be justified only insofar as the subject is somehow responsible for its formation – just as long its formation can be attributed to the subject. Moreover, we have the claim that being blameless for the formation of a judgements does not *suffice* for that judgement to be justified. Let us grant these plausible assumptions. But why think that views which endorse the Myth are committed to the thought that judgements are merely caused by experience, in such a way that this process and the formation of the resulting judgement are beyond our control? There is not much of an argument from McDowell here in favour of this claim. We could, nevertheless, articulate an argument if we read this paragraph as a continuation of the previous one.[101] In the passage quoted before, we found the idea that experience can stand in rational relations to judgements only if it can stand in relations similar enough to those of probabilification or implication with judgements. We can read the present paragraph as suggesting that the only relation that can be instantiated between experiences (when conceived as the Given theorist does) and judgements is that of causality. Further, the claim could be that causality is not similar enough to implication and probabilification, something that is made apparent by the fact that it gives rise to a process which is completely beyond our control. But if this is the correct way of reading this paragraph, then the reply provided above for the first argument can be deployed again in response to the present argument.

On a Radical Anti-psychologist view, the items we are aware of in experience stand in *truthmaking* relations to potential empirical judgements. The obtaining of such a relation can be exploited by a subject in her judgements, provided she has the relevant conceptual and recognitional capacities. This provides an alternative to McDowell's picture: the relation between experiences and judgements is more complex than that of mere causation. It is neither a relation of probabilification nor of implication. Crucially, on this view, the formation of judgements on the basis of experience is a process which is *not* beyond our

[101] See p. 161 above.

control. Experience does make certain aspects of the environment present to us, and it is true that we have no much control of this process – largely it is a passive occurrence. Although we might control whether or not we open our eyes, pay attention, and maintain our look towards the perceived environment, it is not up to us what is out there for us to see.[102] I will be arguing, that the recognition of those items as the items they are (when we are successful) and the endorsement of a perceptual judgement are *up to us* – they are things that we *do*. As a result, on the Radical Anti-psychologist picture, we are not merely blameless for the formation of perceptual judgements. Their formation is not a brute effect of the world's impingement in our sensibility – it is the result of the active exercise of our conceptual and recognitional capacities. McDowell's claim that endorsing the Myth can merely provide exculpations when we are looking for justification is simply not true of the Radical Anti-psychologist alternative.

iii) Recognition as an Activity, a Proposal

I would like to use these considerations as a springboard to develop further, from an Austinian perspective, the role that recognitional capacities might have in perceptual knowledge acquisition. In particular, I will present a tentative proposal on how to understand the agential control a subject might have in the process which leads to perceptual recognition, and in what sense the achievement of recognizing can be attributed to a subject. Although McDowell's position is not straightforwardly incompatible with the suggestion I will be advancing, his position is not very developed in this direction. If the position I advance turns ot to be perfectly consistent with McDowell's, then the proposal can also be read as a suggestion on how McDowell might develop this aspect of his position. Independently of what McDowell might say, I want to suggest that the proposal to be advanced here shows the potential that the Austinian epistemology defended here has in the contemporary philosophical landscape.

As we saw before, McDowell's commitment to a conception of experience in which conceptual capacities are drawn into operation in experience itself leads him to the idea that these capacities must be *passively* exercised in experience:

[102] See Kalderon (2017) for a discussion of the extent to which perception is also an active occurrence, despite the subject not being in control of what is out there to be perceived. See also Noë (2005).

> I said […] that when we enjoy experience conceptual capacities are drawn on *in* receptivity, not exercised *on* some supposedly prior deliverances of receptivity […] In experience one finds oneself saddled with content. One's conceptual capacities have already been brought into play, in the content's being available to one, *before one has any choice in the matter* (McDowell, 1996: 10, emphasis added).

On this view, when a rational subject has an experience, some conceptual capacities have already been passively exercised, without the subject's involvement. If it is not up to the subject which is the appropriate concept to actualize *in* a given experience, what then is the role of the subject in the acquisition of perceptual knowledge? On McDowell's view, this role seems to be rather diminished:

> Minimally, it must be possible to decide whether or not to judge that things are as one's experience represents them to be. How one's experience represents things to be is not under one's control, but it is up to one whether one accepts the appearance or rejects it (McDowell, 1996: 11).

In fairness to McDowell, he is cautious enough to preface this claim by pointing out that this is a *minimal* role that subjects could have in the formation of empirical judgements. This is consistent with the role of the subject being much more robust than it is depicted in this passage from McDowell. For instance, a suggestion made by McDowell is that it is part of the subject's responsibility to "reshape" our conceptual scheme in response to potential inconsistencies which might arise from unexpected experience (McDowell, 1996: 13). Consider a case in which something novel is presented in experience, say a type of bird we did not encounter before – something which cannot be adequately characterised by our conceptual scheme. In this situation it might be up to the subject to reshape her conceptual scheme to accommodate the novel reality – perhaps by introducing a new concept. In a similar fashion, previously acquired concepts might be found in need of revision on the light of new information. For instance, I might find that my concept of *coriander* turned out to be ineffective for it also applies to parsley. This type of case might involve updating a concept I previously had. There are many ways in which our conceptual scheme might be in continual need of updating, and in McDowell's view it is up to the subject to keep the scheme in good form to deal best with our environment.

But the proposal I want to advance here reflects on a different way in which the subject might affect the way conceptual capacities are exercised on experience. Here I want to look at the way in which the subject might be able to enhance the effectiveness of one's ability to successfully apply some of the concepts that she possesses. Consider the following familiar scenario. You are walking through the park when you see a familiar-looking woman sitting on a bench. Suppose you stop and look at her in an attempt to recognize her. Suppose that at first you mistakenly take the woman to be Maru, only to realize shortly thereafter that it cannot be Maru for you know that she is in Switzerland at the moment. Finally, after closer inspection, you come to the realization that it is not Maru, but her sister Sofía who looks a lot like her. Now, a natural way to describe this case would involve saying that, at first, *you made a mistake* in thinking it was Maru, but that then you *corrected* it by recognizing the woman as Sofía. I take it that this is a neutral description of the situation and, furthermore, that McDowell would have no problems in accommodating it within his view. McDowell can say that *you made a mistake* in endorsing the judgement that it was Maru, and that you *corrected* the mistake by rejecting that first mistaken judgement and by subsequently endorsing the judgement that it was Sofía. On this interpretation of the scenario advanced on behalf of McDowell the error incurred by the subject occurs at the level of the acceptance of a judgement which turns out to be incorrect. But it is not so straightforward that, on McDowell's position, the subject is to be held responsible for the unsuccessful exercise of her conceptual capacities in this scenario – for these are exercised passively on his view. In other words, for McDowell, the subject is not to be held responsible for the error that occurs when the incorrect concept is applied to our experience.

But one natural way of describing the situation would be to say that first *you misrecognized* the woman as Maru, but that then you corrected your mistake by *recognizing* her as Sofía. As McDowell's view stands he lacks the resources to take this description at face value, for the actualization of conceptual capacities in experience, in his view, are not under the control of the perceiver. But let us remember that McDowell's remark regarding the role of the subject in making perceptual judgements maintains that acceptance or rejection of a judgement is a "minimal" role the subject might have. Thus, perhaps the suggestions to be made in the following could supplement McDowell's position.

I want to suggest that the Radical Anti-psychologist position that I wish to defend here does have the elements to accommodate this description at face value. Here, the Austinian influence on my version of Radical Anti-psychologism has the opportunity to come to the foreground. In chapter 1, I advanced an interpretation of Austin's epistemology of perception in which being in a position to attain perceptual knowledge requires the active involvement of the perceiver (as well as being the subject of a successful perceptual experience). Throughout this thesis, I have suggested that among the capacities actively exercised in perceptual cases by the subject to put herself in said position we find recognitional capacities. I also pointed out that it is not straightforward in what sense the exercise of these capacities is an activity attributable to the subject. In the remainder of this chapter I will sketch a view on which recognition is conceived as an activity attributable to the subject. On the one hand, this suggestion will contribute to the development of the active element in our Austinian approach to perceptual knowledge – an element for which, unfortunately, there has not been space to explore in this thesis. On the other hand, this development will provide us with a ground for thinking that our Radical Anti-psychologism can contribute with original positions to the contemporary epistemological debate. For we can see this contribution as a way to accommodate some aspects of perceptual knowledge acquisition for which McDowell does not have a developed treatment – in particular, our position advances one way of explaining the phenomenon of recognizing as something done by the subject and failing to recognize as something for which the subject might be held responsible.

First, let us characterise our perceptual recognitional capacities as capacities to apply concepts to the different elements presented to us by perception in our environment. This characterisation of our recognitional capacities is such that all applications of concepts (successful and unsuccessful) are to be considered exercises of the capacity. On our view, then, capacities to recognize can be either successful or unsuccessful. Successful exercises of the capacity are constituted by correct applications of the concept. We are thinking of recognizing as an achievement in Zeno Vendler's sense of the term (1957). Compare this conception with Alan Millar's conception, in which the exercises of recognitional capacities are always successful. Millar conceives of cases in which we fail to perceptually recognize the items perceived as cases in which the capacity, contrary to appearances, was not exercised

(Millar 2008, 2011). Here I lack the space to develop a reason to favour our referred conception over Millar's. Note, nevertheless, that on the face of it, these conceptions would advance different explanations of the phenomenon of misrecognition or failing to recognize. On our conception misrecognition might include cases where subjects exercised their recognitional capacities in a defective manner, whereas for Millar they might be exhausted by cases where subjects failed to exercise those capacities.

Perhaps the main obstacle in the path of developing a view in which particular exercises of recognitional capacities are attributable to the subject has to do with the fact that, in most cases, we do not seem to be in control of the process of trying to achieve recognition. I suggest that there are two main sources of resistance as to why it might seem that in many cases achieving recognition is beyond our control. First, in many cases, the process of trying to achieve recognition occurs without our intending to recognize the items perceived by us – i.e. recognition can occur automatically. Secondly, in many cases, the process of trying to recognize occurs instantaneously, leaving us with no time to exercise active control over the process. Even so, is it possible to make sense of the idea that recognition is something attributable to the subject? In order to see how a positive answer is possible, let me first consider two different ways in which we might be thought to be actively involved in achieving perceptual recognition. First, we discuss the "ballistic approach" to mental activity advanced by Galen Strawson (2003). Then, we discuss Dorothea Debus suggestion of how we can shape our mental lives (2016). Reflection on the shortcomings of these positions will motivate the proposal of a third account, which, I argue, provides us with a more adequate understanding of the agent's role in perceptual recognition. Finally, I advance a conception on which our involvement in achieving recognition is linked to our history in training to recognize the relevant elements, in adequate environments.

On Galen Strawson's ballistic theory of mental actions, the agent features merely as the initiator of mental activity. On this view, the agent is incapable of controlling the development of the activity. For instance, a subject might initiate the process of deliberation of whether to go out for dinner tonight or stay home. But the development and subsequent result of such process, Strawson tells us, is beyond our active control (see Strawson, 2003: 228-229). On his position, the subject's involvement in mental activity is similar to her involvement in kicking a football, i.e. once the ball has been kicked there is nothing left for

the subject to do but wait and see what happens to the ball. *If* this was the model we applied to perceptual recognition, we would have that concept application would not be attributable to the agent. For the agent would only be involved in getting the process of achieving recognition started. What goes on afterwards would be, *ex hypothesi*, beyond the subject's control. At most, this model would give us reason to think that the subject can be involved in setting the process of achieving recognition in motion. On this view, the role of the subject in recognition would be limited in the following two ways. First, the success or failure of the capacity to recognize would not be attributable to the agent – for, on this position, the agent is responsible only for getting the process started, not for its evolution, nor for its result. Second, even if this minimal space is conferred to the agent (i.e. the possibility of setting the process in motion), it could be argued that in many cases recognition does not occur in this manner. Perhaps in most cases the process of recognition occurs unbidden – i.e. the process sets off without us setting it off. On this view, the role of the agent is too limited for recognition to be properly attributed to the subject for the given reasons. Can we make sense of a more robust involvement of the subject in perceptual recognition? [103]

Perhaps our role in recognition need not be limited to setting the process of achieving recognition in motion. Helen Stewart (2012) has highlighted the importance of being capable of exercising control over our actions – even though such capacity might not be exercised actively all the time. She is interested in exploring the way in which the control we can exercise over our actions constitutes an exercise of our freedom to act. We can attempt to use the notion of being in control of our actions to elucidate the way in which perceptual recognition is something we do. The general idea of being in control of our actions can be illustrated by appeal to a simple example. Walking is something we do, something that is attributable to us independently of the fact that sometimes we walk mindlessly. One suggestion as to why this action is attributable to me is because I can control my walk: I can control the speed of my walk, as well as the trajectory I follow; I can even bring it to a stop altogether. Nevertheless, *if* we tried to model the way in which recognition is something we actively do by appeal to this notion of being under control of our actions, we would face immediate worries. For instance, one problem with this account is that it is not so clear that we have such an intimate control of our perceptual recognitional capacities, as we do of our

[103] See Soteriou (2013), ch. 6 for a discussion of Strawson's ballistic approach.

walks. The process of recognition does not seem to be as malleable as our walks are. I submit that the process of recognition is not one which we can direct with precision. We can control our walk because, in general, we can control how fast and in what direction our legs move. There does not seem to be an equivalent for the process of recognition.[104]

In order to overcome this difficulty we could appeal to a suggestion advanced recently by Dorothea Debus, according to which we can shape some aspects of the course of our own mental lives by exercising "indirect" and "imprecise" control over these. For Debus the control we exercise over an aspect of our mental lives is "indirect" when we do not act upon the relevant aspect of our mental lives we wish to affect, but on a different aspect in the hope that this will affect the target aspect. Our control over an aspect of our mental lives is "imprecise" when we cannot predict, or control, the results or changes brought about by our activity. A paradigmatic example by Debus is our attempt to affect our mood by listening to a song in the hope that it will cheer us up. In this case, Debus suggests that our attempt to affect our mood is indirect – for we do not act upon our mood itself –, and imprecise – for we cannot predict whether listening to a song will succeed in cheering us up (see Debus, 2016: 350). It could be suggested that something similar goes on with respect to recognition, i.e. that the control we exercise over processes of recognition is indirect and imprecise. Consider a case in which a bird I can clearly see standing on a branch resists recognition. Instead of moving my gaze to a different aspect of the visual scene, I might maintain the perceptual contact with the bird and direct my attention to different parts of the animal in the hope that recognition will ensue. This type of control might be considered indirect and imprecise because it is not directed towards the process of achieving recognition itself and because the subject cannot predict or control its result. Although this approach provides us with a more robust understanding of the way in which recognition might be actively exercised by us, it is not clear that this type of control could be exercised in many cases. As we mentioned before, the process of achieving recognition sometimes (perhaps even in most cases) occur instantaneously, leaving no time for us to exercise any control over how it occurs. More importantly, it is not clear that the success or failure of our recognitional

[104] Although some interesting suggestions might be found in O'Shaughnessy (2008): 463, where he discusses the type of control we might exercise over breathing. Unfortunately, here I lack the space to explore these suggestions in any detail.

capacities could be attributed to the subject if she has merely imprecise and indirect control over recognition. On this approach, the subject would be responsible merely for the modification of the conditions under which our capacities of recognition operate. That is, at best, the role of the agent in this conception is that of enabling recognition to occur.

Is it possible to advance an account in which the role of the agent in perceptual recognition is more robust? In the course of discussing the accounts of our role in recognition inspired by Strawson and Debus we identified two major obstacles for developing such an account. First, the fact that sometimes (perhaps even most times) recognition occurs unbidden raised problems for Strawson's approach. Second, that sometimes (perhaps even most times) the process which leads to recognition occurs instantaneously, with no time for us to exercise any control over it, raised problems for Debus' approach. These considerations suggest that perhaps in most cases recognition occurs under circumstances which leave no space for active involvement of the subject – for when recognition occurs unbidden and instantaneously there would be no space left for the agent. But more worryingly, both accounts gave rise to limited accounts of the agential role in perceptual recognition in the following way. Even in cases where the process of recognition is set off by us and where the process of trying to achieve recognition does not occur automatically, the role of the agent would not suffice to attribute to the subject responsibility for the success or failure of the recognitional capacities.

Yet, I think there is space for a more robust conception of the way the agent is involved in perceptual recognition. In "Other Minds" (1946) Austin suggest that part of what explains why we can tell (i.e. know) that the bird before us is a bittern is that we have learned to tell bitterns by sight – perhaps because we had plenty of opportunity in our youth to learn to tell bitterns by sight. I want to elaborate on this suggestion and evaluate the advantages of a conception in which the main contribution made by agents to recognition has to do with the fact that they can shape their recognitional capacities through training. On this understanding, the fundamental role of the agent in perceptual recognition is *not* that of controlling particular exercises of the capacity, or setting the capacity in motion (although that might be done sometimes by us), but that of shaping the capacity itself through training. I submit that on this approach the success or failure of the capacity is attributable to the subject because she is the one who shaped the disposition. Perhaps drawing an analogy with some athletic

endeavours will allow us to explain our proposal better. Many of the bodily movements in sports such as tennis, basketball, or baseball occur automatically in the sense that the subject does not consciously sets them off in motion. Moreover, if not instantaneously, some of these occurrences happen fast enough that the subject cannot exercise control over her activity. But naturally we are happy to attribute to athletes the success of their actions. One explanation of why this is so appeals to the fact that the athletes themselves shaped their relevant athletic capacities through training. These athletes can be considered the agents in these cases because they have trained their dispositions to attain success at a far higher proportion, and in more difficult circumstances, than a normal person.

Many of a subject's athletic capacities might be exercised in an automatic fashion. Nevertheless, their being automatic does not mean that the subject is not responsible for their operation, nor that their success or failure are not attributable to the agent. For even though the subject might lack the opportunity to exercise control over a particular exercise of her capacities, the way her capacities operate in a given circumstance is attributable to the subject. For the way her capacities operate is a result of her training, thus shaping the relevant capacities. I suggest that something similar can be said about recognitional capacities. We can train our perceptual recognitional capacities in a variety of circumstances, thus shaping the way in which these capacities operate. We can train our capacity to tell American goldfinches from female scarlet tanagers by sight, or we can train our capacity to tell praying mantis against a background of green leaves by sight. I contend that the approach I advance here is in a better position to deal with the issues which the previous two proposals struggled with. The proposal I advance here can straightforwardly accommodate the facts that recognition sometimes occurs unbidden and in an automatic fashion. For the views inspired by Strawson and Debus about agential involvement in recognition would find applicability only when recognition is set in motion by the agent and when the opportunity to exercise control over the process of recognition arises. But these are no problems for the approach I advance here, for even if recognition occurs unbidden and in an automatic fashion, the way these capacities are exercised will be attributable to the agent as long as the capacity has been shaped by the agent.

On the previous two proposals it was difficult to sustain the idea that the success or failure of our recognitional capacities was attributable to the agent. On the account inspired

by Strawson, the agent was responsible merely for setting the process of trying to achieve recognition in motion, not for its success or failure. On the account inspired by Debus, the subject was responsible for the modification of the conditions under which recognitional capacities operate, a modification whose impact could not be precisely predicted, or controlled, by the agent. But on the proposal advanced here there is a very clear way in which success and failure of our recognitional capacities can be attributable to the agent. For on our conception the agent is responsible for the shape of her recognitional capacities. On this view, within the reasonable limits imposed by the opportunities afforded by one's surroundings, it is up to the agent to shape her recognitional capacities, such that she might be able to tell things by sight or by other sensory modalities. Just as in the case of athletic performances, different agents can shape their recognitional capacities to yield a higher proportion of successful exercises, and to achieve success under challenging conditions. By studying the shape and behaviour of American goldfinches I might become better at telling American goldfinches by sight. By attuning my capacity to tell American goldfinches to operate in conditions of poor light and in an environment where ringers (such as the female scarlet tanager) abound, I might extend the scope of my capacity to cover challenging conditions.

The proposal advanced here, I submit, provides us with a sketch of a plausible account of the role of the agent in perceptual recognition. On this account, the subject is responsible for the application of concepts to the elements presented in experience. Admittedly, the view, as it has been advanced, remains underdeveloped. Moreover, I do not claim to have advanced conclusive arguments for thinking that the proposal advocated here is correct. The strongest reason I have advanced in favour of this proposal is that it has the capacity to take at face value talk of subject's recognizing or failing to recognize things in her environment by means of perception. Admittedly, this is a modest case for our proposal. I want to conclude, nevertheless by sketching how a pattern of argument could be used to highlight the explanatory power of the type of position advanced here.

On our view, we are responsible for the application of a particular concept in a particular situation. And, thus, the failure or success of a particular exercise is attributable to us. Let use for contrasting a position in which the subject's role is limited to the acceptance or rejection of the conceptual application that arise from perception – call it the "alternative position". Although this possible position is inspired in some remarks by McDowell I should

make very clear that it is not McDowell's conception, for he defends a view in which the role of the subject extends beyond this minimal requirement. I merely use the alternative position to illustrate the explanatory potential of the view I am advocating here.

The suggestion I want to advance here is that this difference in how far the realm of responsibility extends (on each of the views considered here) might be exploited by a pattern of argument in view of lending support to the proposal advocated here. For it is possible to exploit this difference by constructing and reflecting on cases where a subject who fails to recognize an item by perception is to be held responsible for the resulting (false) judgement. Consider, for instance, the case of a professional chef who fails to tell the difference between parsley and coriander. What are we to say about a case like this where, moreover, the relevant judgement is perfectly consistent with the rest of the subject's beliefs? What is wrong with the subject making that judgements, apart from the fact that it is a false judgement? Is the chef who takes the coriander to be parsley making an innocent mistake? It could be suggested that a defender of the alternative position would have to answer in the positive the last question. For on that view, the subject makes her judgement blamelessly. On our position, nevertheless we have the tools to answer this question negatively, for the relevant judgement was brought about by the defective exercise of a capacity for which the subject is responsible. It is the chef's mistake to categorize wrongly parsley as coriander.

The particular argument sketched here might be found too defensive. But what I want to illustrate here is that there is a pattern of argument available – a pattern of argument which exploits the fact that in our proposal the realm of responsibility in perceptual knowledge extends beyond that in the alternative proposal. This difference might be exploited in a more developed argument in favour of the conception advanced here. In particular we have to study the type of situations in which the proposal advocated here holds an explanatory advantage over the alternative position, and other views similar to it.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we advanced a defence of the most distinctive claim of the Radical Anti-psychologist position, and developed as sketch of how the Austinian approach could be developed to yield an original account of the agent's involvement in recognition. In the first part of the chapter I made a case for thinking that concreta, the proposed perceivable reasons

in Radical Anti-psychologism, have normative force and can play a motivational role in the subject's cognitive life. In the second part, we defended the claim from several potential criticisms made on the basis that Radical Anti-psychologism falls prey to the Myth of the Given. We focused on versions of that argument advanced by McDowell and argued that his attacks leave impervious the type of position defended here. Finally, a consideration of the way conceptual capacities are exercised in experience on McDowell's position motivated an exploration of recognitional capacities in the Radical Anti-psychologist. In developing this proposal we drew inspiration from Austin's suggestions regarding recognition. We advanced a conception in which the agent's involvement in recognition can be found at the level of shaping the capacities to recognize through training. It was suggested that this proposal shows how the Austinian epistemology embraced in this thesis has the potential to produce original suggestions relevant to contemporary philosophical discussions. We had already seen that the Austinian approach has this potential when, in Chapter 2, we applied the position to a discussion regarding defeaters for perceptual warrant. The discussion in the latest section of this chapter goes further in exploring the potential of the Austinian position.

Chapter 7 - *Concreta* are truthmakers

The final claim of Radical Anti-psychologism we will be analysing in this thesis is the claim that concreta are truthmakers for many empirical propositions, in particular for an important class of propositions knowable via perception. The relevance of this metaphysical claim to the epistemology of perception advanced here lies in the fact that, on our version of Radical Anti-psychologism, concreta's role as reasons for judging is partially explained by their being truthmakers for the propositions judged. We made use of this claim in the previous chapter. There, we suggested that *one way* for an item to constitute a reason for judging is by the item's standing in an appropriate relation to propositions – a relation which is, at least in principle, exploitable by the judging subject. On Kalderon's version of Radical Anti-psychologism, the relation which is meant to play this role is the truthmaking relation. Moreover, this relation can be exploited by a subject who is perceptually aware of the relevant concretum – so long as the subject has the required recognitional capacities, and the circumstances are suitable for the reliable exercise of these.

Here, it is worth noting that endorsing the view that concreta are truthmakers for many of the propositions knowable via perception might be more committal than is strictly required from our Radical Anti-psychologistic position. It might suffice to maintain that necessarily, for many of the propositions knowable via perception, it is necessary that if a given concreta exists, then the proposition is true. It is an additional step (an additional commitment which might not be incurred on) to maintain, in addition, that these entities make the proposition true. Of course, on this position, one would need to provide an explanation of why this necessary connection holds. The explanation need not be given in terms of a truthmaker view where concreta are the relevant truthmakers. Yet, the truthmaker view provides us with *one* way of explaining this necessary connection. Unfortunately, here I lack the space to pursue this issue further. I merely want to point out that such a possibility might be open for a different version of Radical Anti-psychologism.

In this chapter, we will start by presenting the truthmaker view, i.e. the view that many empirical propositions are made true by virtue of the existence of an entity. We will explain that Radical Anti-psychologism needs to advance a version of this view, where the

relevant truthmaking entities are concrete, and explore some candidates in the literature. The bulk of the chapter, nevertheless, will be devoted to a defensive move on behalf of the general truthmaker view (i.e. the view that there are truthmaking entities, but not necessarily concreta). We will defend the position from the recent attacks advanced by Julian Dodd (1999, 2000, 2001, 2007). The upshot of the discussion will be quite modest in two respects. First, we develop a merely defensive line of reasoning on behalf of the truthmaker view in the face of Dodd's attacks. Second, we defend the general position that there are truthmaking entities – not the more specific position that there are concrete truthmaking entities. In fairness, Dodd's discussion of the truthmaker view engages mainly with the position that the truthmaking entities are states of affairs. But, as we will see, there are further questions regarding whether these are to be considered concrete entities.

There are two distinguishable, but complimentary, attacks from Dodd. According to the first, endorsement of the claim that there are entities which serve as truthmakers constitutes an unwarranted and unmotivated expansion of our ontology. In advancing this criticism Dodd has in mind truthmaker views which introduce states of affairs or tropes into our ontology – the existence of which, on Dodd's view, we are not ordinarily committed to. We will respond to this challenge by arguing that the introduction of states of affairs as truthmakers is warranted by independent reasons and that Dodd's arguments fail to undermine these reasons. According to the second attack by Dodd, there is an internal problem for views which advance states of affairs as the truthmakers for the relevant class of empirical propositions. For Dodd, states of affairs are surrounded by mystery, for it is not clear how they exhibit the required *unity* to distinguish them from the mereological sum of its elements. In advancing this criticism, Dodd is thinking of states of affairs as somehow built out of more basic elements. On that basis, he raises issues about the supposed modes of combination required on this picture (Dodd, 2009). Dodd's conclusion, a rejection of the truthmaker view, ties together these two criticisms in an appeal to ontological economy. On his view, we can account for the truth of empirical propositions without appealing to the existence of states of affairs or tropes. Given the problems he identifies with endorsing the existence of these entities, he suggests that theoretical economy advises against letting them into our ontology. In this chapter, we will only be able to challenge the first part of Dodd's attack. But first, let us explain how the truthmaker view is brought into the philosophical

scene in the first place. We will also explain what version of the view might be required given the theoretical commitments of Radical Anti-psychologism.

7.1 True Propositions and Truthmaking

The claim that concreta are truthmakers for certain empirical propositions is far from being uncontroversial. Yet, a fundamental principle, which finds more widespread support, implicit in this claim is that many empirical propositions are true only insofar as reality is the way it is described by those propositions. This principle is so basic it need not be rejected by some versions of the coherence theory of truth – a view which has been considered to analyse truth in such a way that the relation between truth and reality is not fundamental to an appropriate account of the notion (see Ayer, 1940: 84-93). Roughly, according to these theorists, a proposition is true in virtue of being the content of a belief that belongs to a coherent system of beliefs (Glanzberg, 2013: 1.2). Strictly speaking, a coherentist conception of truth leaves open the possibility of rejecting the claim that the way reality is determines the truth or falsity of propositions or beliefs. But nothing prevents the coherence view from maintaining that there is a strong connection (perhaps even a necessary link) between coherence and reality. For instance, it could be proposed that propositions are made true by coherence, but reality is constituted by coherence. On this view, saying that propositions are made true by coherence is extensionally equivalent to saying that they are made true by reality. If there is such a strong connection between coherence and the way reality is, then a coherence theorist need not reject the claim that some empirical propositions are true in virtue of the way reality is.

Given its widespread support, here we will be assuming that this principle, which links truth to the way the world is, is correct, and we will set aside views which might reject it. Julian Dodd considers this principle to be obviously correct and maintains that it should be common ground amongst most truth theorists (Dodd, 2001: 73-76). Following Wright, Dodd considers this principle to express a platitude concerning truth, and formulates it as follows:

> (CP) "P" is true if and only if things are as "P" says they are (Wright, 1992: 27).

Wright labels this principle the "correspondence platitude", as it gives expression to an insight which plays a central role in classical correspondence accounts of truth – the idea that a proposition is true insofar as it corresponds with a piece of mind-independent reality. Of course, this insight, although labelled by Wright as a correspondentist insight, might be widely accepted even by participants in the debate who would reject a correspondence theory of truth, including coherence theorists and deflationists (Dodd, 2001: 75).

One natural way of fleshing out the correspondence platitude is by postulating a truthmaker view, i.e. a view in which propositions are true because there are certain entities which make them true.[105] This type of truthmaker view has been endorsed recently by the likes of Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra and David Armstrong. This view can take several forms, but an essential idea of the view is the claim that a given class of propositions are made true by virtue of the existence of entities. Here, "by virtue" talk is construed as a form of necessitation. In other words, when we say that a proposition is made true by virtue of the existence of an entity we mean that the existence of the entity *necessitates* the truth of the relevant proposition (Armstrong, 2004: 5-6).[106] For truthmaker *maximalism*, the claim takes an entirely general form and holds that for *every* true proposition, there is at least one entity which necessitates its truth. Truthmaker optimalism holds a weaker version of the claim, which holds that there is at least one entity which necessitates the truth of all true propositions, *except* for universal and negative truths. Finally, truthmaker non-maximalism simply holds that *some* entities necessitate the truth of *some* propositions.[107] Given that the Radical Anti-psychologist claim is a limited thesis about *some* empirical truths (i.e. that some empirical truths have concreta as truthmakers), it only has to be consistent with non-maximalism.

Thus, given the epistemological interests of the Radical Anti-psychologistic position, we need not be committed to truthmaker maximalism – for all we need is that an important class of the propositions we know to be true via perception are made true by concrete entities,

[105] Below we will see how Dodd challenges the derivation from the correspondence platitude to a truthmaker view.
[106] See Bigelow (1988: 125-127), for a different characterisation of the relation between truthmakers and true propositions, according to which the relation is one of entailment. Armstrong (2004: 6) criticises this account on the basis that a relation of entailment only holds between propositions. See also Smith (1999) for the view that the necessitation construal has to be supplemented.
[107] Truthmaker optimalism is, then, merely a form of truthmaker non-maximalism. See MacBride (2013) and Rodriguez- Pereyra (2005) for a characterisation of these versions of truthmaker theories.

entities that we can perceive. It is important to note here, that the requirement that some truthmakers are perceivable entities comes from the Radical Anti-psychologism we are advocating here, not from the truthmaker view. Rodriguez-Pereyra advances a truthmaker principle in defending a version of non-maximalism (Rodriguez-Pereyra, 2005). Nevertheless, such a principle would be unnecessarily strong given our purposes. There, Rodríguez-Pereyra defends a truthmaker principle for an "important class*"* of empirical true propositions – a class which includes both essential and inessential predications. About this class of true propositions, Rodriguez-Pereyra's principle maintains the following:

> (TM) Necessarily, if <p> is true, then there is some *entity* in virtue of which it is true (Rodriguez-Pereyra, 2005: 18).[108]

But this formulation of the truthmaker principle holds that for every true proposition (in the relevant class) there is an entity in virtue of which the claim is true. On this principle, the existence of an entity is a necessary condition for the truth of a given proposition in the class. But all we need for present purposes is, rather, the claim that it is sufficient for the truth of *some* propositions (in particular, some propositions knowable via perception) that there is a concrete entity, whose existence necessitates its truth. Moreover, our Radical Anti-psychologism also requires that the relevant truthmakers are perceivable. The following principle might be more adequate given these theoretical commitments:

> (TM*) If a concrete entity, *e*, is a truthmaker for a proposition, <*p*>, then it is necessary that if *e* exists, then <*p*> is true.[109]

This is not to say, of course, that, for some other theoretical purposes we might require (TM). For instance, such a principle might figure in advancing an account of the truth of propositions which are made true by the absence of a truthmaker. (TM) would allow us to infer that a given proposition <p> is not true (and so, on further principles, false) in the absence of a truthmaker which renders it true, which, in turn might allow us to explain the truth of <¬p>. This move would be unavailable for someone who only endorses (TM*), for, in that case, the absence of a truthmaker would not entail the falsity of <p>.

[108] Here we will follow Rodriguez-Pereyra in using angle brackets to refer to propositions.
[109] Importantly, this is the principle endorsed by Kalderon in his defence of Radical Anti-psychologism, see his (2011): 226.

(TM*) does not say anything about the nature of the concrete entities which can play the truthmaking role for the relevant class of propositions. Different versions of the view will appeal to different entities to play the truthmaking role. For instance, two prominent ways of fleshing out (TM) are the following: (a) that the truthmaking entities are states of affairs, and (b) that the truthmaking entities are tropes (or moments).[110] On the latter view, tropes are understood as particularised properties, such as the blueberry's purpleness or Sofía's smile. One relevant feature of such entities is that they are spatio temporally located, and that they are, *prima facie*, the sort of thing which can be perceived. Mulligan *et al.* (1984) introduce in their characterisation of tropes the idea that they are "existentially dependent or non self-sufficient objects" (1984: 290), the idea being that their existence depends metaphysically on the existence of something else. For instance, the blueberry's purpleness depends for its existence on the blueberry's existence. It seems natural to construe these paradigmatic examples of tropes to be concrete entities. One of the main objections to a truthmaker view in which tropes are the truthmaking entities comes from the possibility that tropes are transferable (Dodd, 2000: 8). Consider the following scenario. The blueberry's purpleness is a trope – an entity the existence of which makes true the proposition that the blueberry is purple. But when the blueberry is pressed against a white canvass such that the colour is now also in the canvass, it would be natural to say that the blueberry's purpleness is now in the canvas.[111] Suppose further that the blueberry is destroyed shortly after it is pressed against the canvas. Arguably, we have now a case in which the relevant trope exists (in the canvas), yet the propositions for which the trope is meant to be a truthmaker seems to be false, for it is not the case that the blueberry is purple. On this reasoning, then, if tropes are transferable, then they cannot play the role of truthmakers, for their existence would not necessitate the truth of the relevant propositions.[112] The viability of a truthmaking view which appeals to tropes needs to be able to deal with the transferability worry.[113]

---

[110] The term "moments" comes from the influential paper by Mulligan, Simons, and Smith (1984) in which they postulate moments or tropes as the truthmakers for many empirical truths. The view that states of affairs are truthmakers is defended at length in Armstrong (1997).

[111] Extant cases which are discussed regarding the transferability of tropes tend to rest on the plausibility of examples where two numerically distinct but otherwise identical tropes swap places. See Ehring (2011: 78).

[112] Similar worries might arise for accounts of transubstantiation in which the qualities of the bread and wine continue to exist whilst not inhering on any substance. See Pasnau (2011: 185-190) for a discussion of transubstantiation in late medieval metaphysics.

[113] See Molnar (2003: 43-46) and Ehring (2011: 78-80) for a defence of the non-transferability of tropes.

The other prominent way of fleshing out (TM*) is by maintaining that the entities which make true the relevant class of propositions are states of affairs. These entities can be characterised generally as entities constituted by a particular and a property, where these are *unified*, not merely aggregated – this makes them different to mereological sums or sets.[114] The reason why we need unity is that the mereological sum of the blueberry and the property of being purple might exist but not necessitate the truth of <the blueberry is purple>. In endorsing this position, we have to bear in mind that our view is constrained by the claim that the truthmakers perception makes us aware of must be concreta. But on a standard account of states of affairs, due to Armstrong (1997), these are constituted by particulars, properties, and relations, where the latter two are understood as universals. Introduction of paradigmatically abstract entities as constituents of states of affairs makes it difficult to see how they could be considered straightforward concrete entities. Thus, if a defender of Radical Anti-psychologism is going to defended this version of the view, then she must be able to explain how states of affairs can be considered concrete. This position could advance an understanding of states of affairs as being constituted by particulars and property instances, where the property instances are straightforwardly concrete. Several questions arise for proponents of this possible view, such as what would be the difference between this version of states of affairs and a trope view? Can this position overcome the worries of transferability while maintaining that states of affairs are concrete entities? Unfortunately, here I lack the space to pursue this issue further.

There is a final worry which arises for the prospects of a defence of the truthmaker view from a Radical Anti-psychologist position. Apart from physical objects and property instances we included events in the list of paradigmatic perceivable concreta. An adequate defence of the truthmaker view from a Radical Anti-psychologistic perspective must make space for events in the truthmaking picture.[115] It must be noted that an exhaustive defence of the truthmaker view on behalf of the Radical Anti-psychologist position should be able to overcome the worries which have been presented in the few last paragraphs. Unfortunately,

[114] See Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002) for a conception of states of affairs where these are construed as classes of resemblance.
[115] See, for instance, Kriegel (2005) for the view that events are "dynamic tropes".

here I lack the space to pursue this issue further, for an appropriate treatment of these issues would require a work of a similar length to this one.

A final point of clarification before we embark on an evaluation of Dodd's arguments. We should note that this conception of the truthmaker view does not entail acceptance of a strong form of a classical correspondence approach in which each proposition is made true by at most one entity.[116] The truthmaker view advanced here is consistent with the idea that one single entity can act as the truthmaker for many propositions, as well as with the idea that a single proposition can have more than one truthmaker. This aspect of the view allows it to explain with not much trouble how propositions such as <the rose is red or the rose is yellow> are true without positing the existence of a distinctive (perhaps disjunctive) truthmaker. For just a single entity can act as a truthmaker for the propositions <the rose is red> and <the rose is red or the rose is yellow>, for instance the state of affairs of the rose's being red. Moreover, since the latter disjunctive proposition need not be made true by *a* disjunctive fact, we can allow that this proposition has more than one truthmaker – in particular, it can be made true by the rose's being red or by the rose's being yellow.

7.2 Dodd's Case against Truthmaking Entities

Dodd's case against truthmaker views depends on the observation that the truthmaker view is only one way of fleshing out the correspondence platitude. His attack targets the type of truthmaker view advanced by Rodriguez-Pereryra. Thus, Dodd has pointed out that the truthmaker principle expressed by (TM) is not equivalent, nor does it follow from, the correspondence platitude (CP) characterised by Wright – the claim, let us remember, that "P" is true if and only if things are as "P" says they are. For the truthmaker view brings with it the commitment that it is in virtue of the existence of some entities that certain propositions are true. Dodd thinks that this move tends to sanction the introduction of "extravagant" entities (such as states of affairs or tropes) into our ontology, over and above those for which we have good reason to think that exist (Dodd, 2001: 81). But, Dodd argues, we do not need to let these entities into our ontology if the task is to accommodate the correspondence

[116] See MacBride (2013) for a characterisation of such strong correspondence theory.

platitude. For this claim does not bring with it the commitment that *entities* have to play the role of truthmakers.

But I submit that it would be possible to challenge this very first step in Dodd's argument. Here, Dodd claims that an appeal to *entities* is absent in the correspondence platitude, and that such ontological commitment comes only with the advancement of (TM). He maintains that the correspondence platitude does not entail the commitment that the existence of entities is involved in explaining the truth of propositions. Nevertheless, this is not obviously so, for Wright's Correspondence Platitude does mention "things" in its formulation. One plausible way of interpreting that term would be to take it to refer to entities. On this interpretation of the platitude, then, we have that propositions are true in virtue of the entities there are in the world. Whether or not (CP) brings commitments to entities will depend on the adequate interpretation of "things". Dodd does not say anything against the plausible reading we have suggested here. But at least one possible responses is available to him. First, he could argue that the correspondence platitude needs to be reformulated without appealing to specific entities. This move might amount to question-begging in the current dialectical setting. Let us grant, nevertheless, for the sake of the argument, that Dodd has established that (CP) does not bring with it commitment to entities. Aside from this remark, I will now limit myself to a presentation of Dodd's case against the truthmaker view. A critical assessment of his argument will be undertaken after the exposition is over.

Dodd's argument for the idea that we do not need states of affairs to function as truthmakers starts by contrasting what could be said, from a truthmaker theorist point of view, about the truth of essential predications against what could be said about the truth of inessential predications. For instance, some opponents of states of affairs as truthmakers could concede that there is nothing wrong with advancing a truthmaker approach to account for the truth of essential predications, that is propositions which predicate something that the object essentially exhibits in virtue of being the object it is, such as <this ball exists>, <Bucephalus is a member of the species *Equus Ferus Caballus*>, and <Bucephalus is identical to Bucephalus>. The reasoning behind this concession is that the existence of the objects that these propositions are about *do necessitate* the truth of the propositions – that is, it would be impossible for the relevant objects to exist and the propositions to be false. For instance, it would be impossible for Bucephalus to exist and not be identical to itself. Dodd

would not see anything wrong with the idea that these entities exist, for he maintains that we seem to have independent reasons to include these kinds of object into our ontology.[117] But the case is very different when it comes to inessential predications such as <the ball is red> and <Bucephalus is buried in Pakistan>. To account for the truth of these propositions, the same strategy cannot be deployed, for clearly in these cases the existence of the relevant objects will not suffice for the truth of the corresponding propositions. The ball might exist and not be red, Bucephalus might have existed but not be buried in Pakistan. One way of responding to this problem posed by inessential predications would be to argue that there is indeed an entity, the existence of which, would necessitate the truth the relevant propositions. At this stage of the argument, a truthmaker theorist could appeal to states of affairs. Given that states of affairs are entities in which particulars and properties are unified, the existence of a state of affairs in which *e* is *F,* does necessitate the truth of <*e* is *F*>. And this is so even in cases where the property predicated of the particular is not essential to the particular. Following the examples presented above, in the former case, the relevant truthmaker would be the state of affairs of the ball's being red, in the latter it would be the state of affairs of Bucephalus' being buried in Pakistan. This strategy, the postulation of states of affairs, provides the truthmaker theorist with enough truthmakers to account for the truth of many inessential predications.

The way in which Dodd presents his case against the truthmaker view is by calling into question the reasons there are for thinking that states of affairs should be accepted into our ontology. David Armstrong appeals to the truthmaker principle to advance an argument in favour of the existence of states of affairs.[118] But in the current dialectical context this move is unwarranted. According to Dodd, if all the support for (TM) comes from the correspondence platitude, and all the support for states of affairs comes from (TM), then introduction of states of affairs into our ontology is bound to seem unjustified. As noted before, for Dodd, the correspondence platitude is not equivalent nor does it imply (TM). The latter brings with it substantial ontological commitments which need not be incurred by someone who accepts the platitude. For Dodd, the truthmaker view brings with it a substantial ontological commitment which requires independent justification (Dodd, 2001: 75-77). It is

[117] We will explore below what these reasons are.
[118] See Armstrong (1997: 113-119).

clear that endorsement of the correspondence platitude does not amount to an endorsement of (TM). Moreover, possibility of endorsing the platitude without postulating truthmaking entities is live. Dodd's own positive proposal consists precisely in the suggestion that in order to account for the truth of inessential predications we need not appeal to "ontological exotica" (Dodd, 2001: 81), such as states of affairs.[119] Dodd's proposal comes down to the claim that in order to account for truth along the platitude's lines, it is enough to appeal to the *way* things are. For instance, we can account for the truth of <the ball is red> by appeal to entities we already accept in our ontology, i.e. the ball and the way the ball is, namely red. It is *the way* some of these things are which accounts for the truth of inessential predications:[120]

> The truth of <the ball is red at *t*> is not, it seems, determined by the existence of some entity (*viz*. a state of affairs or trope); it would seem to be true because some entity (*viz*. the ball) has the property in question at *t* (Dodd, 2001:74).
>
> The items which we *are* undeniably committed to in our talk of objects instantiating properties are properties and their instances, *viz*. objects (Dodd , *ibid*. 78).

On Dodd's view, it is possible to explain truth along the platitude's lines by appeal to the entities we have already let in into our ontology (i.e. objects) which can instantiate properties. All we need to concede is that there are different *ways* in which these entities can be, for instance the ball can be red, but it can also be soft. Insofar as these ways of being are not reified into entities, there is a possible theory of truth which respects the correspondence platitude but does not let states of affairs into our ontology. This last step has been called into question by Rodriguez-Pereyra (2005); on his view the way the ball is can make true the relevant proposition only if we understand these ways of being as entities themselves, which would be tantamount to introducing tropes, or property instances, into our ontology. Let us set aside this worry for the moment. In summary, so far, Dodd's positive proposal purports to show not only that the step from the platitude to (TM*) is not compulsory, it also purports to presents a plausible alternative which does not make the ontological commitments incurred by the truthmaker view.

[119] The reason why he labels states of affairs "ontological exotica" has to do with the idea that states of affairs are mysterious entities. This idea will be further explored below.
[120] See Hornsby's (2005) for a defence of this view.

At this point of the dialectic, Dodd appeals to Ockham's razor and insist that his account of truth is superior to the truthmaker approach (Dodd 2007). Moreover, Dodd strengthens his case against states of affairs by arguing that their nature is "mysterious" – let us remember that he refers to them as "ontological exotica". We will have a closer look into this latter claim below. But, of course, Dodd's negative case would only hold if he was right in thinking that there are no independent reasons either to endorse (TM) or in favour of the truthmaker theorist's ontological commitments (for instance, in favour of thinking that there are states of affairs). In the following we shall call into question the tenability of Dodd's proposal. We will argue that he is mistaken in thinking that there are no independent motivations for introducing states of affairs into our ontology.

7.3 A Defensive Move

One way of rehabilitating the prospects of the truthmaker view in the face of Dodd's objections would be by arguing that the ontological commitments incurred by adoption of the truthmaker principle (TM) are not as controversial as Dodd alleges they are. Dodd's case rests on the idea that the introduction of states of affairs serves the theoretical purpose of accounting for truth within the lines established by the correspondence platitude. But he thinks that this theoretical need can be satisfied without recourse to states of affairs. This possibility, he thinks, removes what he takes to be the only motivation for thinking that there are such things as states of affairs. Besides, he seems to think that we are independently committed to the existence of certain things, and undeniably so, but that among them we do not find states of affairs: "The items which we *are* undeniably committed to in our talk of objects instantiating properties are properties and their instances, *viz*. objects" (Dodd, 2001: 78). It is worth wondering at this point which are Dodd's reasons for thinking that this is the case. He does not advance an argument for this claim, but he seems to be suggesting that these ontological commitments can be derived straightforwardly from the way we talk about these things. Thus, a suggestion which could be extracted from this passage might be that these ontological commitments can be read off from the way we talk about objects instantiating properties.

It is worth trying to unpack what might be involved in this quick line of reasoning. Why does Dodd think that our linguistic practice of talking about objects and their properties

shows that we have this ontological commitment? Is it merely because objects and properties are explicitly mentioned in our talk about objects instantiating properties – i.e. that we have singular terms for particular objects and properties? There are very simple reasons for thinking that, in general, the fact that we have in our linguistic repertoire singular terms for something is far from being a conclusive reason to establish that those things exist. After all, we have in our linguistic repertoire singular terms such as "witch" or "unicorn", but this does not show that such things exist. It could be argued that, in these cases, there are special reasons for not taking these singular terms to be genuinely referential. But in the absence of this kind of special reasons it could be argued that having singular terms, in our language is a *prima facie* reason to think their referents should be included in our ontology. Moreover, if we take ourselves to state truths by the use of those terms, unlike "witch", then this is additional prima facie reason in favour of them being genuinely referential. Given that we do not have reasons to think that we should treat all singular terms which refer to objects and properties in the same way we treat "witch" or "unicorn", we could grant that the centrality of the relevant terms in our language provides us with a good prima facie reason to think there are such things as objects and properties. Here, I am not interested in exploring the possibility of rejecting the idea that these things should be included in our ontology, nor in challenging the idea that the way we talk provides us with good reasons to think that they exist. Instead, I want to take a closer look at the limitations of our appeals to the way we talk to establish ontological claims. More particularly, I want to challenge the claim, implicit in Dodd's passage, that the way we talk about objects instantiating properties does not provide us with at least as good a reason to think that there are states of affairs.

Let us concede to Dodd the point that particulars and properties are the entities our ordinary talk undeniably commits us to. From this it does not follow that ordinary talk does not commit us to the existence of states of affairs. If the reason for thinking that there are particulars and properties is that we have singular terms which make reference to those, then there is no reason to think that a similar argument could not be mounted in favour of states of affairs. We do not only talk about, say, the blueberry and purpleness, we also talk about the blueberry's being purple or the fact that the blueberry is purple. As in "the blueberry's being purple (alternatively, the fact that the blueberry is purple) made him think that autumn had arrived too early this year". Why not take this constructions at face value and argue that

we are undeniably committed to states of affairs too? If we have a case grounded in ordinary talk for particulars and properties, then we also have a similar case for states of affairs. One alternative open for Dodd would be to find a reason for thinking that the singular terms he favours (i.e. those which make reference to particulars and properties) are genuinely referring and deny that those which we favour (i.e. those which make reference to states of affairs) also are. But on what basis could this be argued? One natural suggestion might draw from the reductionist tradition in philosophical analysis. According to this line of thought, if the meaning of all sentences which use singular terms which refer to states of affairs can be systematically reconstructed by substituting those terms with terms which make reference only to particulars and properties, then the former singular terms are not genuinely referring. Importantly, Dodd has done nothing to show that this systematic reconstruction can be achieved. But let us follow this possible argument further. This reconstruction, in turn, would lead to the thought that we do not need to introduce states of affairs into our ontology, for there is a reason to think that the use of singular terms for states of affairs are somehow spurious. But, as Crispin Wright (1983) has pointed out, this line of reasoning is flawed. For the reductionist line of reasoning depends on the equivalence of any sentence which uses terms for states of affairs (call these *S-terms*) to a sentence which uses only terms for particulars and properties (call these *P-terms*). In general,

$$F(s) \text{ iif } F(p)$$

But, as Wright points out, if the obtaining of such equivalence can be used by the reductionist to argue that *S-terms* are not genuinely referring, then nothing prevents us from arguing on the opposite direction. That is to say, we can exploit the equivalence to argue that *P-terms* are not genuinely referring. Something else has to be said if the reductionist line of reasoning is to be considered something other than an arbitrary way of discrediting *S-terms*.[121]

We have called into question the first step of Dodd's case against states of affairs as truthmaker entities, namely the claim that in ordinary talk we are merely committed to particulars and properties, but that states of affairs are entities alien to ordinary talk. The result achieved is quite modest. For we have merely argued that Dodd's case to think there are no positive reasons to posit states of affairs fails. All we have in the form of positive

[121] See Wright (1983: 25-36) for a version of this attack on the reductionist approach in the context of Frege's conception of number terms as genuinely referring. Wright credits Alston (1958) for first developing this line.

reasons for thinking that there are states of affairs are the prima facie reasons that come from our ordinary use of singular terms which seem to refer to them (and our taking to state truths by using those terms.) If we are to advance a positive case in favour of states of affairs then we need to identify positive reasons for including them in our ontology.

Conclusions

In the first part of the chapter we advanced an exposition of the truthmaking view and explored what versions of the view are especially attractive for a defender of Radical Anti-psychologism. Then, we focused on defending the view from one specific attack advanced by Julian Dodd. Here, our defensive stance has been limited to deal with one of the two criticisms advanced by Dodd. Thus, we achieved a very modest conclusion, i.e. that Dodd's attack against the truthmaker view, which is based on considerations about the ontological commitments that flow from ordinary talk, is inconclusive.

We should remember that the second criticism focused on the accusation that states of affairs are mysterious entities, and that it is not possible to advance an adequate account of the unity these entities must exhibit if they are to play the role of truthmakers. Unfortunately, here I lack the space to pursue this line of reasoning by Dodd further. Again, it must be noted that an exhaustive defence of a form of Radical Anti-psychologism which conceives of states of affairs as truthmakers should, at the very least, address these worries by Dodd.

Conclusions. What Has Been Achieved and Avenues for Future Research

In this thesis we have defended a particular account of the way in which perceptual experience figures in making perceivers knowledgeable of their environment. The particular view we defended here maintains that the concrete entities we are aware of in perceptual experience constitute conclusive reasons for making world-directed judgements. I have argued that, despite having received relatively little attention in recent discussions, this position is a live option and is worthy of serious consideration.

In so doing we have accomplished several things. First, we argued that it is possible to find an epistemology of perception in Austin's work – a position which was fleshed out by appealing to Kalderon's Radical Anti-psychologistic proposal (chapters 1 and 3). We also advanced arguments in favour of that view. For instance, we argued for the view that human reflexive perceptual knowledge is an epistemic standing which is based on reasons possessed by the subject (chapter 5). We also argued for the claim that concreta are reasons for judging. Two separate lines contributed to this defence. First, we defended the view that concreta have normative force and can play a motivational role in the subject's cognitive lives. Second, we argued that McDowell's attack against views which endorse the Myth of the Given fails to discredit the Radical Anti-psychologism defended here.

We also streamlined some of the concepts used by the position, such as the notion of concreta (chapter 4), and explored the types of commitments which might be required from the view in other areas of philosophical enquiry, such as commitments on truthmaker theory (chapter 7). In this last chapter we also highlighted that a more exhaustive defence of the truthmaker view should be developed on behalf of Radical Anti-psychologism – a task which we lacked the space to undertake here.

Finally, in several places of this work we found that the proposal advanced here yielded good results when applied to contemporary discussions, and showed potential for future development. In particular, the contribution of our Austinian picture to the debate on perceptual warrant defeaters (chapter 2) showed that the view has potential to be developed in that direction, for it advanced a suggestion which could help McDowell to deal with cases which are problematic for his position. In chapter 5 we found that Austin's appeal to

recognitional capacities in providing us with perceptual knowledge allowed us to advance an original explanation of a common claim made in some reason-based epistemologies. That is, the claim that a subject who is credited with reflexive knowledge should be able to articulate her warrant for that knowledge. An appeal to Austin allowed us to advance an original explanation of why the articulation requirements in cases of reflexive perceptual knowledge can be minimal. Finally, we should mention the sketch of an account of the way in which the agent is involved in perceptual recognition, advanced in the final part of chapter 6. An original account of the way the agent is involved in recognition could provide us with elements to extend the way in which subjects are thought to be responsible for their knowledge. All these are avenues for future research within the project that has been developed in the present work, and which will, hopefully, be carried out elsewhere in future work.

Bibliography

Alston, William P. 1958. "Ontological Commitment2," *Philosophical Studies* 9 (1-2):8-17.

-------.1980. "Level-Confusions in Epistemology", *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 5 (1):135-150.

-------. 1986. "Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology," *Philosophical Topics* 14 (1):179-221. Reprinted in William P. Alston, 1989, *Epistemic Justification: Essays in the theory of Knowledge*. Ithaca: New York.

-------. 1976. "Two Types of Foundationalism," *Journal of Philosophy* 73 (7):165-185. Reprinted in William P. Alston, 1989, *Epistemic Justification: Essays in the theory of Knowledge*. Ithaca: New York.

Alvarez, Maria. 2014. *Kinds of Reasons*. Oxford University Press.

Armstrong, David M. 1968. *A Materialist Theory of the Mind.* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

-------.1973. *Belief Truth and Knowledge.* London, Cambridge University Press.

-------. 1980. "Against Ostrich Nominalism: A Reply to Michael Devitt," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 61.

-------. 1989. *Universals: An Opinionated Introduction,* Westview Press.

-------. 1997. *A world of Sates of Affairs*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

-------. 2004. *Truth and Truthmakers.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Aristotle. 1998. *Metaphysics*, translated by Hugh Lawson-Tancred. Penguin Books.

Austin, J.L. 1946. "Other Minds," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,* Supplementary Volume XX. Reprinted in Austin 1979.

-------. 1950. "Truth," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,* Supplementary Volume XXIV:111-128. Reprinted in Austin 1979

-------. 1958. "Pretending," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,* Supplementary Volume XXXII:261-278. Reprinted in Austin 1979.

-------. 1957. "A Plea for Excuses," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,* 57:1-30. Reprinted in Austin 1979.

-------. 1962. *Sense and Sensibilia,* reconstructed from the manuscript notes by G.J. Warnock, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

-------. 1962b. *How to do Things with Words*, 2nd ed., M. Sbisà and J.O Urmson (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975.

-------. 1979. *Philosophical Papers*, 3rd edition, J.O. Urmson and G.J. Warnock (eds.), Oxford University Press.

-------. 1979b. "Unfair to Facts," in *Philosophical Papers*, 3rd edition, J.O. Urmson and G.J. Warnock (eds.), Oxford University Press.

Ayer, A. J. 1940. *The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge*. MacMillan.

-------. 1956. *The Problem of Knowledge*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

-------. 1967. "Has Austin Refuted the Sense-datum Theory?," *Synthese* 17:117-140.

Bennett, Jonathan. 1966. "Real," *Mind* 75(300):501-515.

Bigelow, John. 1988. *The Reality of Numbers: A Physicalist's Philosophy of Mathematics.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

BonJour, Laurence. 1980. "Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge," *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 5 (1):53-73.

-------. 1985. *The Structure of Empirical Knowledge*. Cambridge Mass.; London: Harvard University Press.

-------. 1999. "The Dialectic of Fundationalism and Coherentism," in *The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology*. John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.). Malden Massachusetts: Blackwell.

-------. 2009. *Epistemology: Classic Problems and Contemporary Responses*. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

BonJour, Laurence & Sosa, Ernest. 2003. *Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues*. Willey Blackwell.

Brandom, Robert B. 2000. *Articulating Reasons: an Introduction to Inferentialism*. Cambridge Mass.; London: Harvard University Press.

Brewer, Bill. 2015. "Exclusive Individuals," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* Supplementary Volume LXXXIX:125-142.

Burge, Tyler. 2003. "Perceptual Entitlement", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 67 (3):503-548.

-------. 2011. "Disjunctivism Again," *Philosophical Explorations* 14(1):43-80.

Carnap, Rudolf. 1932. Reprinted in 1987. "On Protocol Sentences," translated by Richard Creath and Richard Nollan, *Noûs* 21 (4):457-470.

Cavell, Stanley. 1965. "Austin at Criticism," *The Philosophical Review* 74 (2):204-219.

Conee, Earl & Feldman, Richard. 2001. "Internalism Defended," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 38 (1):1-18. Reprinted in Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, 2004, *Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology.* Oxford University Press.

Cornman, James W. 1975. *Perception, Common Sense, and Science*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Dancy, Jonathan. 1995. "Arguments from Illusion," *Philosophical Quarterly* 45 (181):421-438.

-------. 2000. *Practical Reality.* Oxford University Press.

Davidson, Donald. 1963. "Actions Reasons, and Causes," *The Journal of Philosophy* 60(23): 685-700.

-------. 1967. "Causal relations," *The Journal of Philosophy* 64(21):691-703.

Debus, Dorothea. 2016. "Shaping Our Mental Lives: On the Possibility of Mental Self-Regulation," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 116(3): 341–365.

Dodd, Julian. 1999. "Farewell to States of Affairs," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 77 (2):146-160.

-------. 2000. *An Identity Theory of Truth*. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press.

-------. 2001. "Is truth Supervenient on Being?," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 102 (1):69-85.

-------. 2007. "Negative Truths and Truthmaker Principles," *Synthese* 156 (2): 383-401.

-------. 2009. "Events, Facts and States of Affairs," in Robin Le Poidevin (ed.), *The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics*. Routledge.

Dretske, Fred. 1969. *Seeing and Knowing.* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

-------. 1971. "Conclusive Reasons," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 49 (1):1-22.

Ehring, Douglas. 2011. *Tropes: Properties, Objects, and Mental Causation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fish, William. 2010. *Philosophy of Perception: A contemporary Introduction*. Routledge.

Foster, John. 2000. *The Nature of Perception.* Oxford University Press.

Frege, Gottlob. 1956. "The Thought: A Logical Enquiry," translation by A. M. and Marcelle Quinton, *Mind* LXV (259):289-311.

Furmerton, Richard. 2000. "Classical Foundationalism," in Michael DePaul (ed.), *Resurrecting Old-Fashioned Foundationalism*. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

Ginet, Carl. 2013. "Infinitism is not the Solution to the Regress Problem," in *Contemporary Debates in Epistemology.* Matthias Steup, John Turr & Ernest Sosa (eds.). Wiley-Blackwell.

Glanzberg, Michael. 2013. "Truth", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/truth/>.

Glendinning, Simon. 2011. "Unmasking the Tradition," in *The Philosophy of J.L. Austin,* Martin Gustafsson & Richard Sørli (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Goldman, Alvin. 1976. "Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge," *Journal of Philosophhy* 73:771-791.

-------. 1979. "What is Justified Belief?" *Justification and Knowledge*. George Pappas (ed.). Boston, D Reidel.

-------. 1999. "Internalism Exposed," *Journal of Philosophy* 96 (6):271-293.

Graham, Daniel W. 2010. *The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy: The Compete Fragments and Selected Testimonies of the Major Presocraties Part I*. Translated and edited y Daniel W. Graham. Cambridge Cambridge University Press

Grice, H. Paul. 1975. "Logic and Conversation," in Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman (eds.), *The Logic of Grammar*. Encino: Dickenson. Reprinted in his *Studies in the Way of Words.* Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Gustafsson, Martin. 2011. "Introduction: Inheriting Austin," in *The Philosophy of J.L. Austin,* Martin Gustafsson & Richard Sørli (eds.). Oxford University Press.

Hale, Bob. 1987. *Abstract Objects*, Blackwell.

Hale, Susan C. 1988. "Spacetime and the Abstract/Concrete Distinction," *Philosophical Studies* 53 (1988):85-102.

Hofweber, Thomas & Velleman, J. David. 2011. "How to Endure," *Philosophical Quarterly* 61(242):37-57.

Hornsby, Jennifer. 2005. "Truthmaking without Truthmaking Entities," in *Truthmakers: the Contemporary Debate,* H. Beebee & J. Dodd (eds.), Oxford University Press.

-------. 2008. "A Disjunctive Conception of Acting for Reasons," in Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson (eds.), 2008, *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jackson, Frank. 1982. "Epiphenomenal Qualia", *The Philosophical Quarterly* 32(127):127-136.

Johnston, Mark. 2006. "Better than Mere Knowledge?" in Tamar Szabo Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds.), *Perceptual Experience*, Oxford University Press.

Kalderon, Mark Eli. 2011. "Before the Law", *Philosophical Issues*, 21 (1):219.244.

-------. 2017. "Trinitarian Perception," *Proceedings of the Aristotelain Society*, Supplementary Volume XCI:21-41

Kalderon, Mark Eli & Travis, Charles. 2013. "Oxford Realism," in Michael Beaney (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kaplan, Mark. 1985. "It's Not What You Know that Counts," *The Journal of Philosophy* 82 (7):350-363.

-------. 2000. "To what Must an Epistemology be True?," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 61(2):279-304.

Klein, Peter. 2000. "Why not Infinitism?" *Epistemology* 5:199-208.

-------. 2003. "When Infinite Regresses are not Vicious," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):718-729.

Kriegel, Uriah. 2005. "Tropes and Facts," *Metaphysica* 6 (2):83-90.

Lehrer, Keith. 1990. *Theory of Knowledge*. Boulder: Westview.

-------. 2005. "Coherence and the Truth Connection," *Erkenntnis* 63. 2005.

Lewis, David. 1976. "Survival and Identity," in Amelie Oksenber rorty (ed.), *The Identity of Persons,* University of California Press. Reprinted in his *Philosophical Papers*, vol. 1, Oxford University Press.

Logue, Heather. 2011. "The Skeptic and the Naïve Realist," *Philosophical Issues* 21:268-288.

Longworth, Guy. 2013. "John Langshaw Austin," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/austin-jl/>.

Lesher, J.H. 1999. "Early Interest in Knowledge" in A.A. Long (Ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy.* Cambridge University Press.

MacBride, Fraser. 1998. "Where are Particulars and Universals," *Dialectica* 52(3):203-227.

-------. 2013. "Truthmakers", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/truthmakers/>.

Marion, Mathieu. 2000. "Oxford Realism: Knowledge and Perception I," *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 8 (2):299-338.

-------. 2000b. "Oxford Realism: Knowledge and Perception II," *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 8 (3):485-519.

Martin, M. G. F. "Austin: *Sense & Sensibilia* Revisited," online manuscript.

-------. 2000. "Beyond Dispute: Sense-data, Intentionality, and the Mind-Body Problem," in Tim Crane % Sarah A. Patterson (eds.), *The History of the Mind-Body Problem.* Routledge.

McDowell, John. 1982. "Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge," *Proceedings of the British Academy* 68:455-479. Reprinted in John McDowell, 1998, *Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality*. Cambridge Mass.; London: Harvard University Press.

-------. 1986. "Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space," in Philip Pettit and John McDowell (eds.), *Subject, Thought, and Context*. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Reprinted in John McDowell, 1998, *Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality*. Cambridge Mass.; London: Harvard University Press.

-------. 1993. "Knowledge by Hearsay," in B. K. Matilal and A. Chakrabarti (eds.), *Knowledge from Words: Western and Indian Philosophical Analysis of Understanding and Testimony*. Dordreth: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Reprinted in John McDowell, 1998, *Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality*. Cambridge Mass.; London: Harvard University Press.

-------. 1995. "Knowledge and the Internal," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 55:877-893. Reprinted in John McDowell, 1998, *Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality*. Cambridge Mass.; London: Harvard University Press.

-------. 1996. *Mind and World*. Cambridge Mass.; London: Harvard University Press.

-------. 2006. "Conceptual Capacities in Perception," in Günter Abel (ed.), *Kreativität*. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag. Reprinted in John McDowell, 2009, *Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars*. Cambridge Mass.; London: Harvard University Press.

-------. 2006b. "The disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument," *Teorema* XXV (1):19-33. Reprinted in Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson (eds.), 2008, *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

-------.. 2008. "Avoiding the Myth of the Given," in Jakob Lindgaard (ed.), *John McDowell: Experience, Norm, and Nature*. Oxford: Blackwell. Reprinted in John McDowell, 2009, *Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars*. Cambridge Mass.; London: Harvard University Press.

-------. 2009. *Having The World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars*. Cambridge Mass.; London: Harvard University Press.

-------. 2010. "Tyler Burge on Disjunctivism," *Philosophical Explorations* 13 (3): 243-255.

-------. 2011. *Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge*. Marquette University Press.

-------. 2013. "Tyler Burge on Disjunctivism (II)," *Philosophical Explorations* 16 (3): 259-279.

-------. 2013b. "Acting in the Light of a Fact," in David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), *Thinking About Reasons: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Meinertsen, Bo. 2008. "A Relation as the Unifier of States of Affairs," *Dialectica* 62 (1): 1-19.

Millar, Alan. 2008. "Perceptual-recognitional Abilities and Perceptual Knowledge," in Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge.* Oxford University Press.

-------. 2011. "How Visual Perception Yields Reasons for Belief," *Philosophical Issues* 21 (1):332-351.

-------. 2014. "Reasons for Belief, Perception and Reflective Knowledge," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,* Supplementary Volume LXXXVIII(1):1-19.

Molnar, George. 2003. *Powers: A Study in Metaphysics*. Edited by Stephen Mumford. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Moore. G. E. 1903. "The Refutation of Idealism," *Mind* 12 (48): 433-453.

-------. 1913. "The Status of Sense-data," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,* 14: 355-406.

Moran, Richard. 2005. "Getting Told and Being Believed," *Philosophers' Imprint* 5(5):1-29.

Mourelatos, Alexander P.D. 1978. "Events, Processes, and States," *Linguistics and Philosophy* 2(1978):415-434.

Mulligan, Kevin; Simons, Peter; Smith, Barry. 1984. "Truthmakers," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 44, 3:287-321.

Neurtah, Otto. 1932. Reprinted in 1959. "Protocol Sentences," translated by Goerge Schick, in A. J. Ayer (ed.), *Logical Positivism*. Free Press.

Noë, Alva. 2005. *Action in Perception.* MIT Press.

O'Shaughnessy, Brian. 2008. *The Will: a Dual Aspect Theory*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Pappas, George S. and Swain Marshall (eds.). 1978. *Essays on Knowledge and Justification.* Cornell University Press.

Pasnau, Robert. 2011. *Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671,* Oxford University Press.

Pears, David. 1979. "A Comparison between Ayer's Views about the Privileges of Sense-Datum Statements and the Views of Russell and Austin," in G. F. Macdonald (ed.), *Perception and Identity. Essays Presented to A. J. Ayer with his Replies to them.* Macmillan Press.

Pitcher, George. 1971. *A Theory of Perception*. Princeton: Princeton Universtity Press.

Plantinga, Alvin. 1996. "Respondeo," in Jonathan Kvanvig (ed.), *Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge*. London: Rowman and Littlefield.

Price, H. H. 1932. *Perception*. London: Methuen. 2nd edition, 1950, London: Methuen.

Pryor, James. 2000. "The Skeptic and the Dogmatist," *Noûs* 34 (4)_517-549.

-------. 2001. "Highlights of Recent Epistemology," *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 52 (1):95-124.

-------. 2004. "What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?," *Philosophical Issues* 14 (1):349-378.

-------. 2013. "There is Immediate Justification," in *Contemporary Debates in Epistemology.* Matthias Steup, John Turr & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Wiley-Blackwell.

Putnam, Hilary. 1994. "Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses: An Inquiry into the Powers of the Human Mind," *The Journal of Philosophy,* Vol 91, No. 9: 445-517.

Rissler, James D. 2006. "Does Armstrong Need States of Affairs?," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 84 (2):193-209.

Roessler, Johannes. 2014. "Reason explanation and the Second-person perspective," *Philosophical Explorations* 17(3):346-357.

Robinson, Howard. 1994. *Perception.* Routledge.

Robinson, William S. 2006. "Knowing Epiphenomena," *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 13(1-2):85-100.

-------. William S. 2015. "Russelian Monism and Epiphenomenalism," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 98(1).

Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo. 2002. *Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals*. Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press.

-------. 2005. "Why Truthmakers" in H. Beebee & J. Dodd (eds.), *Truthmakers: the Contemporary Debate*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

-------. 2006. "Truthmakers," *Philosophy Compass* 1/2:186-200.

Rosen, Gideon. 2014. "Abstract Objects," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/abstract-objects/>.

Schellenberg, Susanna. 2011. "Perceptual Content Defended", *Noûs* (4):714-750.

Sellars, Wilfrid. 1963. "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," in his *Science, Perception and Reality*. Routledge & Kegan Paul. Reprinted from Herbert Feigl and Michael Scriben (eds.), *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume I: The Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalisis.* 1956. University of Minnesota Press.

Schlick, Moritz. 1934. Reprinted in 1959. "The Foundation of Knowledge," translated by Dabid Rynin, in A. J. Ayer (ed.), *Logical Positivism*. Free Press.

Shope, Robert K. 1983. *The Analysis of Knowing. A Decade of Research.* Princeton, Princeton University Press.

Siegel, Susanna. 2010. *The Contents of Visual Experience.* Oxford University Press.

Smith, Barry. 1999. "Truth-maker Realism," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 77:274-291.

Sosa, Ernest. 2007. *A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume I*. Oxford University Press.

-------. 2009. *Reflective Knowledge: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume II.* Oxford University Press.

-------. 2016. "Epistemic Competence and Judgment," in Miguel Ángel Fernández (ed.), *Performance Epistemology: Foundations and Applications*. Oxford University Press.

Soteriou, Matthew. 2013. *The Mind's Construction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

-------. 2016. *Disjunctivism.* London; New York: Routledge.

Snowdon, Paul F. 1992. "How to Interpret Direct Perception," in *The Contents of Experience: Essays on Perception*, Tim Crane (ed.), Cambridge University Press.

-------. 2014. "Austin on the Philosophy of Perception," in Brian Garvey (ed.), *J. L. Austin on Language*. Palgrave-Macmillan.

Steward, Helen. 2012. *A Metaphysics for Freedom.* Oxford University Press.

-------. 2015. "What is a Continuant?," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Volume LXXXIX:109-123.

Strawson, Galen. 2003. "Mental Ballistics or the Involuntariness of Spontaneity," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 103(3):227-257.

Stroud, Barry. 1984. *The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism,* Oxford University Press.

Travis, Charles. 2004. "The Silence of the Senses," *Mind* 113 (449):57-94. Reprinted in his *Perception. Essays after Frege,* 2013, Oxford University Press.

-------. 2005. "A Sense of Occasion," *Philosophical Quarterly* 55 (219):286-314.

-------. 2007. "Reason's Reach," *European Journal of Philosophy* 15(2):225-248. Reprinted in his *Perception. Essays after Frege,* 2013, Oxford University Press.

Urmson, J.O. 1965. "J. L. Austin," *The Journal of Philosophy* 62(19):499-508.

Vendler, Zeno. 1957. "Verbs and Times," *Philosophical Review* 66(2):143-160.

Vogel, Jonathan. 2000. "Reliabilism Leveled," *The Journal of Philosophy* 97 (11):603-623.

Wallace, R. Jay. 2006. *Normativity and the Will: Selected Papers on Mora Psychology and Practical Reason.* Oxford University Press.

-------. 2009. "The Publicity of Reasons," *Philosophical Perspectives* 23 (1):471-497.

Warnock, G. J. 1953. *Berkeley*. University of Notre Dame Press. Revised edition, 1969, Harmondsworth: Penguin.

-------. 1962. "Foreword," in J. L. Austin, *Sense and Sensibilia,* rconstructed from the manuscript notes by G. J. Warnock, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

-------. 1989. *J.L. Austin*, London: Routledge.

Williams, Bernard. 1978. *Descartes. The Project of Pure Enquiry*. Pelican Books. Reprinted by Penguin Books, 1990.

-------. 1981. "Internal and External Reasons," in *Moral Luck, Philosophical Papers 1973-1980*. Cambridge University Press.

Williamson, Timothy. 1996. "Cognitive Homelessness," *Journal of Philosophy* 93 (11):554-573.

-------. 2000. *Knowledge and its Limits*. Oxford University Press.

Wright, Crispin. 1983. *Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects*. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press.

-------. 1991. "Scepticism and Dreaming: Imploding the Demon," *Mind* 100 (1):87-116.

-------. 1992. *Truth and Objectivity.* Cambridge Mass.; London: Harvard University Press.

-------. 2004. "Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free?)," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* 78 (1):167-212.

-------. 2007. "The Perils of Dogmatism," in Susanna Nuccetelli and Gary Seay (eds.), *Themes from G.E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

-------. 2008. "Comment on John McDowell's 'The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument'," in Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson (eds.), 2008, *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

-------. 2014. "On Epistemic Entitlement (II): Welfare State Epistemology," in Elia Zardini and Dylan Dodd (eds.), *Scepticism and Perceptual Justification*. Oxford University Press.

Zalabardo, José L. 2006. "BonJour, Externalism, and the Regress Problem," *Synthese* 148 (1):135-169.

-------. 2012. "Wright on Moore," in Annalisa Coliva (ed.), *Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge: Themes From the Philosophy of Crispin Wright*. Oxford University Press.